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The impact of new technologies within and across industries is only felt through
their widespread diffusion, yet studies of technology diffusion are scarce compared
to other aspects of the innovation process. The electric power industry is one industry
that is currently undergoing substantial change as a result of both technological and
institutional innovations. In this dissertation I examine the economic rationale for the
adoption of smart meters by electric power utilities and the relationship between smart
meters and the evolving electric power industry. I contribute to empirical research on
technology diffusion by studying the early diffusion of smart meters in the US electric
power industry.
Using a panel dataset and econometric models, I analyze the determinants of
both the interfirm and intrafirm diffusion of smart meters in the United States. The
empirical findings suggest multiple drivers of smart meter diffusion. Policy and regu-
latory support have had a significant, positive impact on adoption but have not been
the only relevant determinants. The findings also suggest that utility characteristics and
some combination of learning, cost reductions, and technology standards have been im-
portant determinants affecting smart meter diffusion. I also explore the policy implica-
tions resulting from this analysis for enhancing the diffusion of smart meters. The costs
and benefits of adopting smart meters have been more uncertain than initially thought,
suggesting that some policy support for adoption was premature. The coordination of
policies is also necessary to achieve the full benefits of using smart meters.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
This dissertation is an empirical study of the diffusion of a process innovation.
Specifically, it studies the diffusion of smart electricity meters in the electric power in-
dustry of the United States. Smart meters refer to advanced electricity meters based on
digital technology that are capable of recording electricity consumption data in hourly
intervals or less and are also capable of two-way communication between the electric
power utility and the consumer. Smart meters are considered a key technology for build-
ing smart electric power grids that use information and communication technology to
efficiently and reliably match supply and demand in electricity markets. Smart meters
enable time-varying pricing of electricity in retail markets and a more flexible demand
side than has been the case historically. They also provide a basis for further innovation
related to consumer engagement about electricity use.
The research herein adds to the body of knowledge on the diffusion of new tech-
nologies and has important public policy implications for innovation in the electric
power industry. Furthermore, this research examines the adoption of technology in a
heavily regulated industry, and therefore regulation plays a more important role here
than in most diffusion studies. In this chapter I provide definitions and conceptual de-
pictions of innovation and diffusion processes, basic information on smart metering
technology, and specific research questions, all of which will aid in understanding the
research as a whole.
1
1.1 The Innovation Process
Innovation can be defined generally as the implementation of a new idea. A new
idea can take the form of a technology or institution, for example. The economics of
innovation evolved from the economic study of science and technology. Science can
be defined as the search for knowledge and technology can be defined as the applica-
tion of scientific knowledge toward certain practical ends, typically in the form of tools
(Audretsch et al. 2002, 156).
Technology also has both hardware and software dimensions. The hardware
dimension refers to an artifact itself, or the physical aspects of a tool. The software di-
mension refers to an artifact’s information base, or the ability to use a tool. Additionally,
the knowledge embedded in technology has both a codified and tacit dimension. The
context within which technology is developed and used, such as the organizational
structure within firms, is another important dimension. These multiple characteristics
of a technology affect the nature of its diffusion, making it less than straightforward
(Rogers 2003, 12-14; Dosi and Nelson 2010, 91–93).
There are arguably three main stages in the process of technological change: in-
vention, innovation, and diffusion. This trilogy, often attributed to Schumpeter (1939),
highlights the difference between invention and innovation. Invention refers to the
generation of new technology whereas innovation refers to the practical use of new
technology. The mere creation of a new technology does not imply that it will be used.
Entrepreneurship, then, plays a crucial role in bridging the invention and innovation
stages. Diffusion refers to the spread of a new technology through an economy. Simi-
larly, technology, if used, does not necessarily diffuse widely (Audretsch et al. 2002; Dosi
and Nelson 2010, 91–93).
Conceptual models of the innovation process provide a useful means for sum-
marizing the stages of the process and their interrelatedness. The early linear model of
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innovation, often attributed to Bush ([1945] 1960), proposed that basic scientific knowl-
edge led to applied scientific knowledge in the form of technology that then led to the
commercialization and diffusion of that technology, captured in the Schumpeterian tril-
ogy. Although the linear model helps frame discussion of the innovation process by
identifying basic stages, it has been critiqued for having little empirical support for its
sequential nature. Practical demands for or actual use of technology, for example, may
necessitate or influence basic scientific research, and innovation may continue over time
as a technology is improved during its diffusion. Nonlinear models of innovation mod-
ify the linear model by, for instance, adding feedback loops among the stages, indicating
the systemic and interactive nature of the innovation process (Kline and Rosenberg 1986;
Rogers 2003, 138; Godin 2006; Balconi, Brusoni, and Orsenigo 2010). Grupp (1998, 19)
provides one such model where innovation does not necessarily proceed sequentially in
time from basic research to technology development to diffusion and where these may
occur in parallel, as depicted in Figure 1. This model highlights the interdependency
and ambiguity of relationships of the stylized stages of the innovation process often
found in the real world. The linear model persists in some form, however, because it of-
fers a simple and useful heuristic for initially thinking about innovation and identifying
key elements of the process (Balconi, Brusoni, and Orsenigo 2010).
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Figure 1. A Nonlinear Model of Innovation. Adapted from Grupp (1998, 19).
The diffusion stage of the innovation process is the focus of this dissertation but
its study should not neglect the interactions that link it to the other stages. Decisions
made early in an R&D process can impact the future path of diffusion (Grupp 1998,
20–21; Rogers 2003, 136–137; Ortt 2010). Diffusion may also be linked to R&D through
supply-demand interactions (Stoneman 1987b, 80–97), and technologies may change and
essentially be invented during their diffusion process (Bijker 1992). Such interactions
may be termed “innofusion” and also highlight the potential importance of user innova-
tion (Fleck 1988; Hippel 2010). The diffusion of technologies may also require R&D on
the part of adopting firms in order for them to adapt technology to their needs, which
can be termed “re-invention” (Rogers 2003, 180–188) or “creative adoption” (Antonelli
2006).
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1.2 The Diffusion Process
Technological diffusion has several characteristics and is itself a process. Diffu-
sion can be defined as the process by which an innovation is communicated through cer-
tain channels over time among the members of a social system (Rogers 2003, 5) or as the
process by which an innovation spreads through an economy over time (Stoneman 2002,
3). Research on diffusion is multidisciplinary, including the fields of economics, mar-
keting, management, sociology, anthropology, communication, and geography (Rogers
2003, 44–45). Each field may focus on different aspects of the diffusion process and use
different methods of analysis, but they all study the same phenomenon and their re-
spective research is relevant to other fields. Crossdisciplinary awareness has grown over
time, but work remains to be done in advancing truly interdisciplinary research (Katz,
Levin, and Hamilton 1963; Warner 1974; Ruttan 1996; Rogers 2003, 40). Although tech-
nological diffusion was well-studied during the early years of the economic study of
innovation, research in this area has waned over time and focus has shifted to topics
such as R&D and technology transfer from universities to industry. Many questions and
avenues of research remain open, and the importance of technological diffusion for ad-
vancing productivity and economic growth and development suggest that it should be
studied more than it currently is (Stoneman 2002, 303–306).
The multidisciplinary research on the diffusion of innovations has identified
four fundamental elements of the diffusion process: the innovation, communication
channels, time (and space), and the social system (Rogers 2003, 11). An innovation can
be characterized by five attributes: relative advantage, compatibility, complexity, trial-
ability, and observability (Rogers 2003, 15–16). There are also three types of adoption
decisions: optional, collective, and authority (Rogers 2003, 28–30). The decision-making
process of adopting an innovation has five sequential stages: knowledge, persuasion,
decision, implementation, and confirmation (Rogers 2003, 169–170). All of these factors,
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in addition to the promotional efforts of change agents, affect the rate of diffusion of an
innovation (Rogers 2003, 221–223). The adoption of innovations can also be discontin-
ued, either from failure to realize benefits or the adoption of superior innovations. For
organizations like firms the decision-making process may be more complex (Gold 1980,
1981), involving agenda setting, matching, redefining and restructuring, clarifying, and
routinizing (Rogers 2003, 421).
New technologies manifest themselves as product innovations or process innova-
tions. The development and marketing of a new technology by a firm, for example, is a
product innovation from that firm’s perspective. If the new technology is a capital good,
then from the perspective of a user firm this technology is a process innovation because
it alters the production process of that firm. The diffusion of process technologies can be
studied at different levels, including international, intranational, interindustry, intrain-
dustry, interfirm, and intrafirm levels. Interindustry diffusion refers to the economy-
wide spread of a technology whereas intraindustry diffusion refers to the spread within
a specific industry. Interfirm diffusion refers to the adoption of technology across firms,
or the extensive margin of use, whereas intrafirm diffusion refers to the intensity of use
of technology within firms, or the intensive margin of use (Stoneman and Battisti 2010).
Important stylized facts about the diffusion of technology are that diffusion
takes time and that rates of diffusion vary across technologies, industries, and countries
(Stoneman 2002, 12–26). It is also the case that many technologies never diffuse. There
are numerous other stylized facts as well (Kemp and Volpi 2008):
(1) Firms can adopt different technologies and the diffusion of one technology influ-
ences the diffusion of another, making diffusion difficult to predict.
(2) Diffusion involves the transfer of information.
(3) Diffusion is more than simply the transfer of information.
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(4) Technologies that are economically attractive will have a faster rate of diffusion
and a higher level of diffusion.
(5) Technologies that are economically attractive do not diffuse instantaneously.
(6) Technologies steadily improve during their diffusion.
(7) Expensive and complex technologies typically diffuse more slowly.
(8) The population of potential adopters changes over time.
(9) Diffusion typically follows an S-shaped curve.
This last fact refers to the measurement of a diffusion process at a macro level that often
results in an S-shaped pattern of growth over time.
Diffusion metrics can be aggregated at the industry or national level or disag-
gregated at the firm level. In the interfirm case diffusion is often measured using the
cumulative number of adopters, as depicted in Figure 2a. Mathematically this interfirm
diffusion metric is given by
mt = ∑ at
where mt denotes the cumulative number of adopters at at time t. An alternative diffu-
sion metric for the interfirm case is given by
Mt =
mt
nt
where Mt denotes the proportion of adopters at time t determined by the number of
current adopters mt and total number of potential adopters nt at time t (Karshenas and
Stoneman 1995, 266).
The S-curve depicts four stages in a successful diffusion process or technological
lifecycle: the introduction of an innovation, early growth in adoption, maturation and
take-off, and saturation. An additional stage, not shown, can occur when a technology
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becomes obsolete or is superseded by a new, superior innovation and subsequently de-
clines. Viewing diffusion as a multistage process implies that the adoption environment
and the determinants of diffusion can change over time such that diffusion must be
analyzed in the appropriate context and with respect to other diffusion processes. Diffu-
sion emerges at the macro level from the diversity and interaction of adoption decisions
of individual firms at the micro level in a continually changing adoption environment
(Grübler 1991).
Number
of
users
time
N
0
a. Stylized S-curve for Interfirm Diffusion.
Proportion
of
capital
stock
time
1
0
b. Stylized S-curve for Intrafirm Diffusion.
Figure 2. Stylized Diffusion Patterns.
Intrafirm diffusion also typically follows an S-shaped pattern of growth as de-
picted in Figure 2b. Intrafirm diffusion is often measured by the proportion of the cap-
ital stock embodied in a new technology for a particular firm. Mathematically this in-
trafirm diffusion metric is given by
Lit =
Jit
Kit
where Lit denotes the proportion of the capital stock embodied by a new technology for
firm i at time t determined by the amount of new technology capital stock Jit and the
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total capital stock Kit for firm i at time t. An alternative diffusion metric for the in-
trafirm case is given by
Zit =
Xit
Yit
where Zit denotes the proportion of output produced by a new technology for firm i
at time t determined by the output produced by the new technology Xit and the total
output produced Yit for firm i at time t (Karshenas and Stoneman 1995, 266).
Furthermore, adopters may have different characteristics that place them in dis-
tinct adopter categories based on when they adopt, as depicted in Figure 3. Innovators,
for example, may be more tolerant of uncertainty or possess a greater degree of innova-
tiveness than other potential adopters and subsequently adopt earlier. The heterogeneity
of adopter characteristics plays an important role in theories of technological diffusion.
Innovators
Early 
Adopters
13.5%
Early 
Majority
34%
Late 
Majority
34%
Laggards
16%2.5%
x x+sx−sx−2 s
Figure 3. Stylized Categories of Adopters by Innovativeness. Adapted from Rogers (2003,
281), where x denotes mean adoption time and s denotes one standard deviation.
Existing research has highlighted a number of influential determinants in diffu-
sion processes (Stoneman 2002, 52):
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(1) Learning and the spread of information
(2) The cost of adopting new technology
(3) The performance of new technology
(4) Price expectations
(5) Technology expectations
(6) Firm characteristics and their distributions
(7) Discount factors and attitudes toward risk
(8) The extent of product differentiation
(9) The extent of first mover advantages
(10) The impact of other firms’ adoption decisions
(11) The extent to which realized profits generate new investment
Diffusion theory attempts to explain why technological diffusion is not instantaneous.
1.3 Theoretical Perspectives on Technology Diffusion
Although this dissertation is primarily empirical, different theoretical perspec-
tives may influence the interpretation of empirical data and the choice of empirical
methods (Sarkar 1998, 155–158). At the same time, it is possible to use a general em-
pirical model to assess the various theoretical factors in the adoption of technology
(Karshenas and Stoneman 1993). The study of technology diffusion, like the study of
innovation or the economy more broadly, can be approached from two distinct theoret-
ical perspectives: neoclassical or evolutionary economics. Both schools of thought have
developed within the economics of innovation over time as theoretical and empirical
work has progressed. In particular, evolutionary thinking in innovation studies devel-
oped from the empirically observed importance of heterogeneity, bounded rationality,
interaction, learning, and path dependency in innovation processes, aspects which are
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usually not emphasized or easily accounted for in neoclassical thinking (Verspagen and
Werker 2003; Antonelli 2009).
In general, neoclassical and evolutionary perspectives on the nature of economic
reality are significantly different. These different viewpoints are essentially ontologi-
cal, with the neoclassical approach presupposing a closed, mechanistic system and the
evolutionary approach presupposing an open, processual system (Dopfer and Potts
2008, 1–14). The neoclassical perspective typically views the economy in static terms
and emphasizes equilibrium states and exogenous change, using static tools to analyze
the economy. Neoclassical modeling involves assumptions of unbounded rationality
for economic agents where any uncertainity is reduced to risk. These models assume
maximizing behavior where agents find optimal solutions. In contrast, the evolutionary
perspective views the economy in dynamic and evolutionary terms and emphasizes the
disequilibrium and endogenous nature of change and growth, using dynamic tools to
analyze the economy. Evolutionary modeling involves assumptions of bounded rational-
ity for economic agents in truly uncertain environments where the concepts of variety
and selection play an important role. These models assume satisficing behavior where
agents find adequate solutions (Nelson 1995; Grupp 1998, 51–52; Sarkar 1998; Nelson
and Winter 2002; Dosi and Nelson 2010).
For the study of technology diffusion specifically, the neoclassical perspective
views diffusion as a sequence of changing equilibrium states whereby one equilibrium
level of technology adoption transitions to another equilibrium based on exogenous
changes over time affecting the profitability considerations of firms. The evolutionary
perspective views diffusion as a disequilibrium process whereby the technology, firms,
and the adoption environment change continuously and endogenously over time lead-
ing to a self-propagating process through learning and selection pressures. Despite
these differences, both approaches share in common an emphasis on the heterogene-
ity of firms with respect to their needs, capabilities, and other characteristics like size.
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Additionally, the neoclassical approach may be more adequate in certain contexts, such
as relatively certain adoption environments, and the evolutionary approach may be
more appropriate in other contexts, such as relatively uncertain adoption environments
(Sarkar 1998; Nelson, Peterhansl, and Sampat 2004; Dosi and Nelson 2010, 91–93; Stone-
man and Battisti 2010).
1.4 Electricity and Smart Meters
Based on theories of the diffusion of new technologies, this dissertation assesses
empirically the relative importance of various determinants in the diffusion of smart
electricity meters in the United States. Electricity meters, in general, measure the con-
sumption of electricity. Electricity is a form of energy, electrons in motion that carry
electrical charge. It has two components: voltage and current. Voltage refers to the dif-
ference in electrical charge between two points, or the potential ability of electrons to
do work. Current refers to the flow of electrical charge. Electricity is a secondary energy
source generated from primary sources such as coal (nonrenewable) or wind (renew-
able). An important aspect of electricity is that supply and demand must be equal at
every instant because storage is not economically viable with current technology (EIA
2017b).
Electricity has come to be viewed as a general purpose technology, used to
power lighting, electric motors, and other applications. The use of electrical energy has
spawned further innovation especially in the application of electric motors to various
end uses. Electricity is now a basic input to most production processes and has arguably
led to significant productivity improvements over other sources of energy, in industry as
well as in the home. The efficiency of its use and the reliability of its supply is of great
importance for modern economies (Rosenberg 1998; Bresnahan 2010).
Electricity meters have historically measured electrical energy, the total consump-
tion of electricity (i.e., kilowatt-hours, or kWh). Some meters have also measured electric
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power, the rate at which electricity is being consumed (i.e., kilowatts, or kW). Advanced
meters available today possess the same functions as well as additional capabilities.
They are able to measure and record consumption in real time. Smart meters refer to a
specific type of advanced electricity meter based on digital technology that are capable
of two-way communication between the electric power utility and the consumer. Smart
meters are a product innovation from the meter manufacturer’s perspective but they are
a process innovation from the electric power utility’s perspective. Furthermore, smart
meters are one component of an advanced metering infrastructure that also includes
communication networks and meter data management systems.
Smart meters are considered an enabling technology critical for the development
of a smart electric power grid that efficiently and reliably matches supply and demand
in electricity markets. These advanced meters provide capabilities for time-varying
pricing of electricity, automated meter reading, and automated outage management
among other uses. Smart meters can lead to more efficient use of electricity through
real-time monitoring and analysis of consumption, especially through reductions in
electricity use at times of peak demand when the power grid is most stressed. They can
also aid in the integration of distributed generation and storage resources and electric
vehicles onto the power grid through import-export measurement functions. Smart
meters can have a positive environmental impact as a result of these capabilities. In
addition to these benefits, smart meters also have costs. They are more expensive than
other types of meters and they raise privacy, security, and health concerns (NETL 2008;
EEI 2011).
Smart meters are currently halfway diffused in the United States as measured by
the number of smart meters in use compared to the total number of meters, indicating
that the diffusion process is ongoing (IEI 2016a; EIA 2017a). This should not, however,
discourage a study of the diffusion of smart meters so far. Diffusion processes should be
studied at successive stages in order to arrive at a fuller understanding of their determi-
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nants. It is not guaranteed that smart meters will diffuse completely. This approach also
provides a means to overcome the pro-innovation bias of much diffusion research that
results from exclusively studying successful innovations ex post (Rogers 2003, 112–113).
Therefore, this dissertation studies the early stage in the diffusion of smart meters.
1.5 Research Questions
There are three research questions addressed in this dissertation:
(1) What factors have influenced the interfirm diffusion of smart meters?
(2) What factors have influenced the intrafirm diffusion of smart meters?
(3) What are the policy implications for enhancing the diffusion of smart meters?
I will attempt to answer these questions in two main chapters, one analyzing the deter-
minants of the interfirm and intrafirm diffusion of smart meters and the other assessing
smart meter diffusion policies.
The analysis in this dissertation contributes to empirical research on technologi-
cal diffusion by examining both the interfirm and intrafirm diffusion of a new technol-
ogy in the context of a highly regulated industry. One contribution of this dissertation
is its exclusive focus on diffusion, which is arguably understudied in the innovation
literature compared to the invention and innovation stages. The insights provided can
enhance innovation activities in the electric power industry. Studying the adoption of
smart meters in particular is important because they can help transform retail markets
by providing more opportunities for consumer engagement about electricity consump-
tion and a more flexible demand side. They also support further technological and insti-
tutional innovation in the electric power industry.
Furthermore, public policy in the United States at both the state and federal
levels has supported the adoption of smart meters by electric power utilities, princi-
pally for their role in fostering reductions in peak demand and overall consumption
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with resulting benefits for consumers, the economy as a whole, the environment, and
national security (Rose 2014). The research in this dissertation also contributes to the
small empirical literature on diffusion policy. Additionally, the empirical analysis in
this dissertation is based on a panel dataset created from data provided by the Energy
Information Administration (EIA). The use of panel data in the empirical study of diffu-
sion processes is rare, and the dataset itself is derived from publicly available data that
facilitates reproducible research.1
The remainder of this dissertation proceeds with historical and institutional back-
ground on the US electric power industry and a description of smart metering technol-
ogy (Chapter II), an overview of research on smart meters in the social sciences (Chapter
III), an overview of models of technology diffusion (Chapter IV), and a discussion of
hypothesized determinants of smart meter diffusion in the United States (Chapter V)
that precede an empirical analysis of the early diffusion of smart meters in the United
States (Chapter VI), an assessment of smart meter diffusion policies in the United States
(Chapter VII), and a conclusion that summarizes key findings, provides an international
comparison of smart meter diffusion, and suggests future areas of research (Chapter
VIII).
1. All data analysis in this dissertation was performed with R (R Core Team 2017). Data and R code for
importing, cleaning, and analyzing the data are available upon request.
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CHAPTER II
SMART METERS AND THE US ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY
Understanding the historical and institutional context of the US electric power
industry and the capabilities of smart metering technology is crucial for understanding
the technology adoption decisions of electric power utilities and the evolving context
within which smart meter diffusion occurs. In this chapter I provide historical and insti-
tutional background on the electric power industry in the United States and describe the
technological evolution of electricity meters. I describe smart metering technology and
present a comprehensive listing of their costs and benefits. Additionally, I suggest that
electricity meters and the electric power industry have co-evolved over time, mutually
influencing one another.
2.1 The Evolution of the US Electric Power Industry
The structure of the electric power industry in the United States has changed
relatively little over time since the widespread adoption of state regulation by 1914, re-
sulting in local or regional monopoly utility services for electricity supply. The most
substantial changes have occurred in the past two decades, including the restructuring
of electricity markets in a number of states during the 1990s that introduced elements of
competition in the electricity supply chain. The California electricity crisis of 2000–2001,
however, stopped restructuring from spreading further. The industry is undergoing sub-
stantial change in the present as a result of technological change, ecological pressures,
and prior restructuring. Technological progress has occurred steadily in the industry
over time. Perusing the history of the industry reveals that it has been, and continues to
be, shaped by an interplay between technological and institutional innovations.
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The origin of the electric power industry lies in the work of Thomas Edison dur-
ing the late nineteenth century. Edison pioneered not only the technical aspects of elec-
tric lighting and electricity distribution but also the electric power utility as a business
model. He was influenced heavily by the gas-lighting utility business model, his direct
competitor at the time in lighting services. Edison’s Pearl Street station in Manhattan
came online in 1882 as the first central power station linked to a distribution system,
analogous to the gas industry’s distribution network. This was, in effect, the first utility.
Electricity was originally used for lighting and only later were additional applications
developed, primarily machines and appliances utilizing electric motors (Hughes 1983,
18–46; Neufeld 2016, 16–20).
During the early years of the industry competition was fierce and corruption
was common. Private utilities negotiated contracts with municipalities and bribery and
political favoritism often determined which utilities were awarded contracts. Some mu-
nicipalities chose municipal ownership of electricity supply as a means to avoid this
corruption. Municipal ownership also offered a more rapid development of electricity
supply. Municipalities faced similar financial hurdles to privately owned utilities in
the large amounts of upfront capital required, but they also had better access to capital
markets. (Holland and Neufeld 2009; Neufeld 2016, 24–28).
The industry eventually came to desire monopoly status, under the influence of
electric utility entrepreneur Samuel Insull. Insull was motivated by system expansion
and achieving economies of scale to reduce the cost of electricity supply. By integrating
distribution systems over wider geographical areas, Insull came to see state regulation
as a means to achieve certainty and profitability of investments. The industry as a whole
wanted to reduce inefficient and unprofitable competition stemming from the natural
monopoly properties of electricity distribution. The threat of public power from munici-
pally owned utilities was also an influence in accepting state regulation. As the industry
moved in this direction it became subject to regulation at the state level. In 1905 New
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York was the first state to establish a modern public utility commission and adopt reg-
ulation of the industry based on cost recovery through rates of return on capital invest-
ments. This rate-of-return regulation subsequently led to retail rates of electricity based
on the average cost of supply. The economic rationale for regulation of the industry re-
volved around the natural monopoly characteristics of electricity supply. Regulation
applied to a vertically integrated monopoly that implied the bundling of the electricity
supply chain, integrating generation, transmission, distribution, and retailing under one
firm in a given geographic area. This structure spread to most other states within two
decades. Municipal and later co-operative utilities were not regulated in most cases be-
cause their ownership structures were viewed as having the best interest of consumers
in mind. Vertical integration and state regulation of the industry persisted throughout
most of the twentieth century, although not without significant policy changes along the
way. The industry also sustained technological progress and reduced electricity prices
over this time, primarily from efficiency gains and economies of scale in centralized
generation (Hughes 1983, 201–226; Hirsh 1989, 13–86; Hirsh 1999, 11–31; Holland and
Neufeld 2009; Neufeld 2016, 46–95).
Over the course of the first half of the twentieth century utility managers forged
a consensus with politicians, regulators, financiers, electrical manufacturers, and con-
sumers on the benefits of system expansion and interconnection with the oversight of
state regulation. This grow-and-build strategy through technological momentum proved
successful. There were regional differences, however, in the nature of growth with dif-
ferent regions pursuing distinct paths of growth dependent on unique supply, demand,
and political factors (Hughes 1983, 140–174, 363–403, 404–460; Hirsh 1999, 33–54).
The Federal Water Power Act of 1920 created the Federal Power Commission and
encouraged the development of hydroelectric generation projects. Importantly, it laid
the foundation for the federal regulation of interstate wholesale electricity transmission
via the commerce clause of the US Constitution. The Federal Water Power Act of 1930
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and the Federal Power Act of 1935 boosted the regulatory power of the Federal Power
Commission by making it an independent regulatory agency and giving it jurisdiction
over all interstate wholesale transmission and power sales. The Commission was man-
dated to ensure reasonable and just electricity rates. These policies also allowed for the
creation of federally owned utilities and the eventual support of rural electrification
through the Tennessee Valley Authority and other agencies as well as the establishment
of rural co-operative utilities (Holland and Neufeld 2009; Neufeld 2016, 158–160).
The stable structure of the industry began to erode during the 1970s from a num-
ber of factors. The 1973 oil crisis resulted in cultural changes and policy initiatives sup-
porting energy efficiency and conservation, just as many utilities began switching from
coal to oil as a primary fuel source for generating electricity. Additionally, the first nu-
clear power plants were built during this time period and were more expensive than
expected because of cost overruns, delays, and safety regulations. Growth in demand
for electricity was also lower than expected, leading to plant cancellations even after
significant financial investment. Inflation in the overall economy also increased during
this time period along with nominal interest rates, leading to higher borrowing costs.
Technological stasis also occurred for conventional generation sources, reaching lim-
its of thermal efficiency in converting pimary fuels to electrical energy. As a result of
these factors, electricity prices began to rise rapidly throughout the country for the first
time in the industry’s history. Conventional methods of regulation came under attack
for shielding utilities from the full consequences of their investment decisions through
cost recovery mechanisms. These events together sowed the seeds of change. Addition-
ally, during this time the Department of Energy Organization Act of 1977 created the
Department of Energy (DOE) by consolidating energy-related federal agencies. It also
transformed the Federal Power Commission into the Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission (FERC), becoming an independent regulatory agency within the DOE (Hirsh
1989, 87–171; Hirsh 1999, 55–70; Holland and Neufeld 2009; DOE 2017a; FERC 2017).
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The National Energy Act of 1978, which was composed of several different initia-
tives, implemented various policy changes such as emphasizing efficiency and stream-
lining the construction of new nuclear power plants. The most significant portion for
the power industry was the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 (PURPA). This
law required states to consider eliminating promotional rate structures such as declining
block rates that decrease the price of electricity as more is consumed and to evaluate
retail rates based on marginal costs. Though initially overlooked, PURPA also allowed
third-party generation of electricity by independent power producers. Utilities were
required by this law to purchase electricity from qualifying facilities that utilized cogen-
eration or renewable fuels, paying the avoided costs of what the utility would have had
to incur to generate the electricity themselves. PURPA was enforced by FERC and al-
lowed state experimentation with different regulatory models in the implementation of
its provisions. PURPA would end up altering the electric power industry in the United
States profoundly and can be considered the first step toward competition in wholesale
electricity markets (Hirsh 1999, 73–100; Holland and Neufeld 2009).
The 1990s saw a move to liberalization of electricity markets, primarily because
of concerns over high electricity prices but also as a means to encourage innovation.
One of the indirect consequences of PURPA was the demonstration that large-scale
power generation was no longer alone in offering low-cost electricity as a result of ad-
vances in cogeneration, gas turbine, and renewable energy technologies. PURPA led
to the Energy Policy Act of 1992 that reinforced the policy shift toward wholesale com-
petition. This law required utilities to wheel, or transmit and distribute, the electricity
generated by exempt wholesale generators, a new kind of independent power producer,
to wholesale customers even if the utility could have supplied these customers itself. It
essentially mandated wholesale competition by separating generation from transmis-
sion. Furthermore, in 1996 FERC Order 888 declared the transmission system a common
carrier, curbing the potential market power of existing utilities by allowing open access
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to transmission networks. Together, these policies embedded competition in wholesale
electricity markets and subsequently allowed wholesale prices to be largely determined
by those markets (Hirsh 1999, 239–260; Holland and Neufeld 2009; FERC 2015b, 39).
Liberalization implied the unbundling of the electricity supply chain and the end
of the utility consensus concerning the natural monoply characteristics of the industry
and the benefits of regulation. It was recognized that generation and retailing could be
unbundled from transmission and distribution. It was also recognized that the regula-
tory framework should persist for transmission and distribution networks that continue
to be natural monopolies. Unbundling generation from transmission, however, created
new problems in the coordination of generation activity to maintain the stability and re-
liability of the power grid. The nature of electric power grids, namely that supply must
meet demand at every instant, requires these activities to be coordinated closely. Under
vertical integration coordination is relatively easy because the monopoly distribution
utility has complete information of and control over generation activity, but this is not
true of independent generators in a competitive market. Unbundling gave rise to inde-
pendent system operators and regional transmission organizations as new institutions
to coordinate market activity and ensure reliability, safety, and low cost. Market power
also became a concern (Hirsh 1999, 119–131, 261–271; Holland and Neufeld 2009; FERC
2015b, 39–40).
Two models of competition in electricity markets were developed during this
period and currently exist in different states. One is the wholesale competition model
where generating firms compete with one another to sell their electricity to distribu-
tion utilities that maintain retail monopolies in their respective service areas. The other
is the customer choice model that typically couples wholesale competition with retail
competition. This model represents a more substantial break from the past by allowing
consumers to choose among electricity suppliers. Some states, however, may allow cus-
tomer choice without having formal wholesale markets. Of those states that adopted the
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customer choice model, only Texas has experienced active retail competition and to a
lesser extent in the Northeast (Joskow 1997; Borenstein and Bushnell 2015).
States have pursued different paths in restructuring their electricity markets. Cal-
ifornia, Pennsylvania, and New Hampshire were among the first states to implement
restructuring in the mid-1990s, but the California electricity crisis of 2000–2001 gave
pause to other states who were considering restructuring. The gains from restructuring
have been regarded as modest, and some states even regretted the decision for a time. In
states that chose not to restructure, traditional vertically integrated markets could still
experience significant changes in some aspects of regulation, such as a move away from
rate-of-return regulation toward performance-based regulation. Revenue decoupling, for
instance, changes incentives for utilities such that increasing their profits is not depedent
on selling more electricity. This approach to revenue regulation removes disincentives
for investing in energy efficiency, although it may pose new problems. Currently, as de-
picted in Figure 4, the United States has a mix of traditionally regulated and liberalized
electricity markets, varying by region and state. States indicated as having wholesale
competition are those largely engaged in formal wholesale markets with independent
system operators or regional transmission operators. This figure is a rough guide as
wholesale markets may only exist in certain regions of a state and customer choice may
only apply to commercial and industrial consumers or have other limitations. Addition-
ally, some states without wholesale competition allow customer choice for industrial
and commercial consumers. Despite the persistence of wholesale markets with fluctuat-
ing wholesale prices determined by marginal costs, time-varying retail prices reflecting
such time-varying wholesale prices have not seen widespread adoption (Holland and
Neufeld 2009; RAP 2000, 2011; EEI 2012; Borenstein and Bushnell 2015).
22
Vertically Integrated
Wholesale Competition
Customer Choice
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with Customer Choice
Figure 4. Status of Electricity Market Restructuring in 2017. Data from FERC (2015b), EMRF
(2016), and ACCES (2017).
Further changes to the US electric power industry came in the Energy Policy
Act of 2005. This law strengthened the power of FERC by repealing the Public Util-
ity Holding Act of 1935, which effectively eliminated interstate holding companies
that owned multiple utilities. This law also encouraged time-based pricing, demand
response, net metering for distributed renewable generation (such as from solar photo-
voltaics), and incentives for energy efficiency. Although PURPA originally encouraged
time-varying rates, the metering technology available at the time was apparently too
costly for widespread use. But when cheaper technology became available in the 1990s
time-varying prices still did not diffuse. Part of this hesitation may be explained by
potential changes in the distribution of benefits among customer classes as a result of
different rate structures. The law reinforced sections of PURPA by requiring state utility
commissions to again consider time-based rates and the enabling metering technolo-
gies. Furthermore, the law charged FERC with assessing the status of demand response
and advanced metering in the United States and required regulatory bodies in all states
to authorize studies of advanced metering for potential deployment (EEI 2006a, 2006b;
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FERC 2006, 2007, 2008, 2009a, 2011a, 2011b, 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015a, 2016; Joskow and
Wolfram 2012).
Smart meters enable a greater variety of demand response options, which con-
stitutes one of the most important benefits of this technology. Demand response can be
defined as changes in electricity consumption in response to changes in electricity prices
over time. Mechanisms for changing consumption include incentive-based programs,
such as direct load control or interruptible rates, and price-based programs, such as
time-of-use or real-time pricing. Times of high demand and stress on the electric power
grid, the peak load problem, motivates demand response programs. The costs include
the necessary metering infrastructure, other enabling technologies, and management of
demand response programs. The benefits include bill savings, avoided infrastructure
costs, improved reliability, and reductions in market power (FERC 2006; Albadi and
El-Saadany 2008).
Creating a flexible demand side is part of a major recent development in the
industry known as the smart grid. A smart grid combines information and communi-
cation technology with sensing and control technology applied to the power grid in
order to increase the economic efficiency and physical reliability of electricity supply.
The essence of the smart grid, synonomous with grid modernization, is the use of dig-
ital technologies allowing situational awareness through micro-level visibility of grid
operations. In contrast, the use of analog technologies allows only a macro-level view
of grid operations producing limited information and enabling only heuristic decision
making. Smart grid technologies enable real-time monitoring and optimal decision mak-
ing through automated control of the power grid. Sensors placed along the distribution
grid, for example, can detect power outages and associated automation controls can
reroute power in order to minimize the number of consumers affected. Another impor-
tant aspect of the smart grid is the integration of intermittent and distributed generation
and storage resources, often customer-owned, onto the grid. The smart grid enables a
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more transactive grid with two-way flows of both information and electricity (NETL
2009; Joskow 2012).
The concept of a smart grid can be traced back to visions of a power grid with
homeostatic control that balances supply and demand through dynamic pricing and
automation technologies (Schweppe, Tabors, and Kirtley 1981). The use of information
technology in enabling such a vision was predicted to increase the efficiency of energy
use and supply resulting in improvements of energy and capital productivity. Addi-
tionally, it was predicted to aid the decoupling of energy use from economic growth
and to potentially change the structure of utilities and the industry itself (Walker 1985,
1986). The smart grid can also be considered a technological paradigm that orients ad-
vances in electric power technology along certain technological trajectories (Dosi 1982).
Technological and institutional change in the industry is difficult, however, as a result of
technological momentum and regulatory, political, and cultural barriers, biasing some
trajectories over others (Hirsh and Sovacool 2006). The outcomes of these recent techno-
logical and institutional developments are ongoing and yet to be fully seen.
The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 encouraged the develop-
ment of the smart grid in the United States. Both this law and the preceding Energy
Policy Act of 2005 supported advanced metering in the form of smart meters. In ad-
dition, this law tasked FERC with assessing the potential of and utilizing demand re-
sponse resources, which it did with an assessment, plan, and implementation proposal
(FERC 2009b, 2010, 2011c). In related efforts, the DOE together with the Environmental
Protection Agency initiated a public-private collaboration to increase commitments to
energy efficiency, resulting in a national action plan for energy efficiency (DOE/EPA
2006, 2008). Furthermore, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Re-
covery Act), passed in response to the Great Recession that began in 2007–2008, funded
grid modernization programs administered by the DOE and originally authorized by
the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007. The Smart Grid Investment Grant
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(SGIG) program subsidized deployment of smart grid technologies and the Smart Grid
Demonstration Program (SGDP) subsidized R&D for smart grid technologies. Addi-
tional policies are needed to continue incentivizing investment in smart grids, with
special care given to regional differences in power grid characteristics (NSTC 2011; Guo,
Bond, and Narayanan 2015; DOE 2017b).
During the time since restructuring began, the environmental costs of gener-
ating electricity have gained prominence in public policy debates. Although local air
and water pollution have always been a concern in the industry, attention has shifted
to greenhouse gas emissions associated with the burning of fossil fuels and resultant
global warming. Comprehensive climate change legislation, such as implementation of
a carbon tax as a means to monetize the negative externalities, has not seen success at
the federal level, and the recent Clean Power Plan is a regulatory approach from the ex-
ecutive branch to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions in the power industry. The rise of
clean, renewable generation from solar and wind through policy support and declines
in their costs of production has led to new technical and economic challenges as a result
of their intermittent and distributed nature. In addition, energy storage and electric ve-
hicles may also diffuse more widely in the future for similar reasons, posing additional
challenges. Another benefit attributed to the smart grid is its ability to address such
challenges and thus reduce the ecological footprint of the power industry. These issues
will collectively shape the structure of and technological change in the industry going
forward (EPRI 2008b; Hledik 2009; NETL 2011; Borenstein and Bushnell 2015).
The recent history of the US electric power industry highlights a theme of de-
mand response as a means to address the peak load problem and engage customers in
new markets. The desire to expand the participation of the demand side in electricity
markets also includes pushes for retail electricity prices to reflect the dynamic prices
determined in wholesale markets. Such time-varying rates are hoped to incentivize
changes in consumption behavior, especially at times of peak demand. In 2011 FERC Or-
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der 745 declared demand response to be equivalent to a generation source in wholesale
markets, equating reductions in demand with avoided generation and valuing it as such.
This represents an important change in market rules that has caused greater attention
given to demand response resources. The bright line dividing federal and state regula-
tion is also increasingly becoming blurred as a result. Technological change is required
to make the demand side more flexible, and metering technology is especially crucial for
enabling demand response programs (Rose 2014; Panfil 2015).
2.2 The Evolution of Electricity Meters
Technology and industrial structure often co-evolve (Hughes 1987; Nelson 1994).
The evolution of the US electric power industry is tied to the evolution of electricity
metering technology in a co-evolutionary process. Changes in the industry have led to
changes in metering technology and changes in metering technology have led to—and
are currently leading to—changes in the industry. The diffusion of certain metering
technologies, then, is dependent in part on the overall form and context of the industry.
Electricity meters, in general, measure the consumption of electricity. Metering
technology is integrally tied to the structure of retail electricity rates, and rate structures
are ultimately limited by the capabilities of electricity meters. Retail rate structures can
take different forms and are typically volumetric charges based on kilowatt-hours (kWh)
of electricity consumed. They may also contain invariant components in the form of
fixed charges. Rates often differ by customer class as well, which include residential,
commercial, industrial, and sometimes others. Retail rates can be static or dynamic.
Static rates are predetermined and may only change seasonally. In conventionally reg-
ulated markets static rates are determined through regulatory ratemaking processes
whereas in markets with retail competition static rates are determined by retailers. Static
rates include flat rates and time-of-use (TOU) rates. Flat rates are based on total con-
sumption, irrespective of the time of day, in the form of a price per kWh consumed. Flat
27
rates can also be used in combination with a demand charge, a fee based on the maxi-
mum electric power demanded by a consumer at any instant. TOU rates refer to prices
that vary over the course of a day but are predetermined and do not change in real time.
A simple TOU rate structure combines a low rate for the off-peak period and a high
rate for the on-peak period. The motivation behind TOU rates, and time-varying rates
in general, is to incentivize customers to reduce consumption during periods of peak
demand. A more complex rate structure may include rates for mid-peak shoulder peri-
ods as well. Demand charges can also be added to a TOU rate structure (Capehart and
Storin 1983; Borenstein, Jaske, and Rosenfeld 2002; Lazar and Gonzalez 2015).
Dynamic rates are prices that change in real time. Unlike TOU rates they are not
predetermined. Dynamic pricing is intended to reflect marginal system costs influenced
by actual on-peak and off-peak times of demand. Real-time pricing (RTP) is the ultimate
dynamic pricing with prices changing in real time (typically defined as each hour). Criti-
cal peak pricing (CPP) is a special type of dynamic pricing used to incentivize demand
reduction during times of expected high demand, such as very hot days during the sum-
mer. CPP is typically determined a few days in advance and limited to a certain number
of hours per year. CPP can be used in combination with any other type of rate structure
(flat, TOU, or RTP). Dynamic rates can also be combined with demand charges. While
more dynamic rates entail more risk, they also entail potentially more reward. The mo-
tivation for using time-varying prices is to increase the economic efficiency of electricity
markets by aligning prices with marginal costs, curb potential market power in competi-
tive markets, and increase economic equity by reducing cross-subsidies from those who
consume more during off-peak times to those who consume more during on-peak times
(Borenstein, Jaske, and Rosenfeld 2002; Lazar and Gonzalez 2015).
Early electric utilities charged their customers based on the number of lamps in-
stalled, independent of the actual consumption of electricity. For a short period this was
reasonable because of the nature of users’ needs at the time—primarily lighting in the
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early evening. As the adoption of electric lighting and the uses for electricity expanded,
however, it became clear that pricing of electricity should be based on consumption.
This led to a demand for direct-reading electricity meters that measured total energy use
(Bowers 1982, 193–201; Brown 1985; Bowers 1990, 373–377; Neufeld 2016, 34–41).
There was an intense debate within the early power industry over the most ap-
propriate rates to charge consumers, even before economists turned their attention to
the issue (Hausman and Neufeld 1984; Hausman and Neufeld 1989; Neufeld 2016, 34–
41). Historically, residential and commercial rates have typically been flat whereas in-
dustrial rates have typically been more dynamic. Regardless, the pricing of electricity
based on consumption requires a device to measure consumption, and a more complex
rate structure requires a more sophisticated meter. Subsequently, the actual benefits of
different rate structures are dependent upon, in part, the underlying costs of the en-
abling metering technology (Capehart and Storin 1983; Lazar and Gonzalez 2015).
The population of electricity meters is diverse, but only a few types of meters
have been selected and widely used in the industry. In some cases, specific types of me-
ters are used for very specific applications, such as special meters for use in high voltage
applications. After moving to price electricity based on consumption rather than the
number of lamps, Edison developed a meter based on an electrolytic cell. Other inven-
tors and companies developed different kinds of meters during these early years, which
were mostly analog, electromechanical devices. The industry desired practical instru-
ments that were portable, quick and easy to read, and reliable. The Aron meter, the first
electricity meter with direct reading of measurements, was based on pendulum clocks
and wires that interacted with the electricity supply to measure consumption. Arthur
Wright, a British pioneer in the power industry, invented the first recording meter in
1886 to monitor electric load, using paper pulled by clockwork and marked by a pointer
connected to a meter (Bowers 1982, 193–201; Brown 1985; Bowers 1990, 373–377).
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The Thomson meter, invented in 1882, was the first motor meter, where the total
number of revolutions of a disc driven by an electric motor and restrained by an eddy
current break measured electricity consumption. This meter was intended for direct cur-
rent (DC) systems although it could be modified for alternating current (AC) systems.
Induction motors were later developed that proved more convenient for use in meters
on AC systems, after the “battle of the systems” resulted in the widespread adoption of
alternating current. The Shallenberger meter, invented in 1898, incorporated an induc-
tion motor that drove a disc in a similar fashion. This meter design was subsequently
improved upon and developed into the standard, analog watt-hour meter that became
the working horse meter of the industry for decades. Measurements of total consump-
tion are read manually via a row of dials (Bowers 1982, 200–201; Hughes 1983, 106–139;
Brown 1985; Bowers 1990, 373–377; Neufeld 2016, 28–34).
During the debates surrounding rate structures in the early twentieth century,
it was emphasized that there must be a practical way to implement time-varying rate
structures. There were, in fact, analog meters available at this time that were capable
of measuring electricity consumption during different time periods that could be used
to levy simple TOU rates. This type of meter took the form of a basic Shallenberger
meter with an additional register and a clock that would switch between the two reg-
isters based on predetermined time periods. A demand meter could also be attached
to measure maximum power demand. More sophisticated designs were also available.
Although meters capable of supporting TOU pricing were available during the early
years of the industry, TOU rates were not adopted despite awareness of the peak load
problem. Demand charges were adopted instead, not as a second-best approximation
of peak-load pricing but arguably as a means to price discriminate and to compete with
self-generation in industry. This pricing strategy also supported a growth strategy for
the large, centralized vision of the industry. The reasoning behind the widespread adop-
tion of demand charges, then, as well as the higher costs and inflexibility of more com-
30
plex meters, essentially explain the nondiffusion of these early TOU meters (Capehart
and Storin 1983; Brown 1985; Neufeld 1987; Yakubovich, Granovetter, and McGuire 2005;
Neufeld 2016, 34–41).
The electromechanical watt-hour meter has been used extensively in the resi-
dential class of consumers as well as the commercial and industrial classes, where it
has often been paired with a demand meter. This type of meter was selected because
of its relatively low purchase and maintenance costs, high reliability, and 25–30 year
rated life. Electromechanical meters, still in use today although no longer commercially
available, eventually gained competition from electronic meters as a result of advances
in electronic and computing technology during the mid-twentieth century. The advent
of solid-state technology, integrated circuits, and microprocessors led to the develop-
ment of electronic meters utilizing digital signal processing. These meters originally
performed the same functions as the standard analog electromechanical meter, measur-
ing and providing a direct reading of total electricity consumption. Electronic meters
were first used for large commercial and industrial customers who were subject to more
complex rate structures than residential customers and required finer granular data
on their electricity consumption. As the costs of electronic meters decreased their use
spread to all customer classes (Capehart and Storin 1983; Brown 1985; EEI 2006a, 5–7;
EEI 2011, 7–8).
The first generation of electronic meters still needed to be read manually via a
digital display. The invention of automatic meter reading (AMR) in the 1970s, however,
changed this. AMR meters combine an electronic meter with a communication module.
This allows for the one-way communication of consumption data, either to a remote col-
lector in a utility employee’s vehicle or via a fixed network to a central location. Older
electromechanical meters could also be retrofitted to AMR meters with a drop-in com-
munication module at low cost. This technology helped automate the meter reading and
billing process through telemetry. The communication system can either be a telephone
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system, radio frequency (RF) system, low-frequency ripple system using power lines,
or high-frequency power line carrier system, each of which have their advantages and
disadvantages. AMR also enables tamper and outage detection. AMR can be considered
one of the first steps toward a smart grid in that it combines information and commu-
nication technology with the power grid (Capehart and Storin 1983; FERC 2006, 20; EEI
2011, 7–12).
Electronic meters gradually evolved in the 1980s and 1990s from AMR into what
have come to be known as smart meters. As microproccesor technology improved, elec-
tronic meters became capable of measuring and recording data on electricity consump-
tion in separate time intervals (typically in 60-, 30- or 15-minute intervals). The micro-
processor enabled easy programing of register schedules for use with time-varying
rate programs. These meters also gained the ability to measure and record maximum
power demand and could be programmed in a similar manner. In addition, they were
capable of being programmed for complicated time-varying rates that could change
over the course of a year based on a seven-day time clock and an annual calendar clock.
They could also be connected to tape recorders for recording consumption data, but this
proved too costly to implement widely. Memory storage was an initial limitation for
the capabilities of electronic meters but subsequent improvements in memory storage
technology overcame this barrier to increased functionality. These metering technolo-
gies have also influenced the development of digital display devices that allow active
monitoring of consumption and direct and indirect load control systems, including au-
tomated energy management systems containing preprogrammed instructions based
on preferences and prices that can manage a consumer’s electricity load automatically
through microcontrollers. Importantly, these electronic meters were upgraded to func-
tion with two-way communication (Capehart and Storin 1983; Sioshansi 1991; EEI 2011,
7–8).
32
Figure 5. An Electromechanical Meter.
Figure 6. A Smart Meter.
A smart meter can be defined as a digital electricity meter capable of measur-
ing and recording interval data combined with two-way communication capabilities.
Smart meters are part of a smart meter system that has come to be known as advanced
metering infrastructure (AMI). AMI is a system composed of smart meters, communi-
cation systems, and meter data management systems. The diffusion of smart meters
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encompasses the diffusion of AMI, a set of complementary innovations. The presence
of a two-way communication system via a fixed network implies that a utility can both
send and receive messages to and from a customer’s meter. The additional line of com-
munication from the utility to the customer enables direct load control by utilities when
combined with gateway networks and microcontrollers on machines and appliances.
It also enables remote on-demand reads, remote meter programming, remote service
switching, and remote switching of registers in a multiregister meter, which is useful
for implementing time-based rates. In addition to electricity consumption smart meters
can measure power demand and voltage. These measurements provide useful infor-
mation to utilities for managing distribution grids Furthermore, the specific choice of
the communication network architecture may depend on population density as well
as a utility’s vision for the smart grid because it can serve other functions apart from
metering, such as distribution automation (NETL 2008; EEI 2011; MITEI 2011, 132–137).
Table 1 compares the capabilities of electromechanical, AMR, and smart meters.
In sum, smart meters are a capital-embodied process innovation with distinct advan-
tages over previous metering technologies. They are multi-function tools providing
information-rich operational capabilities. Smart meters are also labor-saving and poten-
tially capital-saving investments. Furthermore, the evolution of AMI from AMR and
previous technologies exemplifies how technological change is combinatorial, incre-
mental, and cumulative, often leading to greater complexity and capability over time
(Rosenberg 1979; Arthur 2009).
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Table 1. Capabilities of Metering Technologies.
Meter Type Capabilities
Electromechanical Manual reads
Automatic meter reading (AMR) Automated reads, outage detection,
tamper detection
Advanced metering infrastructure (AMI) Interval data and time-varying rates,
power quality data, import/export
functions, remote on-demand reads,
remote service switching, remote
meter programming
Note: Additive capabilities from electromechanical to AMI.
From this description of the evolution of metering technology it is clear that both
the needs of the power industry on the demand side and the technological opportunities
offered by microprocessors on the supply side have shaped the direction of metering
technology advancement. The barriers to implementing time-varying rates have not
been technological but rather economic and behavioral. Uncertainties as to the actual
response of consumers to time-varying prices, for example, have been an important bar-
rier in addition to the costs of implementation and the regulatory approval process for
investor-owned utilities. The economic rationale for smart meters depends on various
factors. Smart meters have initially been more expensive than less advanced meters and
there has been some uncertainty as to their rated life and their maintenance and repro-
gramming costs. If the relative advantage of smart meters does not provide sufficient
benefits compared to costs, then their adoption and deployment may not be economical.
2.3 The Economic Rationale for Smart Meters
Smart meters offer many benefits over the electronic and electromechanical me-
ters that preceded them, though they impose new costs as well. The costs and benefits
of smart meters are diverse and they are distributed across multiple stakeholders.
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2.3.1 Costs
Smart meters have four major elements of cost: expense, privacy, security, and
health. Because of their capabilities smart meters incur a greater financial cost relative
to less advanced meters, though their price has fallen over time. Furthermore, smart
meters cannot realize their full benefits unless part of an AMI system, which requires
the installation and associated costs of communication systems and meter data manage-
ment systems. In some cases utilities can upgrade from AMR to AMI relatively easily, if
a fixed network communication system was previously selected, by replacing AMR me-
ters with smart meters and making incremental upgrades to the system. In other cases
they have to build up the entire communication system. This issue will impact the total
cost of deploying AMI such that the prior diffusion of AMR may impact the diffusion
of AMI. Additionally, different deployment strategies, such as full, replacement, or tar-
geted deployment, may incur different costs (Levy, Herter, and Wilson 2004; NETL 2008;
EEI 2011).
Smart meters also impose potential costs to privacy, stemming from consump-
tion data. Consumers may not be comfortable with utilities or other parties having ac-
cess to detailed data on their electricity consumption. Such data can be used to identify
the use of individual appliances and home or work patterns. The ownership of data is a
point of issue. Related to privacy concerns, there are also security concerns with respect
to unauthorized access to meters and their recorded data. Smart meters have physical
ports to access data and are also networked with communication systems, both of which
can potentially result in unauthorized access. Efforts have been made to protect data,
however, such as increased endpoint security as well as data encryption. The National
Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) has established security guidelines and is
collaborating with meter manufacturers and the industry as a whole to produce secure
meters and networks. The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 empowered
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NIST as the national coordinator for smart grid technology standards and cybersecurity
guidelines. The North American Electric Reliability Corporation, whose mission is to en-
sure grid reliability, has also issued cybersecurity standards, and the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act of 2009 also increased cybersecurity measures through its smart
grid programs (NETL 2008; EEI 2011; MITEI 2011, 197–234).
Smart meters that use wireless transmission for communication, leading to RF
exposure, can potentially impose health costs. Scientific studies have shown, however,
that RF exposure from smart meters is negligible. RF exposure is regulated by standards
set by the Federal Communications Commission. Smart meters fall under a low power,
unlicensed category, similar to wireless Internet routers. They also emit substantially
less RF exposure than cell phones. Such devices have generally not been found to pose
negative effects on human health. Nevertheless, all such devices undergo a testing and
certification process with the Commission. Furthermore, smart meters, like all previous
meters, are typically installed on the exterior of homes and businesses facing away from
living and working spaces and in a partially shielded enclosure. Any exposure also oc-
curs only when the RF device is in operation, which is usually no more than 15 minutes
in total per day. Still, RF exposure from smart meters, if it occurs at all, has been shown
to be well within legal limits (NETL 2008; EEI 2011).
Although most of these costs are uncertain and difficult to quantify, they may
qualitatively impact the assessment of the optimal rate of smart meter diffusion. Their
adoption may be premature if these issues have not been adequately addressed. The
most certain and established costs of smart meters are the financial costs.
2.3.2 Benefits
The benefits of smart meters are multidimensional and intertwined with the ben-
efits of smart grids. These benefits can be categorized based on the various stakeholders
that they impact, including utilities, consumers, and society as a whole. The benefits can
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also be divided between operational and nonoperational benefits with respect to utilities’
needs and their management of the power grid. Framing the benefits of smart meters in
terms of operational and nonoperational benefits is useful because it naturally leads to a
discussion of smart meter diffusion policy from a market failure perspective in terms of
private and social costs and benefits (Levy, Herter, and Wilson 2004).
Utilities benefit across the supply chain from the deployment of smart meters.
For customer service and related field operations, smart meters reduce the cost of meter
reading through the elimination of meter reading positions and associated expenses.
They also help automate the billing process and reduce expenses in this area as a result,
such as through reductions in billing errors. Smart meters can also reduce costs asso-
ciated with service connections and disconnections through remote switching. Smart
meters can reduce call center activity and associated costs through improved customer
engagement and automated outage detection. Additionally, smart meters can detect
meter tampering and electricity theft. Another byproduct of the data collected by smart
meters is reduced costs for load research used in marketing and forecasting demand
(NETL 2008; EEI 2011; MITEI 2011, 132–137).
For managing the power grid, advanced metering infrastructure enables utilities
to engage in advanced distribution operations, advanced transmission operations, and
advanced asset management, all of which are aspects of a smart grid and can lead to
cost reductions. Power quality data collected by smart meters also aids utilities in im-
proving the reliability of the distribution grid. As part of these smart grid operations,
smart meter data benefits both transmission and distribution grids by improving trans-
former load management and capacitor bank switching. Smart meter data can also be
used to develop new revenue streams through monetizing the flow of information and
to improve efficiency of supply and demand, reliability of service, and grid system de-
sign and planning (NETL 2008; EEI 2011; MITEI 2011, 132–137).
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Consumers of electricity benefit from smart meters through improved relation-
ships with their utility resulting from access to finer consumption data that can be used
for energy management purposes and engagement about energy use. Consumers also
benefit from more accurate billing, a greater variety of rate options, improved reliability
and outage restoration, and access to power quality data. Furthermore, smart meters
can act as an interface between the power grid and the loads and distributed genera-
tion and storage resources of consumers. Smart meters are capable of net metering, for
example, through measuring power inflow and outflow. Depending on public policy,
this may incentivize consumers to also become producers of electricity (NETL 2008; EEI
2011; MITEI 2011, 132–137).
Additionally, smart meters enable consumers to participate in demand response
programs and related markets. For residential consumers smart meters can be con-
nected to home area networks that communicate information to household appliances.
Consumers can program their preferences so that appliances such as washers and dry-
ers only operate during certain time periods or depending on prices. Such activities can
reduce consumers’ bills. Consumers can also voluntarily allow utilities direct control
over certain appliances typically in exchange for bill credits. Furthermore, insofar as
smart meters reduce costs to the utility they also put downward pressure on electricity
prices, from which consumers benefit. Some of these benefits, though, depend on policy
and regulatory action and may not be available to all consumers (NETL 2008; EEI 2011;
MITEI 2011, 132–137).
Society as a whole benefits from the use of smart meters principally through
the demand response that they enable, by shifting consumption to off-peak times and
lessening the peak load problem. Effective demand response can help avoid the cost of
building excess capacity in peak generation and transmission and distribution networks.
Blackouts can also be avoided through dynamic pricing and other demand response pro-
grams during periods of high demand, leading to significant financial savings through
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avoidance of business productivity losses and breakdowns in other dependent sys-
tems like water distribution. Smart meters can also help integrate distributed energy
resources like rooftop solar onto the grid that can benefit society through innovation
and cleaner energy generation. Reductions in consumption during peak times and for
overall energy use as well as increased generation from cleaner, distributed resources
can also benefit society through improved environmental quality (NETL 2008; EEI 2011;
MITEI 2011, 132–137).
Similar to the costs, some of the benefits of smart meters are more certain than
others. Many of the benefits associated with the adoption of smart meters relate to con-
sumption patterns and demand response. Yet it is uncertain how beneficial demand
response programs can be because their effectiveness depends on how consumers ac-
tually respond to time-varying prices and other incentives. This cannot be predicted
perfectly. Demand response is important because it opens up new markets and potential
avenues of innovation in the electric power industry, another benefit of smart meters.
Smart meters are a key technology in the development of smart grids that provide addi-
tional benefits beyond the meters themselves. Maximizing the value of AMI investments
through multiple functions and nonmetering capabilities may be crucial to justifying the
costs. Smart meters can serve as a technology platform on which to expand grid mod-
ernization and can do so at a relatively small marginal cost, such as through upgrading
of communication networks for nonmetering purposes (Levy, Herter, and Wilson 2004;
NETL 2008; EEI 2011; MITEI 2011, 132–137).
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Table 2. Costs and Benefits of Smart Meters.
Private Costs More expensive than other meter types
Social Costs Privacy concerns from detailed data
Security concerns from networked systems
Health concerns from RF emissions
Private Benefits Utility operations capabilities
Social Benefits Economic efficiency through time-varying rates
Energy management capabilities
Integration of distributed generation and storage resources
Reductions in environmental emissions
Table 2 summarizes the costs and benefits of smart meters. The costs and ben-
efits are classified by private and social categories though some elements of the social
costs and benefits may also apply to the private costs and benefits of utilities. For util-
ities, relative to society as a whole, the net benefits of smart meters may not be great
enough to warrant their adoption or an adequate pace of adoption. Moreover, these
costs and benefits vary across utilities. This creates a potential role for public policy in
supporting the diffusion of smart meters, like that embodied in the Recovery Act smart
grid programs. Although the financial expense of smart meters is an important determi-
nant in the diffusion of smart meters, there are many other relevant factors illuminated
by theoretical models of technology diffusion.
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CHAPTER III
SOCIAL RESEARCH ON SMART METERS
The extant research on smart meters in the social sciences is broad. The majority
of this social research, however, is related to the behavioral aspects of the consumption
feedback that smart meters provide, often in combination with incentives given by time-
varying rates. The realized benefits of smart meters from changes in consumption, as
studied in the behavioral research, impact the diffusion of the technology through cost-
benefit evaluations. Less research exists on the technological innovation aspects of smart
meters, such as the determinants of their diffusion. Table 3 surveys and provides a clas-
sification of recent research related to smart meters. Though not exhaustive, this survey
is representative of the distribution of research with respect to general research topics.
Table 3. Research on Smart Meters in the Social Sciences.
Author(s) (Year) Research Topic Results
Behavior
Allcott (2011) Smart meters and dynamic
pricing
Hourly real-time pricing in-
creases consumer surplus by
$10 per household per year.
Buchanan, Russo,
and Anderson
(2014)
Smart meters and consumption
feedback
Energy monitors facilitate
learning about consumption
behavior.
Buchanan, Russo,
and Anderson
(2015)
Smart meters and consumption
feedback
The success of in-home dis-
plays on reducing overall
consumption depends on user
engagement.
Carroll, Lyons, and
Denny (2014)
Smart meters and TOU pricing TOU rates lead to significant
reductions in both overall and
peak demand.
continued...
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Author(s) (Year) Research Topic Results
Corbett (2013) Smart meters and consumption
feedback
Smart meters improve utilities’
demand-side management
efforts but also require organi-
zational changes.
Darby (2006) Literature review Real-time direct feedback in
combination with indirect
feedback through accurate
billing can lead to sustained
reductions over time in overall
demand.
Darby (2010a) Literature review Improved consumption feed-
back is necessary but not
sufficient for reducing overall
and peak demand.
Darby (2010b) Smart meters and customer
engagement
Significant reductions in overall
demand require careful design
of customer engagement.
Darby (2012) Smart meters and energy
poverty
Smart meters can help the
energy poor by helping them
manage their consumption.
Davis et al. (2013) Smart meters and pilot studies Significant bias exists in the
experimental design of many
studies regarding smart meters
and their impact on consump-
tion feedback.
Cosmo, Lyons, and
Nolan (2014)
Smart meters and TOU pricing Consumers significantly re-
duce peak demand after the
introduction of TOU prices and
information feedback.
Faruqui and Sergici
(2010)
Literature review Households respond to dy-
namic pricing by reducing peak
demand but the magnitude
of price response depends on
multiple factors.
continued...
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Author(s) (Year) Research Topic Results
Faruqui, Sergici,
and Akaba (2013)
Smart meters and dynamic
pricing
Residential customers respond
to dynamic pricing. Response
to critical peak pricing is simi-
lar to response to critical peak
rebates.
Faruqui, Sergici,
and Akaba (2014)
Smart meters and dynamic
pricing
Demand response to critical
peak pricing is greater than re-
sponse to critical peak rebates.
Gans, Alberini, and
Longo (2013)
Smart meters and consumption
feedback
Feedback reduces overall de-
mand by 11-17% on average.
Gilbert and Zivin
(2014)
Smart meters and consumption
feedback
More frequent billing and
reminders reduce overall house-
hold energy consumption by
0.6–1%, but there is significant
heterogeneity in responses.
Guerreiro et al.
(2015)
Sociopsychological factors
influencing the use of smart
meters
Subjective norms, perceived
utility and risk, procedural
justice, and time of use are
important factors influencing
the use of smart meters.
Hargreaves, Nye,
and Burgess (2013)
Smart meters and consumption
feedback
Over the longer term, en-
ergy monitors fall into the
background and have limited
potential for reducing overall
consumption.
Hartway, Price, and
Woo (1999)
Smart meters and TOU pricing TOU pricing can be profitable
to utilities.
Herter (2007) Smart meters and critical peak
pricing
High-use customers reduce
peak demand more than low-
use customers but low-use
customers save more on elec-
tricity bills annually.
continued...
44
...continued
Author(s) (Year) Research Topic Results
Herter and Wayland
(2010)
Smart meters and critical peak
pricing
Larger users reduce peak de-
mand the most. There is no
significant difference in peak
demand reductions with a
higher critical peak price com-
pared to a baseline critical peak
price.
Herter, McAuliffe,
and Rosenfeld
(2007)
Smart meters and critical peak
pricing
Customers with automated
load control technologies re-
duce peak demand more than
those without such technolo-
gies.
Herter, Wood, and
Blozis (2013)
Smart meters and dynamic
pricing
Customers with dynamic pric-
ing reduce peak load more than
those in load control programs.
Ivanov et al. (2013) Smart meters and peak demand Households with in-home dis-
plays and smart thermostats
reduce peak demand by 15%
compared to those without
such technologies.
Jessoe and Rapson
(2014)
Smart meters and consumption
feedback
Consumption feedback fa-
cilitates learning, leading to
reductions in overall and peak
demand.
Kendel and Lazaric
(2015)
Smart meters and consumption
feedback
Smart meters should be com-
bined with other measures like
smart rates in order to have
greater impacts on reducing
overall and peak demand.
Léautier (2014) Smart meters and dynamic
pricing
Savings from real time pricing
is negligible for most residen-
tial consumers, casting doubt
on the value of deploying
smart meters to this class of
customers.
continued...
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Matsukawa (2016) Smart meters and dynamic
pricing
Critical peak pricing combined
with in-home displays lead
to greater reductions in peak
demand.
McKerracher and
Torriti (2013)
Smart meters and consumption
feedback
Overall energy savings from
real-time feedback with in-
home displays are less than
previously found with larger
and more representative sam-
ples.
Olmos et al. (2011) Smart meters and dynamic
pricing
Indirect feedback, critical peak
pricing, and simple TOU pric-
ing together lead to the greatest
reductions in overall and peak
demand.
Simshauser and
Downer (2012)
Smart meters and dynamic
pricing
Dynamic pricing improves load
factors by 9 percentage points.
Torriti (2012) Smart meters and TOU pricing TOU pricing leads to higher
average overall consumption
as well as load shifting in
mornings but not in evenings.
Torriti (2014) Smart meters and consumption
feedback
Smart meters reduce over-
all demand by 29.8% and by
5.2% more compared to load
controllers.
Torriti (2016) Literature review Energy savings from smart me-
ters with consumption feedback
has declined in studies over
time, owing to larger and more
representative sample sizes.
Tsuda et al. (2017) Literature review The effectiveness of demand
response instruments depends
on the characteristics of con-
sumers, location, and climate.
continued...
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Wolak (2011) Smart meters and dynamic
pricing
The transaction costs of re-
sponding to real-time pricing
are negligible for residential
consumers.
Zhang, Siebers, and
Aickelin (2016)
User learning As consumers become more
experienced with smart meters
they save more energy, but
consumer interest must be
maintained over time.
Technology
Erlinghagen, Licht-
ensteiger, and
Markard (2015)
Smart meter communication
standards
Many standards exist but are
not necessarily interoperable,
posing difficulties.
Gerpott and Pauk-
ert (2013)
Consumer valuation of smart
meters
Consumer trust in data pri-
vacy and intention to change
behavior are strongly related to
willingness to pay.
Katz (2014) Smart meters and demand
response
Smart meters provide necessary
information but other policies
are needed to ensure demand
response.
Kaufmann, Künzel,
and Loock (2013)
Consumer valuation of smart
meters
Most consumers perceive a pos-
itive value from smart meters
and are willing to pay for them.
Kavousian, Ra-
jagopal, and Fischer
(2013)
Smart meter data Weather, location, and floor
area are the most important fac-
tors in residential consumption
of electricity.
Krishnamurti et al.
(2012)
Consumer valuation of smart
meters
Consumers confuse smart me-
ters with in-home displays and
other related technologies and
expect savings to be immediate.
continued...
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Kurth (2013) Smart meters and market
design
Smart meters act as the inter-
face between the grid and the
market. Technological stan-
dards are crucial to achieving
the most effective deployment
by avoiding obsolescence and
enabling interoperability.
Leiva, Palacios, and
Aguado (2016)
Smart meters and energy policy Smart meter standards are
needed to facilitate energy
management applications and
electric vehicle charging.
Marvin, Chappells,
and Guy (1999)
Environmental innovation Different smart meter technical
development pathways can be
identified and inserting envi-
ronmental concerns into any
one is only partially a technical
problem.
McKenna, Richard-
son, and Thomson
(2012)
Smart meter data Privacy issues can delay the
deployment of smart meters if
not adequately addressed.
McHenry (2013) Smart meters and governance Maximizing smart meter ben-
efits requires collaboration
and planning across multiple
stakeholders.
Pepermans (2014) Consumer valuation of smart
meters
Consumer preferences are het-
erogeneous with respect to cost
savings and privacy. Dynamic
pricing receives low value.
Urban (2016) Smart meter data privacy Privacy and security threats
from smart meter data can
impose significant social
costs if not addressed before
widespread smart meter use.
continued...
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Diffusion
Chou and Yutami
(2014)
Consumer adoption of smart
meters
Perceived usefulness, ease of
use, and low risk are associated
with an increased propensity to
adopt smart meters.
Dedrick et al. (2015) Adoption of smart grid tech-
nologies
Adoption of smart grid tech-
nologies, like smart meters,
requires organizational and
regulatory changes.
Inderberg (2015) Smart meter diffusion policy Smart meter diffusion in Nor-
way was led by national reg-
ulators. Consumer interest
groups had little influence in
the process.
Jennings (2013) Smart meter diffusion policy Effective deployment strategies
target the correct group of cus-
tomers based on the purposes
for smart meter use.
Schiavo et al. (2013) Smart grid policy and regula-
tion
Regulation must change to fos-
ter innovation in electric power
systems and related experience
is key.
Pupillo and Serre
(2013)
Smart meter diffusion policy Government must play an
active role to guarantee the
diffusion of smart meters.
Rixen and Weigand
(2013)
Smart meter diffusion simula-
tion
The rate of diffusion is affected
by learning and the level of
diffusion is affected by cost-
benefit thresholds.
Rixen and Weigand
(2014)
Smart meter diffusion simula-
tion
The best policy instrument for
encouraging adoption of smart
meters depends on specific
objectives.
continued...
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Spodniak (2011) Smart meter diffusion Central East European coun-
tries lag the rest of Europe in
smart meter adoption. The
lack of standards has slowed
adoption.
Spodniak, Jantunen,
and Viljainen (2014)
Smart meter diffusion The role of the state in smart
meter diffusion decreases after
the market has developed.
Wunderlich (2013) Consumer adoption of smart
meters
Consumer attitudes and per-
ceived locus of causality and
control are important variables
influencing adoption.
Zhang (2010) Smart meter diffusion policy Government initiatives and
regulatory policies have played
a major role in the diffusion of
smart meters around the world.
Zhang and Nuttall
(2011)
Smart meter diffusion simula-
tion
Agent-based models of smart
meter diffusion can inform
policy options.
Zhou and Matisoff
(2016)
Smart meter diffusion policy Public policies supporting
smart meters are more impor-
tant for their diffusion than
social interest groups or selec-
tion regimes.
Evaluation
Faruqui, Harris,
and Hledik (2010)
Cost-benefit analysis of smart
meters
The additional benefits of smart
meters from dynamic pricing,
beyond their operational ben-
efits, are necessary to achieve
positive net benefits from adop-
tion.
Cook et al. (2012) Cost-benefit analysis of smart
meters
Smart meters have substantial
positive net benefits.
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As the table shows, the majority of research can be classified as behavioral re-
search related to consumption feedback and time-varying electricity prices, primarily for
consumers in the residential customer class. These studies typically analyze smart me-
ters combined with in-home displays that provide direct consumption feedback in real
time. The literature reviews for studies of smart meters and their impact on consump-
tion are especially useful for assessing the general findings of the behavioral research.
In particular, Torriti (2016, 61–82) performs a systematic review of behavioral studies
and finds that the estimated reductions in overall and peak demand from using smart
meters with consumption feedback has declined in studies over time. The author argues
that this finding primarily derives from improved sample design in more recent studies
resulting in larger and more representative sample sizes. Earlier studies often faced a
self-selection bias where motivated and energy-conscious consumers were more likely
to participate in behavioral studies. The finding of a smaller demand reduction effect
is important because these energy savings influence cost-benefit evaluations of smart
meter adoption.
Behavioral studies have also been conducted by the industry itself as well as gov-
ernment agencies. Research on the impact of time-varying rates on consumer behavior
stretches back to the 1970s and 1980s, such as the Electric Utility Rate Design Study car-
ried out by the Electric Power Research Institute. EPRI (2009) summarizes the literature
on residential consumption feedback and proposes a theoretical economic framework
and research collaboration strategy to address further research questions. Ehrhardt-
Martinez, Donnelly, and Laitner (2010) perform a systematic review of residential con-
sumption feedback programs and find that some types of feedback are more effective
than others. The authors also note that studies are needed with larger sample sizes ex-
tended over longer time periods to assess the persistence of energy savings. Foster and
Mazur-Stommen (2012) review results from recent industry studies of real-time con-
sumption feedback and find significant heterogeneity among consumers with respect to
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demand reductions. Additionally, Darby et al. (2015) summarize the UK experience with
smart meter deployments and identify best practices for consumer engagement. The
Recovery Act SGIG program also funded behavioral studies for some subsidized smart
meter deployments in order to produce more rigorous experimental designs testing the
impact of different time-varying rate designs on peak demand reduction. Descriptions
of these projects are summarized by Cappers, Todd, and Goldman (2013) and analysis of
results can be found in DOE (2016b).
Apart from consumer behavior, other research topics have concerned such issues
as smart meter data privacy and technology standards. Additionally, although there are
numerous cost-benefit studies by utilities as part of their smart meter business cases,
there are relatively few in academic outlets. The social research not explicitly concerned
with the technological innovation aspects of smart meters is indirectly related to studies
of smart meter diffusion through the expected impacts of the diffusion of this technol-
ogy. The most relevant prior research for analyzing the diffusion of smart meters is
relatively small, and I will discuss these studies in greater detail later when describing
my empirical analysis.
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CHAPTER IV
MODELS OF TECHNOLOGY DIFFUSION
Technology diffusion can be modelled theoretically and empirically as well as
with simulations. In this chapter I provide a brief overview of theoretical models of
technology diffusion and link them to empirical research. Surveys of diffusion models
and empirical findings in the economics literature, from which I draw, can be found
in Stoneman (1983, 1987b, 2002), Thirtle and Ruttan (1987), Metcalfe (1988), Grübler
(1990, 11–69), Dosi (1991), Lissoni and Metcalfe (1994), Karshenas and Stoneman (1995),
Sarkar (1998), Baptista (1999), Geroski (2000), Hoppe (2002), Hall (2005), and Stoneman
and Battisti (2010). Studies of the diffusion of innovations span multiple disciplines,
and I focus here on models of diffusion found in the economics literature. The models
I describe focus specifically on the adoption of technologies by firms. I neglect models
analyzing consumer adoption of technology as well as models analyzing the impact
of technology diffusion on economic growth and development, though there is some
overlap.
4.1 Theoretical Models of Technology Diffusion
Theoretical models of technology diffusion can be categorized into four types:
epidemic, probit, game theory, and evolutionary models. Each type of model attempts
to explain why the diffusion of technology does not occur instantaneously, as observed
widely in empirical data. These models primarily concern interfirm diffusion but they
can typically be extended to cover intrafirm diffusion as well. Each model contributes
unique insights on the diffusion process that may be suited to particular settings. Nel-
son, Peterhansl, and Sampat (2004), for example, argue that diffusion is a complex and
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varied process such that a plurality of theoretical perspectives is beneficial. The major
differences among the theories lie in whether the diffusion process is conceptualized
as a disequilibrium or an equilibrium process, whether it is driven by endogenous or
exogenous forces, and whether adoption decisions are modeled using bounded or un-
bounded rationality.
4.1.1 Epidemic Models
The first theoretical models of technology diffusion relied on an analogy with
medical epidemics, stemming from the characteristic S-curve observed in empirical
data. This type of model, later termed an epidemic model, revolves around informa-
tion, expectations, risk and uncertainty, and learning. In essence, the model is based on
imperfect information about a technology on the part of potential users.
A simple epidemic model presupposes a homogeneous population of potential
users that does not change over time. Interaction among innovators and the rest of the
population spreads (or infects) others with information about the technology, leading
others to adopt. As more potential users adopt, the probability of adopting for nonusers
increases, reaching a maximum rate and then decreasing because of an unchanging
population size. Information regarding the technology grows over time with associated
reductions in uncertainty surrounding the technology. When combined with compet-
itive pressures this information encourages more and more potential users to adopt.
Such a process can be represented mathematically by a logistic equation that traces an
S-curve over time, although other sigmoid or ogive functions can also be used. Such S-
curves can be symmetric, as in a logistic or normal specification, but are often observed
empirically to be asymmetric, as in a Gompertz specification. The mathematical formu-
lations of epidemic models are especially useful for forecasting and simulation purposes,
although such uses do not necessarily have an explicit theoretical underpinning related
to a learning process. They are also useful for describing and comparing diffusion phe-
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nomena at a macro level without resorting to any theoretical framework at the micro
level.
Epidemic models represent diffusion as an endogenous, disequilibrium process
involving the transition from one long-run equilibrium of technology use to another.
Griliches (1957) and Mansfield (1961, 1968) are early, pioneering studies of diffusion
based on epidemic models. Epidemic models can also be applied to intrafirm diffusion
where the emphasis is placed on intrafirm learning (Mansfield 1963a, 1968).
One point of concern is the different types of information that can be transmit-
ted. Awareness of a technology, one type of information, does not automatically lead to
adoption. An evaluation process must take place first. Firms decide to adopt technolo-
gies based on their expected benefits, which are often uncertain. In this sense learning is
integrally tied to reducing uncertainty about the benefits of a technology and also high-
lights the potential difference between information and knowledge. Information about
a technology can concern its hardware or software aspects and their related codified or
tacit knowledge dimensions. Awareness often highlights information about the hard-
ware aspects in addition to codified knowledge, but persuasion typically requires tacit
knowledge of the software aspects. The benefits of a technology may only be revealed
through learning by using or through knowledge spillovers from existing users.
Information, furthermore, can be received from both external and internal influ-
ences (Lekvall and Wahlbin 1973). External sources include media and advertising from
suppliers. Internal sources include peers. The interactive element in peer-to-peer learn-
ing reveals the potential importance of social and economic networks in the diffusion
of new technologies. Learning is also costly, which can have significant impacts on the
diffusion process. The complexity of a technology, in part, determines its own diffusion.
Epidemic models predict a faster rate of diffusion for simpler technologies with clearly
defined and perceived benefits.
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Epidemic models have been critiqued on a number of grounds. Some critiques
include the static, homogeneous population of potential users, unchanging technol-
ogy, passive information processing on the part of potential users, and general lack of
standard economic content concerning decision making. The exact nature of the inter-
personal exchange of information in the model and the potential for other sources of
information such as knowledge spillovers from rival firms is also a point of issue.
A fundamental critique of epidemic models is the lack of heterogeneity among
potential adopters, although early users of the model were certainly aware of the im-
portance of firm heterogeneity in their empirical applications. The degree of homophily
in the population, for example, can impact the effectiveness of communication and per-
suasion among potential users. The ability of users to learn is another important factor
affecting adoption decisions, as well as their degree of risk aversion. Despite these cri-
tiques, more sophisticated epidemic models can and have been developed to address
these issues (Geroski 2000). Antonelli (1989) provides a neo-epidemic perspective on
diffusion—similar to evolutionary approaches discussed later—by integrating bounded
rationality assumptions into a micro-level framework that gives rise to a collective learn-
ing process. Many of the extensions of epidemic models can be found in the marketing
literature, influenced by the seminal Bass model (Bass 1969). These are surveyed in Ma-
hajan and Peterson (1985), Mahajan, Muller, and Bass (1990), and Meade and Islam
(2006).
4.1.2 Probit Models
The desire for choice-based or decision-theoretic models and an emphasis on
the heterogeneity of firm characteristics led to the development of technology adop-
tion models based on conventional microeconomic reasoning. These models were later
termed probit models from their empirical applications. They assume a heterogeneous
population of unboundedly rational, profit-maximizing firms where the costs and ben-
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efits from adoption may differ across firms as a result of differences in firm characteris-
tics such as size, previous investments, or organizational factors. Firms compare benefits
to costs and adopt if a threshold where benefits exceed costs is met. Simple models as-
sume perfect information while extensions incorporate imperfect information. David
(1969) and Davies (1979) are early examples of probit models.
A characteristic S-shaped diffusion path can be obtained in probit models from
the changing costs and benefits over time specific to each firm, resulting in a distribu-
tion of adoption times. An increase in the number of adopters of a technology can occur
either from a decrease in the costs or an increase in the benefits of adopting. Subse-
quently, the rate of diffusion is determined by the rate of change in costs and benefits.
The costs and benefits themselves change exogenously either from changes in the adop-
tion environment or changes in firm characteristics, and these changes can occur simul-
taneously affecting diffusion through multiple processes (Cabe 1991).
Probit models represent diffusion as an exogenous, equilibrium process. The
equilibrium level of adopters reached in each time period is determined by costs and
benefits in such a way that the diffusion process is represented by a sequence of chang-
ing equilibrium states over time. In contrast to epidemic models, probit models do not
necessarily result in a saturation point where all potential users of a technology ulti-
mately adopt. Some firms may find it unprofitable to adopt at any time or the costs
and benefits of adopting change such that further diffusion ceases after a certain time
period. In addition, probit models have been extended to the intrafirm dimension by
Battisti (2000) and Battisti and Stoneman (2005), where the intensity of use of a technol-
ogy within a firm is also determined within a profit-maximizing framework.
Critiques of probit models have been made in a few areas. The basic assump-
tions of this type of model do not include the possibility of interaction or strategic be-
havior among firms. Probit models also do not account for potential endogenous rela-
tionships in the diffusion process. Moreover, the models rely on strong assumptions
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about firm behavior, including rationality and perfect foresight. Some models, though,
assume myopic expectations within a profit-maximizing framework. Probit models in-
corporating learning and the formation of expectations by firms have been developed as
well.
4.1.3 Game Theory Models
Sharing the assumptions of firm behavior found in probit models, game theory
models analyze the impact of strategic interaction on technology adoption decisions.
Reinganum (1981b) and Reinganum (1981a) develop the first game theory models ap-
plied to technology diffusion, from which other work is derived. In these models a styl-
ized S-curve can be generated from strategic behavior related to the timing of adoption.
First-mover advantages play a role here. The stock of adopters in any given time period
may also impact the benefits of adopting for nonadopters. Further work in game theory
models has involved issues of pre-emption and rent equalization in adoption timing
(Fudenberg and Tirole 1985) as well as intrafirm diffusion (Stoneman 2013).
Game theory models show that even if homogeneous firms and perfect infor-
mation are assumed diffusion occurs over time as a result of the interdependence of
adoption decisions. In contrast, a probit model with the same assumptions but with
a lack of interaction results in instantaneous diffusion. Additionally, the endogenous
evolution of market structure stemming from the diffusion of a new technology is a
possibility in these models. Critiques of game theory models are similar to critiques of
probit models with respect to the strong assumptions about firm behavior.
4.1.4 Evolutionary Models
Critiques of the neoclassical unbounded rationality assumption led to the de-
velopment of evolutionary models of technology diffusion. These models are distinct
from the previously described models, but they share certain characteristics from each
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of them. They are based on an evolutionary outlook on economics that is different from
neoclassical conceptions. At the core of the evolutionary perspective are boundedly
rational firms operating in irreducibly uncertain environments.
Evolutionary models view diffusion as a multistage process through which tech-
nology, firms, and the adoption environment change and co-evolve over time endoge-
nously, such that the process is cumulative and adaptive and integrates variation, selec-
tion, and innovation (Grübler 1991, 1996; Silverberg 1991; Metcalfe 1988, 2005a). This
view is consistent with nonlinear models of innovation in which invention, innovation,
and diffusion can operate in parallel and with feedback. Changing environmental condi-
tions can lead to different selection pressures over time amidst a variety of technological
options. Competitive pressures may cause unfit firms to lose market share or exit an in-
dustry from not adopting profitable technologies. Time is viewed in historical terms as
irreversible, and path dependence in technology adoption decisions is possible such that
firm-specific capabilities and strategies built over time or decisions in the early stages
of the diffusion process can significantly influence the path of diffusion. The presence
of dynamic increasing returns to adoption is also important. These cumulative effects
determine the path of diffusion, hence the evolutionary nature of the models. A charac-
teristic S-curve can be obtained from learning and related reductions in uncertainty as
well as imitation of successful adopting firms. Silverberg, Dosi, and Orsenigo (1988) is
an early example of an evolutionary model of innovation and diffusion.
Evolutionary models share with epidemic models the notion that diffusion can
be self-propagating but they incorporate active search and learning processes on the
part of firms instead of the passive acquisition of information. They share with probit
models an emphasis on the heterogeneity of firms and with game theory models the
possibility of strategic interaction and endogenous changes in firm size and market
structure, but they do so within a disequilibrium framework and with assumptions of
bounded rationality. A disequilibrium perspective is rooted in the idea of circular and
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cumulative causation where economic phenomena are viewed as adaptive processes
not necessarily tied to an ultimate end of equilibrium. Bounded rationality is the no-
tion that cognition is a scarce resource and that the costs of making decisions lead to
nonoptimizing behaviors and strategies in uncertain environments (Conlisk 1996; Lee
2011; Mallard 2012; Todd and Gigerenzer 2012). Furthermore, bounded rationality can
be connected to a disequilibrium perspective by viewing nonoptimizing behavior as pro-
cedural rationality in which decisions are refined and adapted over time in a learning
process.
Much of evolutionary theorizing in the economics of innovation can be captured
by replicator equations, originally developed to explain the evolution of populations in
biology (Andersen 2004). The evolutionary approach models diffusion as the evolving
population of technologies and their relative importance as a result of variety genera-
tion and selection mechanisms (Metcalfe 2005a). In this way evolutionary models view
innovation and diffusion as interconnected processes. Other evolutionary models may
be based on Pólya urns or on evolutionary game theory (Dosi and Kaniovski 1994). A
general critique of evolutionary models is that they may overcomplicate representations
of the diffusion process, providing little marginal value over simpler neoclassical ap-
proaches. They also include elements that are not easily quantified and thus cannot be
formally modeled with mathematics (Grupp 1998, 75–76).
4.1.5 Comparing Theoretical Models
The differing theoretical models of diffusion are not necessarily mutually exclu-
sive, even among evolutionary and nonevolutionary models. Nonevolutionary models
can be interpreted as special cases of evolutionary models when firms possess perfect
information and history does not affect current outcomes. In this way evolutionary
models are robust to misspecification of assumptions concerning rationality and his-
tory. It is important to note that the different models simply emphasize one aspect of
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the diffusion process, usually at the expense of the other potential determinants. Even
these formal models do not necessarily capture all the potential determinants affecting
the diffusion of a technology. The development of technology standards, for example,
may play a key role in diffusion, and institutional factors like regulation are also impor-
tant. Such factors may be integrated into some models of diffusion indirectly through
changes in the adoption environment, but they may be endogenous and are typically
difficult to quantify (Grupp 1998, 51–52; Sarkar 1998).
The variety and complexity of diffusion processes precludes the construction of
a general model of diffusion (Gold, Peirce, and Rosegger 1970; Nelson, Peterhansl, and
Sampat 2004). This complexity, however, does not preclude a general list of potential
determinants that may impact a diffusion process, from which relevant factors may in-
form the use of appropriate models. Nelson, Peterhansl, and Sampat (2004) provide a
typology of diffusion processes that is useful in this regard, based on the presence or ab-
sence of dynamic increasing returns and sharp, persuasive feedback. Probit models are
arguably more appropriate when the benefits of a technology are clear or when increas-
ing returns are absent. Evolutionary models are arguably more appropriate when there
is substantial uncertainty regarding the benefits of a technology or when increasing re-
turns are present, as in path-dependent processes. Table 4 summarizes and compares
the theoretical models described above. The major differences exist between equilibrium
and disequilibrium frameworks.
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Table 4. Comparison of Technology Diffusion Theories.
Model Framework Characteristics
Epidemic Disequilibrium Endogenous reductions in uncertainty from
learning through the spread of information
Probit Equilibrium Heterogeneous, profit-maximizing firms re-
sponding to exogenous changes in technology
and adoption environment
Game Theory Equilibrium Strategic behavior in the timing of adoption
Evolutionary Disequilibrium Heterogeneous, satisficing firms adapting
to endogenous changes in technology and
adoption environment
Other models of technology diffusion not covered above or constrained to one
theoretical perspective focus on specific applied issues. Diffusion occurs over both time
and space so that geography may be a causal factor in the diffusion of new technologies
(Hägerstrand (1953) 1967; Brown 1981). Substitution models depict the diffusion process
as the displacement of an older technology for a newer technology, which is not always
explicitly considered in diffusion models (Fisher and Pry 1971; Sharif and Kabir 1976).
Other areas of research include the impact of regulation on adoption decisions (Capron
1971; Sweeney 1981), the adoption of complementary innovations (Antonelli 1993; Stone-
man and Kwon 1994; Colombo and Mosconi 1995; Stoneman and Toivanen 1997; Battisti,
Colombo, and Rabbiosi 2015), and network externalities and path dependence (David
1985; Farrell and Saloner 1985, 1986; Katz and Shapiro 1985, 1986; Arthur 1989). Further-
more, some research has modeled interaction between supply and demand in shaping
technology choices (Metcalfe 1981; Stoneman and Ireland 1983; Stoneman 1987b, 80–97;
Antonelli 1989). There may also be interaction between interfirm and intrafirm diffusion
processes that has not been sufficiently covered in theoretical models. Suggestions and
pathways for future research in the economics of technological diffusion can be found in
Stoneman (2002, 303–306) and Stoneman and Battisti (2010).
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4.2 Empirical Models of Technology Diffusion
Different theoretical perspectives on the determinants of the diffusion of tech-
nology inform the choice of empirical methods for analyzing real-world diffusion phe-
nomena. Empirical work in the study of diffusion has involved case study, historical,
and econometric methods. All of these methods can be complementary to one another
and if used together can provide a fuller understanding of the diffusion process than
any one method alone. Case study methods refer to in-depth analysis of the adoption
decisions of a firm or small set of firms. Historical methods refer to the analysis of pri-
mary sources and other historical evidence to reconstruct diffusion processes and their
determinants. Econometric methods refer to the use of regression analysis to assess the
determinants of diffusion processes. Econometric analysis can be distinguished by the
use of aggregate or disaggregate models (Karshenas and Stoneman 1995). Aggregate
models assess the overall diffusion path by focusing on the number of adopters of a
technology or proportion of output produced by a technology. They are typically used
to compare diffusion patterns across technologies, industries, or countries. Disaggre-
gate models focus on the decision-making processes of firms and typically concern the
timing of adoption decisions.
Numerous approaches to disaggregate econometric analysis of diffusion phe-
nomena have been used, but duration models are generally regarded as the best ap-
proach because of their explicit modeling of the timing of adoption. Regression models
applied to technology adoption include binary and multinomial choice models, count
data models, panel data models, duration models, or combinations of these. The avail-
ability of data has been a major limitation in empirical studies. This is especially the
case for the intrafirm dimension. In particular, lack of data on the timing of adoption
decisions leads to the use of econometric models other than duration models. Panel
data covering a sufficient amount of time is ideal, tracking adoption and intensity of use
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within firms along with relevant covariates. Such data are rare (Karshenas and Stone-
man 1995; Stoneman 2002, 95–105).
In the existing empirical literature Griliches (1957) and Mansfield (1961, 1963a,
1968) are early examples that transformed the logistic equation from epidemic models
into econometric models of interfirm and intrafirm diffusion. Many studies have uti-
lized similar methods. Nabseth and Ray (1974) is another early example employing case
study methods with some econometric analysis (where the data allowed) inspired by
the preceding works. The relevance of duration models for diffusion were later recog-
nized. Karshenas and Stoneman (1993) developed a flexible duration model that can
incorporate a variety of potential determinants of a diffusion process arising from mul-
tiple theoretical perspectives. The authors categorize the potential determinants as epi-
demic effects (from epidemic models), rank effects (from probit models), and order and
stock effects (from game theory models). They do not, however, explicitly address evo-
lutionary perspectives. Their general framework has been used frequently in empirical
research, primarily for studies of interfirm diffusion. The analysis of intrafirm diffu-
sion may also be accommodated by duration models by specifying an extensive level of
adoption and analyzing the time from a basic level of adoption until an extensive level
of adoption. Foster and Wild (1999) and Foster (2004) examine econometric analysis
from an evolutionary perspective with discussions of application to innovation diffusion
based on an augmented logistic diffusion model.
The joint analysis of interfirm and intrafirm diffusion is another issue in the lit-
erature. Multistate duration models have been proposed by Karshenas and Stoneman
(1995) as a way to model interfirm and intrafirm diffusion jointly, but they require sub-
stantial amounts of data. Multistate models have yet to be implemented in the literature,
however, most likely owing to a lack of data. Sequence analysis is an extension of multi-
state models also appropriate for the study of diffusion. Multinomial choice models or
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bivariate probit models can also be used by differentiating between basic adopters and
extensive adopters.
The selection of an appropriate empirical model is determined by a number of
factors. Data availability is a fundamental determinant. Research questions are another,
such as a focus on the level versus the rate of diffusion. Theory must also play a guiding
role in model selection. A thorough understanding of the technology under study and
its historical, social, and economic contexts is imperative. In general, duration models
are best equipped to explain the dynamics of technology diffusion because of their abil-
ity to use panel data and their explicit focus on the timing of adoption decisions. They
model diffusion as a dynamic process and can be used with any theoretical perspective.
Evolutionary perspectives, however, may require alternative approaches, though there
is little empirical literature taking an explicitly evolutionary view that uses econometric
methods. The relative complexity of evolutionary theories of diffusion highlights the
potential limitations of econometric analysis when nonlinear, endogenous, and path
dependent relationships are important characteristics of the diffusion phenomena un-
der study. Qualitative variables such as institutions, social norms, and historical events
are not always easily measured or amenable to econometric analysis. Evolutionary ap-
proaches more often use detailed historical and case study methods as alternatives or
complements to econometric methods. In this way, evolutionary perspectives align with
general critiques of econometrics that this research method cannot answer all questions
and often neglects other sources of data and vernacular economic knowledge. Instead,
this approach promotes pluralistic applied research methods with differential strengths
and weaknesses that collectively advance knowledge of a subject through triangulation
(Sarkar 1998; Swann 2006; Starr 2014).
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4.3 Simulation Models of Technology Diffusion
Computer simulations offer a third mode of investigating diffusion phenomena.
This is important given the general paucity of adequate data on diffusion processes.
Simulation models are computer programs informed by theory and calibrated with ref-
erence to empirical data. Simulations can take the form of system dynamics models or
agent-based models. System dynamics models are based on difference or differential
equations, as found in epidemic models, whereas agent-based models are based on al-
gorithms representing agent behavior, conducive to decision-theoretic models. These
techniques originated from the study of complex systems, which are characterized by
pervasive heterogeneity among agents, uncertainty and bounded rationality, interdepen-
dence and feedback, nonlinearity, emergence, and adaptation. Agent-based models are
particularly useful for evolutionary perspectives in economics, where the economy is
viewed as a complex adaptive system (Lane 1993a, 1993b; Watts and Gilbert 2014).
In agent-based models heterogeneous agents are embedded in social and eco-
nomic networks and interact with one another over time. These models are typically
calibrated to accord with specific economic and historical contexts surrounding the dif-
fusion of a technology. In this regard, agent-based models can overcome some of the
limitations of both mathematical and econometric models. They can more easily explore
interactive behavior and nonlinear and endogenous processes. One important advan-
tage of these models is overcoming the limitations of theoretical representative agent
models that assume homogeneous agents in order to be analytically tractable. Nelson
and Winter (1982) is an early example in the economics literature using computer sim-
ulations informed by evolutionary theory and concerning the search processes of firms
with respect to technology generation and adoption. Silverberg, Dosi, and Orsenigo
(1988) develop an evolutionary model of technology diffusion and use computer sim-
ulations to investigate their theory. More recently, Watts and Gilbert (2014) provide a
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broad overview of agent-based models applied to innovation phenomena, with a focus
on diffusion.
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CHAPTER V
DETERMINANTS OF EARLY SMART METER DIFFUSION
IN THE UNITED STATES
Theoretical models of technology diffusion elucidate the potential determinants
of the early diffusion of smart meters in the United States. These relevant determinants
can then be considered in empirical analysis. In this chapter I describe the relevant de-
terminants and classify them into supply-side, demand-side, and environmental cate-
gories. I also provide expected effects of the determinants on smart meter diffusion.
5.1 Determinants of Technology Diffusion
The determinants of the diffusion of new technologies among firms can be
grouped into three general categories: supply, demand, and environment (DePietro,
Wiarda, and Fleischer 1990; Wejnert 2002). The significance and impact of any given
determinant may differ across the interfirm and intrafirm dimensions. Supply-side fac-
tors include the nature of the technology, improvements in performance, technology
standards, related infrastructure, entrepreneurship and marketing, production capacity,
market structure, and cost structure (Rosenberg 1972; Brown 1981; Gold 1981; Stoneman
and Ireland 1983; Miller and Garnsey 2000; Stoneman 2002, 78–92). Demand-side factors
include user learning, both across and within firms, and heterogeneous firm characteris-
tics, such as size, financial resources, absorptive capacity, and managerial strategy (Gold
1981; Stoneman 2002, 29–54). Environmental factors concern the adoption environment
and include public policies, regulation, geography, or other dimensions (Gold 1981; Dosi
1991; Lissoni and Metcalfe 1994). There may also be interaction among all three general
types of determinants.
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Uncertainty, a fundamental aspect of economic activity, cuts across and influ-
ences all three categories. On the supply side, technology standards are one means to
reduce uncertainty with respect to product quality, upgradability, and interoperabil-
ity. On the demand side, potential adopters of a technology may be uncertain as to the
actual capabilities or benefits of a technology and there may be heterogeneous expecta-
tions, hence the potential importance of learning in the diffusion process. Additionally,
they may be uncertain about the potential technical improvements or changes in price
of the technology over time, impacting their profitability considerations and timing of
adoption. Environmental factors like public policy may also create or reduce uncertainty
by shaping the adoption environment (Rosenberg 1972, 1976; Ireland and Stoneman
1986; Stoneman 2002, 55–66).
The majority of diffusion research, both theoretical and empirical, has focused
on demand-side factors related to firm characteristics to the neglect of supply-side and
environmental factors. Furthermore, the interfirm and intrafirm diffusion processes may
have distinct determinants or they may be interdependent. Most research has exam-
ined these two processes separately, but recent empirical research has analyzed the two
components jointly (Battisti and Stoneman 2003; Åstebro 2004; Hollenstein 2004; Battisti
and Stoneman 2005; Battisti et al. 2007; Hollenstein and Woerter 2008; Battisti, Canepa,
and Stoneman 2009; Arvanitis and Ley 2013). The selection environment within which
adoption occurs as well as the relative importance of determinants may also change over
time, which has not been studied extensively. Collectively, these issues can complicate
empirical analysis considerably by requiring a greater theoretical sophistication and
substantial amounts of data.
The relevant determinants in the early diffusion of smart meters include all three
of the supply-side, demand-side, and environmental factors. Following Karshenas and
Stoneman (1993), these determinants are motivated from the major currents in diffusion
theory, including learning effects emphasized in epidemic and evolutionary models,
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firm-specific effects emphasized in probit and evolutionary models, and environmental
effects emphasized in evolutionary models and to a lesser extent in probit models.
5.2 Supply-Side Factors
Although the characteristics of adopters are the usual focus of diffusion research,
the supply side may play an equally important role. Relevant supply-side factors affect-
ing the diffusion of smart meters include price, competition among meter manufactur-
ers, changes in product quality over time, and technology standards.
The cost of AMI has an impact on the profitability calculations of utilities. Cost
reductions and improvements in technology performance over time can come about
through a cumulative process of learning by doing on the part of manufacturers (Ar-
row 1962b; Nakićenović 2002; Thompson 2010). The price of smart meters has declined
gradually over time since their introduction in the 1990s, likely the result of a general
decline in the costs of electronic products. The decline, however, has only been slight,
and the costs of communication systems and data management systems have remained
relatively stable. Product quality has increased gradually at the same time, including
an expanded capacity for upgradability. The cost of a smart meter may also depend
on the exact functions desired, such as import/export metering or remote connect and
disconnect. More functions generally incur a higher cost. The meters themselves repre-
sent roughly half the cost of an AMI system (FERC 2006; FERC 2010; EEI 2006a, 2006b;
Haney, Jamasb, and Pollitt 2009; EPRI 2011).
The supply side of the meter market has historically been competitive, and prod-
uct differentiation appears to be small. In the North American market, the major sup-
pliers of smart meters currently include Itron, GE, and Sensus and have included Lan-
dis+Gyr, Elster, and Aclara in the past. There are also many smaller entities with lesser
market shares. Globally there has been a trend toward consolidation among meter man-
ufacturers over the past two decades. During this time, electronic meters have overtaken
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the market share of electromechanical meters. The industry has largely come to view
AMI as the standard metering technology for the future, and manufacturing firms have
begun offering communication, data, analytics, and related services as a result. Manu-
facturing capacity on the part of these firms could potentially limit smart meter diffu-
sion depending on the number of large orders from utilities that occur at the same time
(ABS Energy Research 2005, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2010; Alejandro et al. 2014; Ulama 2015).
Technology standards can also play an important role in the diffusion of new
technology by organizing a common technical language that reduces transaction costs
and facilitates information diffusion (David 1987; Link and Tassey 1988; David and
Greenstein 1990; Link and Kapur 1994; Metcalfe and Miles 1994; Tassey 2000, 2015; Blind
2004). Though they are a supply-side phenomenon, their development typically de-
pends on user involvement. Standards can be categorized into two broad types, product
and nonproduct standards, both of which are relevant to the diffusion of smart meters.
Product standards refer to the functionality and design of the product, and nonproduct
standards refer to other technical aspects on which the product is not based. Utilities
may be reluctant to adopt smart meters, for example, if they are not certain that the
product they purchase takes accurate measurements, if they fear vendor lock-in because
of a lack of interoperability among smart grid technologies, or if they fear technologi-
cal obsolescence in an evolving technology space. Standards are especially important if
AMI is viewed as a technology platform and as foundational for the smart grid. Some
standards already exist and others are currently being developed. Various organizations
are involved with the standards setting process. Furthermore, there are standards for
both smart meters and the broader smart grid, related to communication networks and
the need for interoperability of devices connected to and interacting with the power
grid. The lack of standards, especially surrounding interoperability, has likely delayed
the diffusion of AMI (NETL 2008).
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The American National Standards Institute (ANSI), a private nonprofit organiza-
tion based in the United States, has coordinated the development of standards related
to smart meters in collaboration with the National Electrical Manufacturers Association
(NEMA). ANSI C12 is a set of standards related to electricity metering and are revised
and updated over time as metering technology evolves. These standards concern perfor-
mance criteria for electricity metering, including measurement accuracy, product design,
data tables, and interfaces for communication networks. They represent a combination
of product quality and interface standards. ANSI C12.1 and ANSI C12.20 cover mea-
surement accuracy and were revised in 2008 and 2009, respectively, to bolster product
quality. ANSI C12.19 defines how data collected by meters are structured and was last
revised in 2012 from its 2008 version. ANSI C12.22 covers the interoperability of meters
and their data with communication networks as well as the encryption of data. It was
last revised in 2012 from its 2008 version. Another standard, NEMA SG-AMI 1-2009,
was created in 2009 to enable firmware upgradability of smart meters, an important
issue related to technological obsolesence (NEMA 2017).
The National Institute of Standards and Technology, an organization sponsored
by the US federal government through the Department of Commerce, works with indus-
try to develop standards across a broad range of scientific and technological fields with
a focus on measurement. These standards are utilized by the previously described ANSI
standards. NIST was also tasked by the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007
to coordinate the development of technology standards and cybersecurity guidelines
for the smart grid in the United States. It has engaged multiple stakeholders in the de-
velopment process, including utilities, generators, product providers, consumers, and
regulators (NIST 2014a, 2014b, 2017).
With respect to smart meters, NIST works on measurement accuracy, grid edge
sensors, cybersecurity and data privacy, and the interoperability of meters with commu-
nication networks and data systems, including utility networks and behind-the-meter
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home area networks associated with demand response activities. NIST played a leading
role in encouraging early implementation of NEMA SG-AMI 1-2009. In 2009 NIST estab-
lished the Smart Grid Interoperability Panel (SGIP) to aid the ongoing development of
smart grid standards, originally as a public-private partnership. The SGIP has desired
an accelerated timeline for the development of these standards and has utilized a prior-
ity action plan process to achieve this. The AMI-related standards compose one of nine
priority areas. The organization eventually transformed into an industry-led nonprofit
in 2013. NIST and SGIP have also been involved with developing technical standards
for the Green Button Initiative, a program designed to facilitate access to electricity con-
sumption data for consumers. NIST also works internationally with other organizations
to develop smart grid standards, such as the International Electrotechnical Commis-
sion (IEC) whose IEC 61850 international standard is the basis for interoperability work
(GSGF 2014; NIST 2014a, 2014b, 2017).
5.3 Demand-Side Factors
Relevant demand-side factors in the diffusion of smart meters include firm char-
acteristics and learning processes. There are a number of heterogeneous utility charac-
teristics influencing the decision to adopt smart meters. Expectations, relating to price,
performance, or competing technologies, play a role in the timing of adoption. The ex-
pected profitability of adoption is calculated from the expected costs and benefits that
may vary across utilities, region, and time. These costs and benefits are explicitly identi-
fied in utility business cases for deploying smart meters. The relative advantage of AMI
over AMR, involving the additional functions beyond automation of the meter reading
process, may be viewed differently across utilities. AMI is compatible with the previous
adoption of AMR, owing to its direct evolution from AMR. AMI, however, constitutes a
more complex investment than AMR because of its more sophisticated communication
and data systems and potentially broader integration with other smart grid technologies.
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As a result, it may be more difficult for utilities to trial the technology, though pilot pro-
grams and demonstration projects are not uncommon for larger utilities. The adoption
of smart meters may also require organizational changes by utilities in order to realize
the full benefits of their use.
Smart meters are a capital-embodied process innovation that require substantial
investment. The cost of deploying AMI includes hardware and software costs as well as
installation, project management, adjustment, integration, and maintenance costs. De-
ployment costs can also vary depending on the type of deployment pursued, including
full, partial, targeted, or replacement deployment strategies. The benefits of deploying
smart meters include automation of the meter reading and billing processes, improved
operational management of the distribution grid, and improved customer service and
engagement. Additional benefits may be discovered through learning by using. In mak-
ing the decision to adopt smart meters, utilities weigh the expected costs against the
expected benefits. Cost-benefit analyses likely differ across utilities, region, and time
(NETL 2008; Haney, Jamasb, and Pollitt 2009; IEE 2011; EEI 2011; EPRI 2011).
Firm size is a widely analyzed variable in studies of innovation, and size can
often represent more than one relevant factor (Cohen 2010). Diffusion research has
typically found a positive association between firm size and the initial adoption of a
technology and a negative association between firm size and intensity of use (Mansfield
1963a, 1963b, 1968; Rose and Joskow 1990; Fuentelsaz, Gomez, and Polo 2003; Arvanitis
and Ley 2013). The inverse relationship between firm size and time to initial adoption
may stem from the ability of larger firms to more easily handle the costs and risks as-
sociated with technology adoption. It may also be related to greater financial resources,
more frequent capital turnover, closer relationships with equipment manufacturers,
and greater R&D capacity (Mansfield 1963b, 1968; Canepa and Stoneman 2005). Larger
firms may also find it more profitable than smaller firms to adopt technologies that have
significant labor-saving benefits depending on factor market conditions, and this adop-
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tion may enable further growth through economies of scale (David 1966). The absolute
level of investment required and the speed of decision-making processes in larger firms
may also slow down their intrafirm diffusion (Mansfield 1963a; Romeo 1975). Although
larger firms may have more frequent capital turnover, their larger stock of capital can
take longer to turnover completely as a result of vintage effects, which is the case for
long-lasting electricity meters. Additionally, if larger firms tend to be earlier adopters,
then they also generate the initial learning related to the actual benefits of adopting a
technology that can spill over to other firms. Knowledge spillovers can also influence
later adopters to adopt more intensively at a quicker pace. Utility size should have a
positive effect on the rate of interfirm diffusion for smart meters and a negative effect on
the rate of intrafirm diffusion.
For utilities, firm size overlaps to some extent with firm ownership. Investor-
owned utilities (IOUs) are typically much larger relative to municipal utilities (munis)
and co-operative utilities (co-ops). Utility ownership may impact adoption decisions
differently than size through differing organizational influences and incentives as well
as through regulation (Rose and Joskow 1990; Dedrick et al. 2015). Historically, munis
and co-ops have arguably been more engaged with their customers and more open to
investing in energy efficiency given their ownership structures. Insofar as smart meters
further such goals, these ownership structures should exert a positive effect on their
adoption. The general lack of regulatory burden for these utilities can also quicken the
pace of adoption. Additionally, co-ops are primarily rural and cover large geographic
areas, so the adoption of AMI should significantly reduce the costs of meter reads and
service switching. At the same time, munis and co-ops may be more financially con-
strained relative to IOUs, posing a barrier to adoption. In addition, public electric util-
ities can also be integrated with public water and gas utilities that may share metering
infrastructure, and a shared AMI infrastructure could be used for all these metering
needs resulting in additional cost savings. Some IOUs, however, also own and operate
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gas utilities and the same principle applies there. Municipal and co-operative owner-
ship should also have a positive impact on intrafirm diffusion strictly because of their
typically small size compared to IOUs.
Vintage effects may also impact adoption decisions (Mansfield 1963a, 1968; An-
tonelli 1993; Mulder, Groot, and Hofkes 2003; Das, Falaris, and Mulligan 2009). Vintage
effects may exist for those utilities that have previously adopted AMR technology, such
that the prior diffusion of AMR may impact the diffusion of AMI. Electronic meters
typically have a useful life of 10–20 years, so the prior installation of an AMR system
can increase the cost of adopting AMI through premature discontinuance of AMR. The
operational efficiencies resulting from a deployment of AMR also exist for AMI and will
have already been obtained if AMR has previously been deployed. Vintage effects can
negatively impact both the rate of interfirm and intrafirm diffusion if older meters are
replaced by newer smart meters over time. Additionally, most of the costs of adopting
AMI are upfront while the benefits accrue over the product’s lifecycle. The long-lived
nature of AMI capital investments also likely leads to joint adoption and intensity de-
cisions, helping to avoid sunk costs and the difficulty and cost of switching to other
metering technologies after an AMI deployment. Smart meters can also become more
valuable as more of them are deployed because of their role in grid operations and de-
mand response programs.
The significance of a vintage effect, however, likely depends in part on the type
of communication system previously installed for an AMR system (NETL 2008; EEI
2011). If a fixed communication system was previously selected, then the cost of up-
grading to AMI should be less than if a mobile communication system was previously
selected. Investment in the communication system would only incur relatively small
incremental costs. Additionally, it may also be true that a utility that has previously
adopted AMR may be more likely to adopt AMI as a result of the learning process with
AMR technology. Such a utility may recognize the relative advantage of AMI over AMR
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or assimilate the new technology into the organization more readily. Prior experience
with demand-side management activities, like load response programs, may also pos-
itively impact smart meter adoption through a learning process. Technology adoption
decisions can be positively affected by cumulative learning (Colombo and Mosconi 1995;
Arvanitis and Hollenstein 2001). The net effect on AMI adoption of the prior adoption
of AMR is ambiguous and depends on the timing and intensity of this prior adoption.
The choice of AMR versus AMI can also reflect a utility’s overall strategy and vision for
grid modernization.
Adoption decisions are also affected by uncertainty. Because adoption decisions
are also investment decisions, adoption is at least partially irreversible, resulting in sunk
costs, and uncertainty can delay investment on the part of risk-averse firms (Pindyck
1991). One source of uncertainty is technological expectations (Rosenberg 1972, 1976;
Balcer and Lippman 1984; Ireland and Stoneman 1986; Antonelli 1989; Weiss 1994). This
uncertainty relates to issues of improving technology, technological obsolescence, and
interoperability, addressed to an extent by the development of technology standards.
These have all been concerns with smart meters (FERC 2008, 17–22). An additional
source of uncertainty for IOUs is the ability to recover the costs of deploying smart
meters under conventional regulation and the possibility of future deregulation.
Uncertainty is also tied to learning that occurs both within and across firms,
leading to adaptive expectations over time. Learning involves becoming aware of a tech-
nology, its potential benefits, and how to adapt it to local conditions. Learning by using
imparts knowledge to firms on the actual costs and benefits of adopting a technology
and thereby reduces uncertainty, and this learning can be a social, interactive, and cumu-
lative process that generates knowledge spillovers to nonusers and leads to incremental
innovations even as the technology diffuses (Rosenberg 1982; Williams, Stewart, and
Slack 2005). For utilities this also involves learning best practices in smart meter deploy-
ments to minimize costs and recognizing new benefits as they arise to maximize the
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value of smart meters (EEI 2006a; EPRI 2010). Learning may be an important determi-
nant in the diffusion of smart meters because some of their benefits, particularly those
associated with demand response and consumer behavior, are uncertain. Pilot programs
for smart meters, a form of trialing, likely play an important role in the learning process
in this respect, reducing uncertainty for both utilities and regulators before committing
to large-scale deployments.
Dynamic capabilities allow a firm to capitalize on learning to generate value in a
changing environment (Teece 2010). The social and economic context within and around
firms, including organizational structures and regulatory environments, also shapes
innovative performance including that associated with learning (Lazonick 2005). The
most salient capability influencing the adoption of technologies is absorptive capacity,
referring to the ability of a firm to create value from externally sourced knowledge. The
absorptive capacity of a firm impacts adoption decisions through a firm’s ability to learn
about technology and its potential benefits. The degree to which a firm can search for,
process, and utilize knowledge external to itself impacts if and when it adopts a particu-
lar technology. Absorptive capacity may also be correlated with internal R&D activities
(Cohen and Levinthal 1989; Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Rosenberg 1990). Research and
development activities in the electric power industry are low relative to other industries.
Most R&D is carried out by manufacturers and not utilities. Investor-owned utilities per-
form the most R&D, principally through the collaborative, industry-supported Electric
Power Research Institute. This organization was formed in 1972 to address criticisms
of the innovative capabilities of the industry (Hirsh 1989, 131–138, 159–171). Innova-
tiveness is important in that it showcases the differing strategies that utilities have with
respect to changing market conditions, regulation, and technology in the electric power
industry.
Management strategy with respect to business models and technology choices
is subjective but can also influence technology diffusion (Nabseth and Ray 1974; Met-
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calfe and Boden 2003; Preece 1995; Tidd 2010b). Smart grid technology and the rise of
distributed energy resources, including generation and storage, may require new busi-
ness and regulatory models for utilities in order to maximize the full benefits of these
technologies (Fox-Penner 2010; IEI 2015a, 2015b, 2016b; MITEI 2016; Shomali and Pinkse
2016). Utilities that adopt smart meters may also be likely to adopt other smart grid
technologies. The adoption of information technologies may also require changes in the
organizational structure and processes within firms, leading to productivity increases
(Attewell 1992; Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2000). The adoption of AMI likely requires utili-
ties to undergo some organizational changes and also acquire new skills and personnel
related to information technology, data management, and analytics.
Distributed generation has diffused in large part because of net metering poli-
cies. State policies with respect to net metering vary in their design. The majority of
states have enacted specific policies on net metering in order to reduce transaction costs,
ensure reliability, and support other goals like reducing environmental emissions. By
integrating import/export measurement functions into one meter, smart meters may
reduce the costs of metering for these customers. Detailed data on the amount and tim-
ing of electricity generated through distributed generation can help utilities manage
the grid more effectively. In states with visions of more competitive electricity markets,
like California, Texas, and New York, distributed generation is expected and encour-
aged to grow. At the same time, smart meters also enable time-varying net metering
rates, which may make distributed generation less profitable for some customers. Fur-
thermore, distributed storage may follow a similar path to distributed generation if
battery technology improves and associated costs are reduced. Overall, smart meters
help enable both a more flexible supply side and a more flexible demand side. As a re-
sult, utilities with larger numbers of net metering customers should be more likely to
adopt smart meters (Solar ABCs 2010; Römer et al. 2012; Borenstein and Bushnell 2015;
Dedrick et al. 2015).
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5.4 Environmental Factors
In addition to supply-side and demand-side factors, environmental factors can
play a decisive role in the diffusion of new technologies. The institutional structure of
the electric power industry is complex and polycentric. The methods of regulation and
their interaction with technological change and market structure influence how firms
pursue and adopt innovations (Hughes 1971; Sweeney 1981; Blind 2010). Public policy,
including state and federal policies and regulations, prominently shapes the adoption
environment of utilities with respect to smart meters (EIA 2011). Zhang and Nuttall
(2011) and Rixen and Weigand (2014) study the impact of policy on the diffusion of
smart meters via agent-based model simulations. They find that the impacts of different
policies depend on objectives. In particular, they find that monetary grants boost both
the speed and level of adoption, and they also find that liberalized markets are more
conducive to adoption.
Regulation has been found to influence diffusion processes in various industries
(Capron 1971; Oster and Quigley 1977; Hannan and McDowell 1984; Trajtenberg 1990;
Battisti and Stoneman 1998; Stoneman and Battisti 1998, 2000; Acemoglu and Finkelstein
2008; Gruber and Koutroumpis 2013). Government initiatives supporting smart grids are
major drivers in smart metering adoption around the world (Zhang 2010). In the United
States, relevant federal policies include subsidies for smart meters and pressure from
FERC to implement demand response programs, and relevant state policies include the
structure of electricity markets, regulatory strategies and incentives, and technology
mandates. This variation in state-level policy and regulation gives a spatial dimension
to smart meter diffusion in the United States. Such policies are important because vari-
ation in selection environments can lead to variation in technology choice (Glynn 2002;
Watson 2004). Additionally, the polycentric governance of electricity systems, divided
between different levels of government, adds a layer of complexity that can adversely
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impact technology diffusion if policies are not effectively coordinated (Goldthau 2014;
Zhou and Matisoff 2016).
Federal policy has supported the adoption of smart metering and time-varying
electricity rates despite the lack of legal jurisdiction, which rests with the authority of
states to regulate the distribution and retail sale of electricity. In order to better coordi-
nate policies at the federal and state levels, FERC and the National Association of Reg-
ulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) embarked on collaborative activities in 2006.
Federal policy has provided incentives for smart meters but not mandates. The impetus
for such support ultimately derives from energy efficiency and demand-side manage-
ment goals that can be traced back primarily to the 1970s oil crisis. More specifically,
the support for smart metering ultimately rests with the desire for demand response
through time-varying rates. Three federal policies stand out overall in targeting smart
meter adoption (Rose 2014).
One, the recognition of demand response as a viable and important resource in
electricity markets has been a persistent, overriding policy objective. FERC has acted
as a change agent in the diffusion of demand response, for which they have a keen in-
terest in promoting enabling technologies like smart meters. Although FERC does not
have jurisdiction over retail markets, retail markets can shape wholesale markets just as
wholesale markets can shape retail markets. In particular, fluctuating prices in whole-
sale markets are typically not reflected in retail rates (Rose 2014).
Two, the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, passed in response to
the financial crisis of 2007–2008, included provisions that accelerated the tax depreci-
ation for smart meters from 20 years to 10 years. This was an incentive for utilities to
adopt smart meters as a means to further energy efficiency goals. These provisions also
applied to other smart grid technologies (Rose 2014).
Three, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 modified and
funded initiatives first approved in the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007.
81
The DOE received and managed $4.5 billion over five years for smart grid initiatives.
The two main programs funded were known as the Smart Grid Investment Grant pro-
gram ($3.4 billion) and the Smart Grid Demonstration Program ($600 million). Other
funded programs, for example, included workforce training and development ($100
million) and activities related to technology standards, interoperability, and cybersecu-
rity ($12 million). The SGIG focused on deploying smart grid technologies. It provided
matching grants to utilities who invested in AMI, subsidizing the costs of deployment
by up to 50%. In total, the SGIG disbursed nearly $1 billion to 81 utilities leading to the
installation of more than 16 million smart meters across the country (Rose 2014; DOE
2016a, 2016c, 2017b).
While policies at the federal level designed to enhance the diffusion of smart
meters have primarily involved monetary incentives, policies at the state level have
primarily involved regulatory mechanisms. Some aspects of state regulation may also
indirectly influence the diffusion of smart meters. It is typically the case that only IOUs
are subject to state regulation and not munis or co-ops. Although viewed as natural
monopolies and regulated as such in one form or another, distribution utilities may face
different incentives or pressures from the regulatory environment that influence their
adoption decisions. These influences may come from regulatory action or state policies
related to demand response and energy efficiency as well as the absence or presence of
formal wholesale markets and customer choice for electricity supply. There is significant
variation across the states with respect to these policies (EIA 2011; NGA 2016).
Common to all utilities in a given geographic region is the market structure. The
metering stock is owned and operated by distribution utilities, which are regulated in
some form regardless of a state’s restructuring status. Initially, the process of restruc-
turing electricty markets in the late 1990s created a disincentive to invest in advanced
metering because of concerns over stranded assets. Some states even implemented com-
petitive metering with the thought that this would facilitate the diffusion of advanced
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meters. The initial experiences, however, resulted in the opposite effect. These states
found that a competitive metering market was costly compared to a coordinated mass
deployment of advanced meters, and competitive metering policies were thereafter aban-
doned. The very early diffusion of smart meters was primarily influenced by the high
costs of adoption as well as the fear of stranded costs and uncertainty surrounding the
ability to recover the costs of investment stemming from deregulation or the potential
for future deregulation (EEI 2006a; NETL 2008).
The relationship between market structure and innovation has been studied
extensively in the innovation literature, with the primary findings being that a moder-
ate level of competition produces optimal innovation in most industries (Cohen 2010).
In the electric power industry, research has found that the liberalization of electricity
markets can promote innovation activity in energy-related products depending on insti-
tutional context and policy uncertainty (Markard and Truffer 2006; Sanyal and Cohen
2009; Jamasb and Pollitt 2008, 2011, 2015; Sterlacchini 2012; Sanyal and Ghosh 2013;
Cambini, Caviggioli, and Scellato 2016).
In those areas where wholesale markets have existed, wholesale prices of elec-
tricity fluctuate over the course of a day reflecting the time-varying costs of generating
electricity. Insofar as distribution utilities or retail suppliers must purchase electricity
in these markets, they may wish to reflect these costs in time-varying retail prices. The
desire for more efficient electricity markets was a primary driver behind restructuring
policies. Smart meters are an enabling technology for time-varying pricing, so utili-
ties in competitive areas may be more likely to adopt smart meters than those that are
not. Of course, vertically integrated utilities in conventionally regulated states also face
time-varying costs but their cost recovery mechanisms likely lead to less pressure to im-
plement time-varying pricing. The nature of rate-of-return regulation may also influence
technology adoption decisions through a capital-biased incentive.
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State regulation is another major determinant of utilities’ technology choices.
Regulatory interest in advanced metering was boosted by the Energy Policy Act of 2005,
which required all state regulatory commissions to consider advanced metering and
time-varying rates. NARUC passed a resolution in February 2007 recommending that
regulatory barriers be addressed with respect to the adoption of AMI. Recommenda-
tions included the development of AMI business cases, complementary policies and
ratemaking strategies to support demand response, timely cost recovery of investments,
and appropriate depreciation lives. In certain states AMI deployments have been de-
layed because of regulatory concerns over cost and consumer pushback related to pri-
vacy, safety, and health issues. Privacy and security concerns about smart meter data
have also led to laws or regulatory rulings aimed at protecting consumer data, which
could reduce uncertainty about data privacy and encourage smart meter adoption (EIA
2011; McKenna, Richardson, and Thomson 2012; Gerpott and Paukert 2013; Urban
2016).
There are multiple, and potentially complementary, dimensions of state regu-
lation that may influence the adoption of smart meters by utilities. These dimensions
include direct and indirect policies with regard to smart meter adoption. A number of
states, either through legislation or regulatory rulings, have supported or mandated the
deployment of AMI by IOUs (EIA 2011). The desire to expand demand response pro-
grams as well as pressure for improving billing practices can lead to policies supporting
the adoption of smart meters (Praetorius et al. 2009, 115–150; Foster and Alschuler 2011).
These mandates, however, have not necessarily emphasized the complementary adop-
tion of time-varying rates, and some states even limit time-varying rates for residential
customers (Lazar and Gonzalez 2015). Additionally, the nature of rate-of-return regu-
lation may also incentivize capital-biased technology adoption decisions (Averch and
Johnson 1962).
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Another relevant regulatory variable is lost margin recovery, which removes
disincentives for investments in energy efficiency. The two main types of lost margin re-
covery include lost revenue adjustments and decoupling. These mechanisms ensure that
utilities do not lose profits from energy efficiency investments. Lost margin recovery it-
self, though, does not necessarily encourage such investments (Brennan 2010; RAP 2011;
Sullivan, Wang, and Bennett 2011; Morgan 2013). Energy efficiency resource standards
(EERS) incentivize such activity by establishing long-term, legally binding efficiency
goals for utilities (or in some cases third-party efficiency program administrators). EERS
currently exist in twenty-five states and mostly apply to IOUs though in some states
other types of utilities are also subject to the standards. Of those states with EERS, most
account for potential lost revenues by offering cost recovery through performance-based
bonuses. Alternatively, third-party administrators or governmental agencies may be
tasked with the efficiency goals, who do not possess an inherent disincentive to invest
in energy efficiency. The combined presence of both lost margin recovery and EERS,
occuring in over half of the states with EERS, should exhibit a stronger effect on energy
efficiency incentives compared to the effect of either policy alone. The strength of such
an effect, though, likely depends on the specific design of EERS, for which there is sub-
stantial variation across states (Brennan and Palmer 2013; Palmer et al. 2013; Steinberg
and Zinaman 2014; ACEEE 2017a). These two policies may encourage the adoption
of smart meters by utilities insofar as smart meters can lead to reductions in overall
electricity demand through consumption feedback. Smart meters, however, are not nec-
essary to identify areas for efficiency improvements and other investments may prove
more profitable.
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CHAPTER VI
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF EARLY SMART METER DIFFUSION
IN THE UNITED STATES
Smart meters currently compose about half of the electricity meter stock in use
in the United States and they continue to diffuse. In this chapter I present an empirical
analysis of the early diffusion of smart meters in the US electric power industry, consid-
ering jointly the determinants of both interfirm and intrafirm smart meter diffusion. I
describe the patterns of diffusion and also use econometric models to assess the determi-
nants of the diffusion process. Although smart meters have not fully diffused across the
industry, the empirical analysis in this chapter remains informative and policy-relevant,
focusing on the initial stages of the diffusion process.
Most of the theoretical and empirical research on technological diffusion is con-
cerned with the interfirm dimension of diffusion, and when the intrafirm dimension
is studied at all both dimensions are often analyzed separately. The lack of research
on intrafirm diffusion is seemingly odd, given that the impact of process innovations
like smart meters is only felt through their widespread diffusion across both the inter-
firm and intrafirm dimensions. This situation, however, likely results from a lack of
data. Econometric analyses of technology diffusion have typically used cross-sectional
data, which is not ideal because diffusion is an inherently dynamic process. My analysis
will differ in this regard by using a panel dataset that tracks smart meter use by electric
power utilities in the United States across both the interfirm and intrafirm dimensions
over a period of eight years.
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6.1 Data Sources
I use three datasets for the empirical analysis in this chapter. The principal
dataset that I use comes from survey data collected by the US Energy Information
Administration (EIA). The EIA began collecting data on the number of smart meters
installed and operational by distribution utilities at the operating level in 2007 for its
Annual Electric Power Industry Report, Form EIA-861. Participation in this survey is
required of all entities that generate, distribute, or sell electricity in the United States.
Within the dataset is information related to sales, revenue, generation, and energy effi-
ciency among other topics. It effectively covers the population of utilities in the United
States (EIA 2017a).1
Beginning in 2007, the survey requested from distribution utilities counts of
AMR and AMI meters installed and operational by customer classes (residential, com-
mercial, industrial, and transportation).2 The survey also provides explicit definitions
of the different types of meters when requesting counts of meter types in order to avoid
confusion and differences in interpretation of advanced metering on the part of utili-
ties. The survey defines standard meters as either electromechanical or electronic meters
that measure aggregate kWh and where meters are read manually over monthly billing
cycles for billing purposes only. It defines AMR meters as meters that collect data for
billing purposes only and transmit these data one-way from the customer to the util-
ity. It defines AMI as meters that measure and record data in intervals, at a maximum
hourly, and subsequently provide this data to both the customer and the utility at least
once daily. The survey also states that this data can be used for billing and other pur-
poses and notes that these meters can range from hourly interval meters to real-time
meters with two-way communication capabilities that can measure, record, and transmit
1. I only include data for utilities from the fifty states and the District of Columbia. I exclude the five
utilities in US territories because of their unique policy and regulatory status.
2. Form EIA-826 also collects data on counts of AMR and AMI meters installed and operational on a
monthly basis, providing a dataset with finer granularity, but this data first started being collected in 2011.
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data in real time. Additionally, the survey instructs respondents to record AMI meters
as AMR meters if they are only being used as AMR meters, although this note was re-
moved from the survey form for 2013 and 2014 (EIA 2017a).
The survey, however, did not request counts of standard meters and counts of
total meters installed and operational until 2013. The data concerning counts of total
meters per utility are necessary for calculating proportions of meter types, which are
necessary for tracking adoption levels within utilities. Data exist, however, on the total
number of customers per utility, which I use to generate estimates of total meters for use
in calculating proportions. In 2007 there were 639 observations recorded for counts of
advanced meters while in 2014 there were 1,925 observations. This discrepancy exists,
presumably, because of legitimate nonresponse, because those utilities who had no ad-
vanced meters simply skipped the associated questions for those survey years. I impute
these missing responses as zeros (EIA 2017a).
Data concerning utility activities indicates there were 2,803 unique distribution
utilities in the United States from 2007 to 2014 while only 1,991 utilities responded to
the questions concerning counts of meters. These numbers, however, are not precise.
The data tracking utility activities does not count IOUs that operate in more than one
state as separate utilities. In contrast, the number of utilities responding to the meter
questions is somewhat inflated because utilities that operate in more than one state re-
port for each state. I leave IOU data at the operating level because of the importance of
state regulation but add together state responses for munis and co-ops. Upon inspec-
tion it appears that those utilities who did not respond to the meter questions are small
munis and co-ops. It is possible they simply did not respond to the meter questions be-
cause they had neither AMR nor AMI meters during the time period under study, but I
exclude these utilities from the analysis (EIA 2017a).
The final analysis dataset that I use is primarily composed of data from the EIA
survey. It allows me to both describe and analyze the temporal and spatial patterns of
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smart meter diffusion in the United States by using utility-level data tracked over time.
Additionally, the Recovery Act SGIG program provides data on the timing and count of
smart meters installed as a result of this funding for the 81 utilities that were awarded
grants for such purposes (DOE 2015). I also use various other sources to generate vari-
ables related to regulatory environments (EIA 2011; IEI 2014; FERC 2015b; EMRF 2016;
ACCES 2017; ACEEE 2017a, 2017b). After a data cleaning process I arrived at a final
analysis sample composed of 1,805 distribution utilities followed over eight years from
2007 to 2014.
6.2 Patterns of Diffusion
6.2.1 Aggregate Patterns
Figure 7 depicts the aggregate temporal pattern of smart meter diffusion in the
United States with raw counts of smart meters. This pattern is also compared to the raw
counts of AMR meters in order to assess how the meter population is changing over
time. As shown, the smart meter diffusion path appears to correspond to the first half
of an S-curve. Furthermore, the patterns shows that a possible substitution process from
AMR to AMI is underway across the electric power industry.
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Figure 7. Temporal Pattern of Smart Meter/Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) Diffu-
sion Compared to Temporal Pattern of Automatic Meter Reading (AMR) Diffusion in the
United States, 2007–2014. Data from EIA (2017a).
The SGIG subsidies, beginning in 2010, appear to have had a modest impact
overall on the level of AMI deployments, though they certainly boosted the number
of smart meters installed. In 2009 AMI totaled more than 9.5 million meters while in
2014 AMI totaled more than 58.5 million meters. The SGIG funded more than 16 mil-
lion smart meters installed from 2010 to 2015, amounting to roughly one-third of the
increase. Strong growth in AMI deployment was coincident with SGIG funding, per-
haps signifying a crowding-in effect related to learning and knowledge spillovers as a
result of the subsidies or to advancement of the smart grid as a whole.
Additionally, Figure 8 depicts the state-level spatial patterns of smart meter diffu-
sion in the United States with choropleth maps based on the proportion of AMI meters
in use in each state. In contrast, Figure 9 depicts the state-level spatial patterns of AMR
meter diffusion in the United States with choropleth maps based on the proportion of
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AMR meters in use in each state. These spatial patterns are interesting insofar as they
reflect differences in selection environments, most notably electricity market structures
and regulation. There is no clear pattern, however, in this regard. Although California
and Texas, two restructured states, have high proportions of smart meters in 2014, other
states with conventional vertically integrated structures also have high proportions, in-
cluding Alabama, Georgia, and Florida. This may suggest that regulation related to
distribution utilities specifically, as opposed to market structure, is a more important
driver of smart meter diffusion, even if policy rationales and instruments supporting the
adoption smart meters vary across states. Additionally, the spatial patterns suggest that
some utilities are choosing to adopt AMR over AMI.
6.2.2 Interfirm and Intrafirm Patterns
Figure 10 depicts the smart meter diffusion path in the United States with the
cumulative proportion of basic and extensive adopters over time for the final analysis
sample. As discussed later, I prefer to define basic adoption as a utility having a smart
meter proportion greater than 5%, as a means to avoid capturing trialing and discontin-
uance, and extensive adoption as a utility having a smart meter proportion greater than
70%. This alternative measure of diffusion also shows the first half of an S-curve.
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Figure 8. Spatial Pattern of Smart Meter/Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) Diffu-
sion in the United States by State, 2007–2014. Data from EIA (2017a).
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Figure 9. Spatial Pattern of Automatic Meter Reading (AMR) Diffusion in the United States
by State, 2007–2014. Data from EIA (2017a).
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Figure 10. Cumulative Proportion of Basic and Extensive Adopters of Smart Meters.
The relative influence of interfirm and intrafirm diffusion in the overall diffusion
of smart meters so far, in terms of the proportion of basic and extensive adopters, is
about equal. The proportion of extensive adopters lags slightly behind basic adopters.
In 2014, 35% of sample utilities have at least a basic level of adoption whereas 29% have
an extensive level of adoption. This pattern may be somewhat misleading, however,
given that IOUs have the largest metering stocks and by virtue of their size take longer
to become extensive adopters. It is arguably easier and takes less time for smaller munis
and co-ops to achieve an extensive level of adoption. As a result, the pattern does not
adequately represent the contributions of the interfirm and intrafirm dimensions to
the aggregate diffusion of smart meters in the industry in terms of raw counts of smart
meters. The intrafirm component of IOUs dominates the general interfirm component
simply because IOUs typically have much larger metering stocks than munis and co-ops,
even though there are far fewer IOUs in number.
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Figure 11 depicts the changing proportion of basic and extensive adopters over
time within ownership types. I leave out the relatively small number of public utility
districts and state and federal utilities for simplicity. By 2014, more than half of co-
ops have adopted smart meters at a basic level whereas nearly one-third of IOUs have
adopted at a basic level and nearly one-sixth of munis have adopted at a basic level.
Even here, the proportion of extensive adopters lags slightly behind basic adopters for
each ownership type. These patterns may suggest that the decisions to adopt and at
what level to adopt are jointly determined and influenced by the same factors.
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Figure 11. Cumulative Proportion of Basic and Extensive Adopters of Smart Meters by
Ownership Type.
6.3 Duration Analysis of Smart Meter Adoption
A number of econometric models have been used to empirically assess the de-
terminants of the diffusion of new technologies. Some models compete on theoretical
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grounds, but the particular model chosen may also depend on the nature of the tech-
nology, context, stage in the diffusion process, and data limitations. The econometric
models I use here, including duration and fractional response models, attempt to as-
sess the factors at play in the decisions to adopt smart meters in the US electric power
industry.
One econometric approach that explicitly models the timing of events—in this
case technology adoption—and can also use panel data is duration analysis. A duration
model that uses panel data is able to analyze the microdynamics of adoption decisions
through which the aggregate diffusion path emerges. For these reasons and also its
ability to handle censoring relatively easily, duration analysis has become popular in
diffusion research. Duration analysis applied to technology adoption, the time it takes a
firm to adopt a certain technology from when it is commercially available, was first used
by Hannan and McDowell (1984) and is considered the ideal modeling strategy for in-
terfirm diffusion and can also be used for intrafirm diffusion (Karshenas and Stoneman
1993, 1995; Baptista 1999; Fuentelsaz, Gomez, and Polo 2003). This particular method
of analysis is used across many fields under different names, including event history
analysis, survival analysis, and failure-time analysis. The basic ideas are common across
fields but the specific models and techniques used are modified to suit the particular
field in which they are applied (Heckman and Singer 1984b; Box-Steffensmeier and
Jones 2004). Duration analysis is also useful for causal analysis, as opposed to merely
correlational analysis, because it models the influence of past conditions on future out-
comes (Blossfeld and Rohwer 1997).
In previous research on the diffusion of smart meters only one econometric
model has been applied. Zhou and Matisoff (2016) use a linear panel analysis approach
to model smart meter diffusion across the fifty United States using states as observa-
tional units. The authors use the same EIA dataset that I use but differ from my analysis
by focusing exclusively on the impact of public policies across states and their interac-
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tion with federal policies. This study is not concerned with utility characteristics or the
timing of adoption but only with the level of diffusion. In addition, Dedrick et al. (2015)
examine issues surrounding the adoption of smart grid technologies, including smart
meters, but use qualitative interview data from only twelve utilities in the United States.
Spodniak (2011) and Spodniak, Jantunen, and Viljainen (2014) examine smart meter
diffusion in Central East Europe but use thematic and descriptive analysis. Zhang and
Nuttall (2011) and Rixen and Weigand (2013, 2014) also examine aspects of smart meter
diffusion but use agent-based model simulations instead of econometric analyses.
I use duration models to analyze the early diffusion of smart meters in the
United States from 2007 to 2014. I include covariates reflecting the effects of learning,
firm heterogeneity, and selection environments related to public policy and regulation
on the rate of diffusion. Duration models are flexible in that they can incorporate deter-
minants inspired by different theories of technology diffusion, including those focused
on learning, firm characteristics, and adoption environments (Karshenas and Stoneman
1993). As such, this analysis is exploratory in nature, attempting to assess the drivers of
smart meter diffusion in the United States. Duration models can also use either cross-
sectional or panel data in either continuous or discrete time, such that data limitations
play an important role in the specific duration model used.
6.3.1 Data Limitations and Modeling Considerations
Events typically take place in continuous time, although they can occur in dis-
crete time if, for example, decisions are made routinely at certain times in firms. For the
case of smart meters, the transition of a utility from a state of nonadoption to adoption
takes place in continuous, historical time, yet the measurements of adoption from the
EIA dataset are in discrete, yearly intervals. This kind of data is known as grouped du-
ration data, a type of interval-censored data. Heckman and Singer (1984b) and Lancaster
(1990) argue that duration analysis should use continuous-time methods for grouped
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data if the underlying process occurs in continuous time and if the data allows. While
this is certainly reasonable, data collection methods in the social sciences are often too
coarse. The use of continuous-time models applied to grouped data with many event
ties—simulatenous event occurrence—poses problems for estimation (Singer and Wil-
lett 2003; Allison 2014). It follows that the highly discrete nature of the EIA dataset
with respect to the timing of adoption prevents the use of continuous-time models.
Discrete-time duration models are preferable in these situations. Discrete-time mod-
els, though, have a few advantages; they can incorporate time-varying covariates more
easily, treat the effect of time more flexibly, and be estimated more easily (Allison 1982,
2014; Sueyoshi 1995; Jenkins 1995; Singer and Willett 2003).
In any duration model it is necessary to define time and duration. The diffu-
sion of technology concerns the time it takes for firms to adopt a technology (interfirm)
as well as the time it takes to diffuse to a certain level of use within firms (intrafirm).
Technically the process of diffusion begins at the moment of invention, but more prac-
tically it begins when the technology is first commercialized. Defining the time when
diffusion starts, and thus the onset of risk of adoption, is crucial for duration analysis of
technology adoption. For the case of smart meters, utilities technically became at risk of
adopting smart meters when they were first commercialized, and thus measurements of
the time it takes to adopt should start at this date. The first utility deployment of smart
meters, however, occurred in the 1990s (FERC 2006). Defining the beginning of diffusion
from this date would require substantially more data to model, but such data do not
exist.3
Measurements of the timing of events are often censored in duration analysis. In
the EIA dataset there are both left- and right-censored adoption times. Left-censoring
occurs where we observe in the first year of data, 2007, that some utilities have already
3. Some data exists from the first FERC Demand Response and Advanced Metering Report (FERC 2006)
but this survey uses a broader definition of advanced metering that may cover AMR meters. These data,
therefore, are not comparable to the EIA data and in fact do not match well with the EIA data from 2007.
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adopted smart meters but we do not necessarily know if this occurred in 2007 or in
prior years. In a few cases, however, it is clear that a basic level of adoption occurred be-
fore 2007, although it is difficult to verify prior adoption from other sources in order to
identify those observations that are in fact left-censored. Nonetheless, when comparing
the total metering stock to the proportion of smart meters in 2007 for these utilities, only
two utilities can be identified as certainly left-censored. The other utilities are small and
not unlikely to have adopted in 2007, even at an extensive level.
I assume these utilities adopted in the first year of data such that their dura-
tion times are one year, even if for some utilities this is not true. This assumption is a
practical measure in order to easily estimate the duration model. Listwise deletion of
left-censored observations, an alternative strategy, may bias the estimation because the
censoring is likely informative (missing not at random). Informative censoring means
censoring and duration times are not independent. This follows from a theoretical em-
phasis on firm heterogeneity in that earlier adopters may be distinct in their character-
istics (observed or unobserved) from later adopters. The disadvantage to making this
assumption is that the model I use will potentially underestimate the effect of time,
which is likely driven by cost considerations and uncertainty about the benefits of the
technology. There are relatively few utilities in this position and the approximate or-
dering of adoption is still preserved. Additionally, right-censoring, which is relatively
common compared to left-censoring, occurs in the last year of data, 2014, where we
observe that many utilities have not yet adopted smart meters. The amount of right-
censoring observed simply highlights that the diffusion process is ongoing. Accounting
for right-censored observations in duration analysis is relatively easy.
Other issues with the EIA dataset also exist. Data limitations led me to use a
sample of utilities less than the total in the dataset, based on the availability of relevant
data for covariates as well as quality issues. After cleaning the data, I obtain a sample of
1,805 utilities to analyze out of the 1,991 total available. The primary data quality issue
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relates to observing utilities with nonsensical switching from having all AMI meters to
all AMR meters or from all AMR meters to all AMI meters and back again over sequen-
tial years. In addition, with the exception of IOUs, I combined utilities with operations
in more than one state, with responses at the state-level, into a single set of observations
for the primary state. Eight mergers and acquisitions also occured among utilities over
this time period. I account for this by simply adding together the relevant survey re-
sponses as if they were one utility from the beginning (as is done in Fuentelsaz, Gomez,
and Polo 2003).
Another important issue is that I cannot calculate precise proportions of smart
meter use for utilities for most years of available data. In order to define adoption, the
natural diffusion metric I employ is the proportion of a utility’s metering stock that
consists of smart meters. Many diffusion studies have simply defined adoption as a
proportion greater than zero, but this can misleadingly pick up trialing of technology
that should not be considered adoption. This is especially the case if the technology
is discontinued after a trial period. Calculating proportions of smart meter use in this
case would not be necessary and adoption could be defined as a count of smart meters
greater than zero. Model results, however, may be sensitive to definitions of adoption.
The EIA dataset does not contain counts of the total number of meters for each utility
from 2007 to 2012 and the data for 2013 appears to be problematic, preventing me from
calculating precise proportions for these years. Instead, I use data on the total number
of customers to produce estimates for the total number of meters. Although the number
of meters can be greater than the number of customers because some customers have
more than one meter, using estimates of total meters based on counts of customers pro-
duces accurate if not precise estimates of proportions. I simply add a certain percentage
of customers to the total customer count as a means to proxy the count of total meters
for each utility. I use the 2014 data to compare total meters to total customers in order
to determine the percentage increase on a utility-by-utility basis. I ultimately categorize
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utilities as nonadopters and adopters based on a certain range of proportion of use, and
I also perform sensitivity analysis around this issue so that a precise measurement is not
vital to the duration analysis.
Another important modeling consideration is the joint analysis of interfirm and
intrafirm diffusion. The decision to adopt and when and the decision on how inten-
sively to adopt and when may not be independent. A few studies have modeled inter-
firm and intrafirm diffusion jointly using cross-sectional data (Battisti and Stoneman
2003; Åstebro 2004; Hollenstein 2004; Battisti and Stoneman 2005; Battisti et al. 2007;
Hollenstein and Woerter 2008; Battisti, Canepa, and Stoneman 2009; Arvanitis and Ley
2013), but so far none have used panel data. Most of these studies have found that adop-
tion and intensity decisions are independent and influenced by different factors and
thus can be modeled separately, but this is likely not the case for the adoption of smart
meters by utilities. Smart meter deployments are typically announced on a large scale,
implying that adoption and intensity decisions are considered jointly. Perusing utility
business cases for smart meters reveals that different scenarios are considered in cost-
benefit analyses, such as full deployment or partial deployment. A joint decision process
should not be surprising in this case given that smart meters are long-lived capital as-
sets and can also exhibit positive network externalities because as more are deployed
they become more valuable.
A multistate duration model integrates the analysis of these two dimensions into
one model, thereby accounting for the potential interdependency of the two adoption
decisions and their timing. Compared to a basic duration model, in a multistate model
diffusion is modeled as a progressive, sequential process, defining multiple states of
adoption based on certain ranges of proportions of use. Multistate models have been
suggested by Karshenas and Stoneman (1995) but have yet to be implemented in the
empirical literature on technology diffusion, primarily because they require substantial
amounts of panel data. Data limitations also prevent me from pursuing a multistate
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model. In the EIA dataset over half of the utilities who ultimately adopt are observed to
transition directly from a state of nonadoption in one year to a state of complete adop-
tion in the next. These utilities are overwhelmingly small munis and co-ops. A multi-
state model requires a smoother transition that the coarseness of the dataset does not
allow.
Because of these issues with the data, I cannot adequately assess the intrafirm
component of smart meter diffusion within a duration framework. Based on these de-
scriptions of adopters, however, and the fact that utilities typically announce a high
level of adoption when deciding to deploy smart meters, the rate of intrafirm diffusion
appears to be driven primarily by utility size. Vintage effects may also play a role here
as well. For the interfirm dimension I simply model the time until adoption at a basic
level using a discrete-time duration model, which for over half the utilities that adopt is
the same time it takes to reach an extensive level of use. For the intrafirm dimension I
model the level of adoption using a fractional response model.
6.3.2 Discrete-Time Duration Model
Duration analysis of technology adoption is a natural approach to analyzing in-
terfirm diffusion, which models the time (i.e., the duration) until initial adoption of a
technology (i.e., the event or transition). Previous diffusion research has used various
types of duration models that estimate the conditional probabilities of adopting a tech-
nology. A general continuous-time model was developed by Karshenas and Stoneman
(1993), based on the popular Cox proportional hazards model. This model suits empir-
ical analysis of technology diffusion because it can incorporate a variety of theoretical
perspectives, including learning and firm-specific effects. The general philosophy, how-
ever, that multiple theories can and should be tested in the same empirical model can be
extended to other duration models. I follow this approach within a discrete-time dura-
tion model for analyzing smart meter diffusion in the United States. General discussions
102
of discrete-time methods in the context of duration modeling in social science research
can be found in Allison (1982, 2014), Yamaguchi (1991), Box-Steffensmeier and Jones
(2004), Singer and Willett (1993, 2003), and Tutz and Schmid (2016).
Let duration be denoted by the discrete random variable T such that T ≥ 0.
Then let t represent a discrete time period and a specific realization of T such that t =
1, 2, ..., q. A discrete-time approximation for an underlying continuous-time process
groups the occurrence of events in the intervals [0, 1) for t = 1, [1, 2) for t = 2 and so on
and where the origin of defined duration time, t = 0, precedes the first observed event
occurrence. Let the probability mass function of T be given by
f (t) = Pr(T = t)
where 0 ≤ f (t) ≤ 1 and ∑qt=1 f (t) = 1, representing the probability of adopting at time
t. The cumulative distribution function, then, is given by F(t) = Pr(T ≤ t) = ∑s≤t f (t)
where s denotes possible time periods. Let the survival function be given by
S(t) = Pr(T ≥ t) =
q
∑
s≥t
f (t) = 1−∑
s<t
f (t) = 1− F(t− 1)
representing the probability of not adopting until time t or after. Let the hazard function
be given by
h(t) =
f (t)
S(t)
=
f (t)
1− F(t− 1)
representing the ratio of the probability of adopting at time t to the probability of sur-
viving until time t or after. The hazard function can be re-expressed as a conditional
probability such that
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h(t) = Pr(T = t | T ≥ t)
where 0 ≤ h(t) ≤ 1, representing the probability of adopting at time t given that adop-
tion has not already occurred.
Let the hazard rate for utility i where i = 1, 2, ..., n at time t be given by
hit = Pr(T = ti | T ≥ t, x it)
where 0 ≤ hit ≤ 1 and x it denotes a vector of covariates. This equation represents the
discrete-time hazard function, the probability that a utility adopts at time t given that it
has not already adopted and given relevant covariates that may change over time.
Adoption can be defined in various ways, depending on the technology under
study and the specific diffusion metric used. Most diffusion studies define a basic level
of adoption simply as the proportion of the capital stock embodied in the new technol-
ogy or the output produced with the new technology being greater than zero. While
this may be reasonable in some cases, I prefer to define adoption more stringently as
a proportion of the metering capital stock greater than 5% in order to avoid capturing
potential trialing and discontinuance (such as through pilot programs). I also perform
sensitivity analyses by defining adoption alternatively as a proportion greater than zero
and as a proportion greater than 10%.
Let the timing of adoption be represented by a binary variable, ait, indicating
whether adoption has occurred in the time interval [t− 1, t) such that
ait =

1, if pit ≥ 0.05, ai,t−1 = 0
0, otherwise
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for t = 1, 2, ..., ti and where pit denotes the proportion of smart meters installed and op-
erational for utility i at time t. This implies that the number of observations that a utility
contributes to the analysis dataset includes the years of nonadoption up to and includ-
ing the first year of adoption, because no further information is needed once adoption
occurs. Furthermore, utilities with right-censored observations, in which ait = 0 for
all years, contribute the full information they provide despite never adopting. The orig-
inal panel dataset, then, shrinks to a utility-year dataset containing only the relevant
years of data on a utility-by-utility basis. This data structure also easily accounts for
time-varying covariates.
Subsequently, the hazard rate can be re-expressed as
hit = Pr(ait = 1 | ai,t−1 = 0, x it)
and defined as a function of covariates and time such that
hit = g−1(x it, t)
where g(·) is a link function that bounds the hazard rate between 0 and 1. The duration
model can then be interpreted within a binary response modeling framework and es-
timated using maximum likelihood methods with pooled data. Allison (1982) shows
that the multiple observations that a single observational unit contributes to the analysis
dataset can be treated as independently observed in a pooled model if events are non-
repeatable. This is an assumption, stemming from the conditional nature of the hazard
rate, that the repeat observations contributed by an observational unit are independent
conditional on having survived to each time period and conditional on the associated co-
variate values in each time period. I relax this assumption, however, by using clustered
standard errors to correct for any autocorrelation (Cameron and Miller 2015).
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The logistic function is a popular link function, owing to its relative ease of esti-
mation and interpretation. This leads to a pooled logit model estimated by maximum
likelihood methods. Duration dependence can be accounted for by simply including
a time variable, in the form of a linear trend, a polynomial of some degree, splines, or
more flexibly as a set of indicator variables. A discrete-time logistic duration model can
be specified as
hit =
exp(x ′itβ + d
′
tα)
1 + exp(x ′itβ + d
′
tα)
or more appropriately its inverse, g(hit), as
ln
(
hit
1− hit
)
= x ′itβ + d
′
tα
where x it denotes a vector of covariates including a constant with a vector of coefficients
β and dt denotes a vector of time variables with a vector of coefficients denoted by α
representing duration dependence. The exact specification of the time variables ulti-
mately depends on theoretical considerations. For smart meter adoption, I prefer the
most flexible form and use a set of indicator variables.
A logit model for discrete duration data was first proposed by Cox (1972). The
logit model, however, is not directly connected with the Cox proportional hazards
model but was intended as an approximation to the parameter estimates obtained in
a Cox model if the grouped intervals were sufficiently narrow. The logit model is also
not connected to any other continuous-time model. Subsequent work by Kalbfleisch and
Prentice (1973) and Prentice and Gloeckler (1978) found that the complementary log-log
link is the actual discrete-time analog of the Cox model and is also more appropriate
when grouped intervals are not narrow.
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An important difference in the selected link function concerns implicit assump-
tions of proportionality. A logit model results in a proportional odds assumption whereas
a complementary log-log model results in a proportional hazards assumption. Propor-
tionality refers to a constant relative difference between two firms’ odds or hazard rates,
respectively, in a given time period. A model specification with interactions between
time and one or more covariates would constitute a nonproportional model. Such inter-
actions imply that the effects of a covariate are not constant over time. I test this assump-
tion of proportionality but find that it is inconsequential.
In the general context of binary response models, the complementary log-log
link is most appropriate for datasets with very few event occurrences. Logit and com-
plementary log-log specifications give very similar results when the probability of an
event is low. The differences in the estimates between the two specifications are often
negligible (Jenkins 1995; Singer and Willett 2003; Allison 2014). I perform sensitivity
analysis with respect to the link function and find that the results are robust across logit,
probit, and complementary log-log specifications. I focus on the logit model because of
its relative ease of estimation and interpretation.
6.4 Fractional Response Analysis of Smart Meter Adoption
To more adequately address the intrafirm component of smart meter diffusion, I
also use a fractional response model where a utility’s proportion of smart meter use is
modeled directly as the response variable. A fractional response model is preferable to a
linear model because it bounds the response between 0 and 1. Let pit, where 0 ≤ pit ≤ 1,
represent the proportion of smart meters installed and operational for utility i at time t.
Furthermore, let pit be defined as a function of covariates and time such that
pit = g−1(x it, t)
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where g(·) is a link function that bounds the response between 0 and 1. Similar to bi-
nary response models, a link function is necessary to bound the response between 0 and
1. I focus again on a logit model for simplicity. A fractional response logit model can be
specified as
pit =
exp(x ′itβ + d
′
tα)
1 + exp(x ′itβ + d
′
tα)
or more appropriately its inverse, g(pit), as
ln
(
pit
1− pit
)
= x ′itβ + d
′
tα
where x it denotes a vector of covariates including a constant with a vector of coefficients
β and dt denotes a vector of time variables with a vector of coefficients denoted by α.
Different estimation techniques have been proposed for fractional response models, such
as nonlinear least squares, but quasi-maximum likelihood methods have been shown to
perform the best in most situations (Papke and Wooldridge 1996; Ramalho, Ramalho,
and Murteira 2011).
In contrast to the duration model, in the fractional response model I use the
entire panel dataset. Fractional response models, however, are a relatively new econo-
metric method, and panel versions are still being developed. Additionally, different
estimation techniques are required for different distributions of the response variable,
which include both zeros and ones in my case (Ramalho, Ramalho, and Murteira 2011).
Therefore, I estimate simpler pooled versions of fractional response models and use clus-
tered standard errors by utility to correct for any autocorrelation (Cameron and Miller
2015). These estimates are still consistent, if not efficient. I also estimate both one-part
and two-part models. One-part models consist of a fractional response model on the full
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dataset regardless of the response values. Two-part models consist of a binary response
model in the first part, differentiating between responses with zeros and those with posi-
tive values, and a fractional response model in the second part that includes only those
observations with positive values. I also use a similar set of covariates to those in the
duration models and represent time as a set of indicator variables.
6.5 Model Variables and Summary Statistics
Descriptions of model variables and expected effects of covariates are presented
in Table 5, based on the hypothesized determinants discussed in the previous chapter.
Summary statistics for model variables for the pooled sample are presented in Table 6.
Sample characteristics by type of utility are presented in Table 7. Though IOUs repre-
sent a small proportion of utilities by number, they supply the majority of the American
population with electricity by customer base.
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Table 5. Descriptions of Model Variables.
Variable Description Expected
Effect
Response
AMI meter prop. (pit) estimated proportion of AMI meters
Adoption 1 (pit > 0) = 1 if estimated proportion of AMI meters > 0 ,
= 0 otherwise
Adoption 2 (pit ≥ 0.05) = 1 if estimated proportion of AMI meters ≥ 0.05
, = 0 otherwise
Adoption 3 (pit ≥ 0.10) = 1 if estimated proportion of AMI meters
≥ 0.10, = 0 otherwise
Covariates
Total customers (log) continuous, log of total customers +/-
Investor-owned utility binary, = 1 if investor-owned utility, = 0 other-
wise
+
Co-operative utility binary, = 1 if co-operative utility, = 0 otherwise +/-
AMR meter prop. continuous, estimated proportion of AMR meters +/-
Demand-side mgmt. binary, = 1 if engaged in demand-side manage-
ment activities (lagged one year), = 0 otherwise
+
Net metering binary, = 1 if net metering customers > 0, = 0
otherwise
+
State AMI support binary, = 1 if subject to state support for adop-
tion of AMI, = 0 otherwise
+
Wholesale comp. binary, = 1 if operating in formal wholesale
markets, = 0 otherwise
+
Customer choice binary, = 1 if operating in state with customer
choice, = 0 otherwise
+
Lost margin recovery binary, = 1 if subject to lost margin recovery, = 0
otherwise
+/-
Energy eff. stds. binary, = 1 if subject to energy efficiency resource
standards, = 0 otherwise
+/-
2008 binary, = 1 if year is 2008, = 0 otherwise +
2009 binary, = 1 if year is 2009, = 0 otherwise +
2010 binary, = 1 if year is 2010, = 0 otherwise +
2011 binary, = 1 if year is 2011, = 0 otherwise +
2012 binary, = 1 if year is 2012, = 0 otherwise +
2013 binary, = 1 if year is 2013, = 0 otherwise +
2014 binary, = 1 if year is 2014, = 0 otherwise +
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Table 6. Summary Statistics for Model Variables.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Response
AMI meter prop. (pit) 0.30 0.44 0 1
Adoption 1 (pit > 0) 0.41 0.49 0 1
Adoption 2 (pit ≥ 0.05) 0.35 0.48 0 1
Adoption 3 (pit ≥ 0.10) 0.34 0.47 0 1
Covariates
Total customers (log) 9.31 1.75 2.08 15.49
Investor-owned utility 0.10 0.30 0 1
Co-operative utility 0.39 0.49 0 1
AMR meter prop. 49.64 46.11 0 100
Demand-side mgmt. 0.19 0.39 0 1
Net metering 0.50 0.50 0 1
State AMI support 0.02 0.15 0 1
Wholesale comp. 0.40 0.49 0 1
Customer choice 0.31 0.46 0 1
Lost margin recovery 0.05 0.21 0 1
Energy eff. stds. 0.24 0.43 0 1
2008 0.13 0.33 0 1
2009 0.13 0.33 0 1
2010 0.13 0.33 0 1
2011 0.13 0.33 0 1
2012 0.13 0.33 0 1
2013 0.13 0.33 0 1
2014 0.13 0.33 0 1
Notes: Pooled sample 2007–2014. n = 14,440 utility-years.
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Table 7. Sample Characteristics by Type of Utility.
Utility Type Number Num. Prop. Total Customers Cust. Prop.
IOU 176 0.10 106,649,869 0.74
Co-op 708 0.39 17,790,309 0.12
Muni 847 0.47 13,685,438 0.10
PUD 64 0.04 3,736,686 0.03
State 7 0.00 1,336,782 0.01
Federal 3 0.00 39,731 0.00
Total 1,805 1.00 143,238,815 1.00
Notes: 2014 data. IOU = investor-owned utility. PUD = public utility district.
Utility size is proxied by the total number of customers. I log transform this vari-
able because of the vast size differences among utilities. Utility ownership is captured
by two indicator variables for IOUs and co-ops, with publicly owned utilities primarily
composed of munis left as the reference group. The adoption of AMR meters is mea-
sured by the estimated AMR proportion of a utility’s metering stock, expressed on a
0–100 scale. I estimate this proportion in the same way I estimate AMI proportions dis-
cussed previously. Demand-side management activities are captured by an indicator
variable if a utility reported having customers in incentive-based demand response pro-
grams, including direct load control, interruptible rates, demand bidding/buyback,
emergency demand response, capacity market programs, and ancillary service market
programs. I lag this variable to ensure that it does not reflect demand response pro-
grams implemented during or after smart meter adoption. The impact of distributed
generation resources through net metering programs is captured by an indicator vari-
able for having net metering customers or not. I use an indicator variable instead of a
continuous variable for total net metering customers in order to make interpretation eas-
ier. Alternative estimates suggest that the total number of customers is not as important
as having net metering customers.
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I also include a set of indicator variables reflecting different adoption environ-
ments. The impact of state support for smart meter adoption is captured by an indicator
variable for those states that have actively supported smart meter deployments, such
as through mandates or guaranteed recovery of investment costs.4 This variable ap-
plies only to IOUs and for the effective years. Electricity market structures are captured
by a set of indicator variables for utilities operating in the various formal wholesale
markets, with utilities operating in conventionally regulated markets as the reference
group.5 Alternative estimates suggest that including multiple indicator variables for
specific markets capturing any relevant differences in the markets are not important.
Additionally, I include an indicator variable for states that have implemented customer
choice for all customer classes.6 I include two more indicator variables related to en-
ergy efficiency. States with lost margin recovery mechanisms, including lost revenue
adjustments and decoupling, are captured by an indicator variable that applies to the
relevant IOUs for the effective years.7 Another indicator variable captures those states
with energy efficiency resource standards that applies to the relevant utilities for the
effective years.8 I also considered an interaction term between these two variables to
capture a possible synergistic effect resulting from removing disincentives to invest in
energy efficiency while also providing incentives to invest in energy efficiency. Alterna-
tive estimates showed that this interaction variable was not significant and likelihood
ratio tests concerning its inclusion were not rejected, so I exclude it for simplicity. Zhou
and Matisoff (2016) also assess other variables hypothesized to affect smart meter diffu-
4. States with active support for smart meter adoption during the period under study include AZ, CA,
CT, IL, ME, MA, PA, TX, and VT.
5. Formal wholesale markets include the CAISO, ERCOT, PJM, NYISO, SPP, MISO, and ISONE markets.
6. States with customer choice for all customer classes during the period under study include CT, DE, IL,
ME, MD, MA, MI, NH, NJ, NY, OH, PA, RI, and TX along with DC.
7. States with lost margin recovery mechanisms for IOUs during the period under study include AL, AZ,
AR, CA, CO, CT, HI, ID, IN, KS, KY, LA, ME, MD, MA, MI, MS, MO, MT, NV, NM, NY, NC, OH, OK, OR,
RI, SC, SD, VT, WA, and WY along with DC.
8. States with energy efficiency resource standards during the period under study include AZ, AR, CA,
CO, CT, HI, IL, IN, IA, ME, MD, MA, MI, MN, NV, NM, NY, NC, OH, OR, PA, RI, TX, VT, WA, and WI.
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sion in the United States, like demographic characteristics and data privacy and security
policies, but they do not find any evidence of their importance. I exclude these variables
from my models for simplicity.
The remaining determinants are collectively captured by a set of indicator vari-
ables representing time with 2007 left as the reference year, including the impact of the
SGIG subsidies, effects of learning, reductions in cost and improvements in performance
of smart meters, and the development of technology standards. Subsequently, the time
variables reflect calendar time dependence, a trend of variables changing over time, and
not necessarily duration dependence (Colombo and Mosconi 1995), though the two are
equivalent in this case because no new distribution utilities were created during the pe-
riod under study if mergers are ignored. It is not ideal, of course, for the time variable
to capture all these effects because I cannot adequately assess the impact of each effect
separately, but multicollinearity issues prevent me from including additional variables.
Learning effects are typically captured with a time variable or some other estimate of
duration dependence (Karshenas and Stoneman 1993; Fuentelsaz, Gomez, and Polo
(2003); Battisti and Stoneman 2005). Alternatively, a variable representing the cumula-
tive stock of adopters can be used (Colombo and Mosconi 1995; Battisti, Canepa, and
Stoneman 2009), but in this case the variable is highly collinear with time. Any measure
of adoption costs, such as the average price of a smart meter, depicting the slight down-
ward trend that has occurred would also be highly collinear with time. Using a set of
indicator variables, however, allows some flexibility in teasing out some of these effects.
Similar multicollinearity issues have been common in previous empirical stud-
ies of diffusion. Fuentelsaz, Gomez, and Polo (2003) use time as a variable reflecting
learning effects but note that it could capture other influences that change over time like
changes in the technology or price. Colombo and Mosconi (1995) use time as a variable
reflecting price and performance trends as well as growth of exogenous information
about a technology. The difficulty of including system-level variables that vary over
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time but are fixed across observational units is one of the drawbacks of discrete-time
duration models.
These collinear variables, though, are interrelated theoretically, reflecting dif-
ferent sources of uncertainty that impact the expected profitability of adopting smart
meters. Learning reflects reductions in uncertainty over time about the actual costs and
benefits of adoption. Utilities may be uncertain about changes in the costs of adoption
over time, such as changes in the price of smart meters. Furthermore, utilities may be
uncertain about the performance, reliability, and interoperability of smart meters as well
as future improvements in the technology, which should be reduced over time through
the development of technology standards. These variable should exert a positive influ-
ence on adoption if these interrelated uncertainties are being reduced over time, such
that time should be positively correlated with adoption.
With respect to the SGIG subsidies, although it is possible to identify the grant
recipients, using an indicator variable for such purposes in the duration model is not
possible because it results in quasi-complete separation. All recipients of the subsidies
adopt smart meters but there are still utilities who did not receive the SGIG subsidies
that do adopt smart meters. This quasi-complete separation means maximum likelihood
estimates do not exist if such a variable is included in a binary response model (Albert
and Anderson 1984). By including a set of indicator variables for time, however, it is
possible to assess the effect of time before and after the SGIG subsidies became available.
This allows at least some means to assess the impact of the SGIG program.
Additionally, a potentially important variable related to learning that is not cap-
tured in the covariates because of lack of data is absorptive capacity. Some measure of
R&D activity, such as R&D expenditures or number of R&D employees, has typically
been used as a proxy in previous diffusion research (Karshenas and Stoneman 1993;
Colombo and Mosconi 1995; Battisti and Stoneman 2005) because absorptive capacity
is likely correlated with internal R&D activities (Cohen and Levinthal 1989; Cohen and
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Levinthal 1990; Rosenberg 1990). These data are not collected in the EIA dataset. The
ownership variables, to an extent, may capture the effect of absorptive capacity because
IOUs perform more R&D than other types of utilities and are more likely to be members
of the Electric Power Research Institute, the industry-supported collaborative R&D or-
ganization. Of course, there is likely variation even within IOUs. In addition, a publicly
available list of members of this organization does not exist for the period under study
that could be used to create an indicator variable indicating membership.
It is possible that unobserved heterogeneity, in the form of utilities’ abilities to
learn, may be present in the model described. Some utilities, for example, may adopt
smart meters earlier than others because of their superior ability to assess the costs and
benefits of adoption. A selection effect would then ensue that decreases the baseline
hazard rates over time, because utilities that are more susceptible to adopting do so
first thus leaving in the population at risk of adoption those utilities that are not as sus-
ceptible. Neglecting sources of unobserved heterogeneity is known to bias estimates of
baseline hazard rates, the time variables in this case, toward negative duration depen-
dence, but it does not affect the estimates for the included covariates (Heckman and
Singer 1984a, 1984b; Vaupel and Yashin 1985; Nicoletti and Rondinelli 2010). It is pos-
sible to account for unobserved heterogeneity by adding a firm-specific random effect
term to the duration model. Heckman and Singer (1984a, 1984b) show that assumptions
about the distribution of the unobserved heterogeneity term can produce sensitive re-
sults in continuous-time models and develop an alternative nonparametric estimation
method. Land, Nagin, and McCall (2001) extend this analysis to discrete-time models,
but the estimation method becomes considerably more complicated. I find positive pos-
itive duration dependence in model estimates that suggests unobserved heterogeneity
can safely be ignored, though the effect of time could still be underestimated.
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6.6 Empirical Findings
6.6.1 Life Table Estimates
Before presenting the results of the regression analyses, life table estimates for
time until smart meter adoption, defined as an AMI proportion ≥ 0.05, are presented
in Table 8. These estimates are the discrete-time analog of the popular, nonparametric
Kaplan-Meier estimates of hazard and survival rates for continuous-time data (Efron
1988). Life tables describe the distribution of event occurrences and how associated
hazard and survival rates depend on time alone, essentially assuming a homogeneous
sample. Decomposed by ownership types, 56 IOUs, 386 co-ops, and 158 munis adopted
smart meters by the end of 2014. Graphical representations of the hazard and survival
functions are depicted in Figure 12.
Table 8. Life Table Estimates of Hazard and Survival Rates for Smart Meter Adoption.
Year nadopterst nrisksett ĥt se(ĥt) Ŝt se(Ŝt)
2007 30 1805 0.017 0.0030 0.98 0.0030
2008 66 1775 0.037 0.0045 0.95 0.0053
2009 56 1709 0.033 0.0043 0.92 0.0065
2010 91 1653 0.055 0.0056 0.87 0.0080
2011 102 1562 0.065 0.0063 0.81 0.0093
2012 74 1460 0.051 0.0057 0.77 0.0099
2013 138 1386 0.100 0.0080 0.69 0.0109
2014 68 1248 0.054 0.0064 0.65 0.0112
Hazard and survival rates provide an alternative to diffusion curves for describ-
ing diffusion processes and provide more information than simply the level and speed
of processes (Trajtenberg and Yitzhaki 1989). They should be interpreted jointly. While
hazard rates indicate how likely it is to have an event in a given time period, they do
not indicate how many events actually occur. Survival rates provide an estimate of the
magnitude effect of the hazard rate. The specific estimates for each time period are
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less important than the general trend of the values over time. The general trend for the
hazard function is a steady increase over time, though there is a significant reversal in
2014. The magnitudes of the hazards are also quite low. The general trend for the sur-
vival function is a steady rate of adoption over time and also indicates that the median
survival lifetime is beyond eight years. These trends, of course, could change as the
diffusion process proceeds.
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Figure 12. Life Table Estimates of Hazard and Survival Functions for Smart Meter Adoption.
95% confidence intervals shaded in gray.
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6.6.2 Duration Model Estimates
The estimates for discrete-time duration models with differing definitions of
adoption are presented in Table 9. As a whole they suggest multiple determinants of
smart meter diffusion in the United States including supply-side, demand-side, and
environmental factors. Covariates with significant effects that are mostly robust across
models include utility size, utility ownership, adoption of AMR, net metering, state
support for smart meter adoption, and time.
Table 9. Estimation Results for Discrete-Time Duration Models.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
AMI prop. > 0 AMI prop. ≥ 0.05 AMI prop. ≥ 0.10
Variable β mfx β mfx β mfx
Constant −6.471∗∗∗ −6.216∗∗∗ −6.093∗∗∗
(0.352) (0.429) (0.436)
Total customers (log) 0.291∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.144∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗ 0.005∗∗
(0.036) (0.002) (0.043) (0.002) (0.043) (0.002)
Investor-owned utility −0.177 −0.009 −0.749∗ −0.025∗∗ −0.626 −0.021∗
(0.272) (0.013) (0.339) (0.009) (0.344) (0.010)
Co-operative utility 1.186∗∗∗ 0.071∗∗∗ 1.689∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ 1.782∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗
(0.098) (0.007) (0.117) (0.007) (0.119) (0.007)
AMR meter prop. −0.022∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.034∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗∗ −0.001∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.0001) (0.002) (0.0001) (0.002) (0.0001)
Demand-side mgmt. −0.787∗ −0.033∗∗ −0.129 −0.005 0.144 0.006
(0.384) (0.012) (0.395) (0.015) (0.359) (0.015)
Net metering 0.530∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗ 0.641∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.607∗∗∗ 0.025∗∗∗
(0.102) (0.006) (0.121) (0.006) (0.124) (0.006)
State AMI support 0.516 0.033 1.193∗∗ 0.070∗ 1.234∗∗ 0.070∗
(0.304) (0.023) (0.402) (0.032) (0.409) (0.032)
Wholesale comp. 0.219∗ 0.012∗ 0.137 0.006 0.135 0.005
(0.104) (0.006) (0.125) (0.005) (0.128) (0.005)
Customer choice −0.185 −0.010 0.009 0.0003 −0.046 −0.002
(0.117) (0.006) (0.135) (0.005) (0.138) (0.005)
continued...
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...continued
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
AMI prop. > 0 AMI prop. ≥ 0.05 AMI prop. ≥ 0.10
Variable β mfx β mfx β mfx
Lost margin recovery −0.060 −0.003 0.482 0.022 0.394 0.017
(0.271) (0.014) (0.333) (0.018) (0.333) (0.016)
Energy eff. stds. −0.151 −0.008 −0.300∗ −0.011∗ −0.357∗ −0.013∗
(0.118) (0.006) (0.148) (0.005) (0.151) (0.005)
2008 0.520∗∗ 0.032∗∗ 1.052∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.919∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗
(0.168) (0.012) (0.225) (0.015) (0.234) (0.014)
2009 0.430∗ 0.026∗ 1.134∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 1.254∗∗∗ 0.067∗∗∗
(0.183) (0.013) (0.232) (0.016) (0.232) (0.016)
2010 0.982∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 1.795∗∗∗ 0.114∗∗∗ 1.793∗∗∗ 0.109∗∗∗
(0.171) (0.015) (0.221) (0.020) (0.225) (0.019)
2011 1.314∗∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 2.123∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 2.194∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗
(0.170) (0.017) (0.220) (0.022) (0.223) (0.022)
2012 1.051∗∗∗ 0.077∗∗∗ 2.020∗∗∗ 0.140∗∗∗ 2.072∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗
(0.186) (0.017) (0.232) (0.023) (0.234) (0.023)
2013 2.096∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗ 3.083∗∗∗ 0.268∗∗∗ 3.125∗∗∗ 0.262∗∗∗
(0.177) (0.023) (0.224) (0.028) (0.228) (0.028)
2014 1.843∗∗∗ 0.169∗∗∗ 2.594∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 2.689∗∗∗ 0.211∗∗∗
(0.208) (0.026) (0.254) (0.030) (0.255) (0.030)
Num. obs. 12, 023 12, 588 12, 662
Log-Likelihood −2, 412.648 −1, 894.583 −1, 830.561
Deviance 4, 825.296 3, 789.166 3, 661.122
Pseudo R2 0.199 0.279 0.293
Likelihood Ratio 950.011∗∗∗ 1, 206.298∗∗∗ 1, 252.988∗∗∗
Notes: Pooled logit models. Averages of individual marginal effects. Clustered standard errors in parenthe-
ses. Significance levels: ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
Utility size is positively associated with adoption and the effect is statistically
and economically significant. In contrast, the effect of ownership types is divergent.
Relative to publicly owned utilities, IOUs are less likely to adopt and co-ops are more
likely to adopt. The significance and magnitude of this effect, however, is greater for co-
ops. This most likely owes to the rural nature of co-operative service territories where
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automation of the meter reading process and remote service switching via two-way
communcation is especially beneficial as a result of the large distances among customers.
Additionally, this result could also derive from the customer-oriented perspective of
co-op management. It is somewhat surprising that IOUs are less likely to adopt than
publicly owned utilities given the greater amounts of R&D performed by IOUs. The
effect could perhaps result from the regulatory burden of seeking approval for smart
meter investments that munis do not face (Dedrick et al. 2015). Additionally, having net
metering customers has a modest, positive effect on adopting smart meters.
The estimates for adoption of AMR should be interpreted with some caution be-
cause of the inability to properly capture the exact nature of AMR adoption. The effect
across models is very small but suggests that a vintage effect dominates any learning
effect from prior adoption, thus slowing the diffusion of smart meters. This is not to say
that a learning effect is absent; rather, the vintage effect simply appears to be more sub-
stantial. Because of the opposing influences the small effect should not necessarily be
interpreted as a vintage effect with no practical significance. Vintage effects likely have
greater importance in practice than this estimate suggests. Alternatively, some utilities
have decided to adopt AMR instead of AMI during the period under study, which can
be observed in the data. This raises the issue of potential endogeneity of this variable
and the resulting simultaneity bias if the decision to adopt AMR or AMI is considered
jointly. The issue of choice among competing technologies, vintage effects, and endo-
geneity does not appear to have been addressed in the extant empirical research on
diffusion, and simultaneity would be difficult to address with a discrete-time duration
model using panel data.
State support for smart meter adoption has a positive effect on adoption, al-
though it is not significant in Model 1. This suggests that active state support has been
important for smart meter adoption, either enabling or constraining adoption by IOUs.
The impact of the different electricity market structures across the United States is not
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significant. Neither wholesale competition nor customer choice has a significant effect
on adoption compared to conventionally regulated states. This finding suggests that
time-varying, market-determined wholesale prices do not seem to exert a strong pres-
sure on utilities to adopt smart meters in order to charge time-varying retail prices. In
some cases, though, regulators may actually be limiting the availability of time-varying
rates for retail customers. These combined findings suggest that the regulatory process
is more important than market structure in the decision to adopt smart meters. Nonethe-
less, the two variables may be linked in that regulatory support for smart meters may
also stem from a broader policy goal of liberalizing electricity markets, such as in states
like California and Texas.
The impact of energy efficiency is also not significant. Lost margin recovery
mechanisms do not exert a significant effect and the impact of energy efficiency resource
standards is only weakly significant and not robust across specifications, suggesting that
energy efficiency is not a significant driver of smart meter adoption. The estimates for
energy efficiency resource standards are even negative, although the magnitudes are
modest. It could be that competing investments have taken priority to achieve energy
efficiency targets.
The effect of time on adoption is highly significant with an upward trend re-
flecting an increasing hazard of adoption over time. Figure 13 graphs the estimated
marginal effects for the year indicator variables from Model 2, leaving 2007 as the ref-
erence year. The same marginal effects for the Models 1 and 3 display a similar trend
though the magnitudes are slightly different. After the Recovery Act was signed into
law there is a noticeable upward trend in the hazard after 2009 compared to 2009 and
2008. This finding suggests that smart meters may be too cost-prohibitive for many util-
ities to adopt, even if it may be socially desirable to do so. It may also be the case that
utilities who received funding adopted earlier than they might otherwise have because
of the availability of subsidies, thus increasing the rate of diffusion. Furthermore, there
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is another noticeable upward trend after 2012 when a technology standard related to
interoperability was developed. Some utilities have explicitly stated they have waited to
adopt until certain technology standards have been finalized, such as the interoperabil-
ity standard.
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Figure 13. Estimated Marginal Effects for Year Indicator Variables from Model 2. 95%
confidence intervals shaded in gray. 2007 left as reference year.
These noticeable effects seem to suggest that both the SGIG subsidies and tech-
nology standards have been important determinants for smart meter adoption. It is
also likely, however, that cost reductions and learning have contributed to this general
upward trend. Anecdotal evidence suggests that utilities have been learning the actual
costs and benefits of adopting over time, both from using the technology and through
knowledge spillovers (EPRI 2010). Although there is no way to completely disentan-
gle these effects from one another, the use of year indicator variables in the duration
model provides at least some means to do so but the estimates should be interpreted
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with some caution. Additional evidence is needed to give greater weight to any one of
these effects.
6.6.3 Fractional Response Model Estimates
The estimates for fractional response models are presented in Table 10. I exclude
the demand-side management covariate in order to avoid any potential endogeneity be-
cause smart adoption can enhance these activities. The results of the fractional response
models are similar to the duration model estimates. Covariates with significant effects
that are mostly robust across models include utility size, utility ownership, adoption of
AMR, net metering, state support for smart meter adoption, and time.
Table 10. Estimation Results for Fractional Response Models.
One-Part Model Two-Part Model
Part One Part Two
Variable β mfx β mfx β mfx
Constant −5.971∗∗∗ −6.990∗∗∗ 1.779∗
(0.528) (0.457) (0.697)
Total customers (log) 0.033 0.002 0.325∗∗∗ 0.034∗∗∗ −0.274∗∗∗ −0.032∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.003) (0.047) (0.005) (0.061) (0.007)
Investor-owned utility −0.283 −0.018 −0.140 −0.015 0.166 0.019
(0.424) (0.026) (0.341) (0.036) (0.415) (0.048)
Co-operative utility 2.220∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗∗ 1.366∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 1.782∗∗∗ 0.206∗∗∗
(0.143) (0.007) (0.123) (0.011) (0.176) (0.020)
AMR meter prop. −0.068∗∗∗ −0.004∗∗∗ −0.029∗∗∗ −0.003∗∗∗ −0.061∗∗∗ −0.007∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000)
Net metering 0.937∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗ 0.877∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.165 0.019
(0.131) (0.008) (0.104) (0.011) (0.163) (0.019)
State AMI support 1.338∗∗ 0.083∗∗ 0.535 0.056 0.890∗ 0.103∗
(0.435) (0.027) (0.376) (0.039) (0.394) (0.045)
Wholesale comp. 0.019 0.001 0.114 0.012 −0.328∗ −0.038∗
(0.138) (0.009) (0.120) (0.012) (0.158) (0.018)
continued...
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...continued
One-Part Model Two-Part Model
Part One Part Two
Variable β mfx β mfx β mfx
Customer choice 0.093 0.006 −0.106 −0.011 0.199 0.023
(0.166) (0.010) (0.146) (0.015) (0.201) (0.023)
Lost margin recovery 0.290 0.018 0.234 0.024 0.255 0.029
(0.365) (0.023) (0.317) (0.033) (0.365) (0.042)
Energy eff. stds. −0.383∗ −0.024∗ −0.187 −0.020 −0.207 −0.024
(0.168) (0.010) (0.139) (0.015) (0.190) (0.022)
2008 1.514∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 1.021∗∗∗ 0.107∗∗∗ 0.404 0.047
(0.174) (0.011) (0.115) (0.012) (0.264) (0.031)
2009 2.211∗∗∗ 0.137∗∗∗ 1.532∗∗∗ 0.160∗∗∗ 0.807∗∗ 0.093∗∗
(0.194) (0.012) (0.128) (0.013) (0.284) (0.033)
2010 2.848∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗∗ 2.067∗∗∗ 0.216∗∗∗ 1.092∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗
(0.206) (0.013) (0.135) (0.013) (0.308) (0.035)
2011 3.467∗∗∗ 0.215∗∗∗ 2.561∗∗∗ 0.267∗∗∗ 1.367∗∗∗ 0.158∗∗∗
(0.213) (0.013) (0.145) (0.014) (0.312) (0.036)
2012 3.955∗∗∗ 0.245∗∗∗ 2.881∗∗∗ 0.301∗∗∗ 1.817∗∗∗ 0.210∗∗∗
(0.218) (0.013) (0.151) (0.014) (0.316) (0.036)
2013 4.729∗∗∗ 0.293∗∗∗ 3.469∗∗∗ 0.362∗∗∗ 1.973∗∗∗ 0.228∗∗∗
(0.225) (0.013) (0.160) (0.014) (0.322) (0.037)
2014 5.079∗∗∗ 0.315∗∗∗ 3.755∗∗∗ 0.392∗∗∗ 2.159∗∗∗ 0.249∗∗∗
(0.227) (0.013) (0.165) (0.014) (0.324) (0.037)
Num. obs. 14, 440 14, 440 3, 112
GGOFF (LM) 3.834 89.923∗∗∗ 40.103∗∗∗
P test for one-part vs. two-part model (LM): 0.029
Notes: Pooled logit models. Averages of individual marginal effects. Clustered standard errors in parenthe-
ses. Significance levels: ∗p < 0.05; ∗∗p < 0.01; ∗∗∗p < 0.001.
The one-part model appears to fit the data better than the two-part model based
on the insignificant P test statistic. Additionally, the logit specification for the one-
part model appears appropriate based on the insignificant generalized goodness-of-
functional form (GGOFF) test statistic. In contrast, for both the binary and fractional
response parts of the two-part model the logit specification appears to not be appropri-
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ate. Alternative specifications using different link functions, however, do not generate
different results for the GGOFF test and the estimates for the parameters and marginal
effects are similar.
The advantage of the two-part model is that it essentially distinguishes between
the interfirm and intrafirm dimensions of adoption and models them jointly. The binary
response part is similar to the discrete-time duration model in modeling interfirm diffu-
sion, except it is estimated with the full panel dataset. The fractional response part only
includes observations with positive values and therefore models the intrafirm dimen-
sion. The most noticeable difference in the estimates between part one and part two of
the two-part model is for utility size, which is positively associated with adopting but
negatively associated with the level of adoption. The estimates for the year indicator
variables also reflect a general upward trend for both the one-part and two-part models.
6.7 Discussion
Duration analysis and fractional response analysis of smart meter adoption in
the United States suggest that policy and regulatory support have positively influenced
adoption and thus the rate and level of smart meter diffusion. This is consistent with the
findings of Zhou and Matisoff (2016), but I also find that utility characteristics and some
combination of learning, cost reductions, and technology standards are important. In
the absence of public policy support for smart meter adoption, it is likely that the rate
and level of smart meter diffusion would be lower than they currently are. The finding
that learning and technology standards have likely been influential is important because
policy has also supported these activities.
The diffusion of new technologies can be affected by a myriad of factors, includ-
ing supply-side, demand-side, and environmental factors. The econometric evidence
presented in this chapter suggests that factors from each category have influenced, with
varying magnitudes, the adoption decisions of utilities with respect to smart meters.
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The most significant variables for the time period under study, however, appear to be
the policy and regulatory environment and some combination of learning, cost reduc-
tions, and technology standards. At the federal level, the monetary subsidies in the Re-
covery Act’s SGIG program boosted both the level and rate of diffusion by reducing the
costs of adoption. At the state level, policy and regulatory support for smart meters, ei-
ther through technology mandates or the guaranteed cost recovery of AMI investments,
has also had a significant impact on diffusion. The results also suggest that differences
in electricity market structures have not impacted the diffusion of smart meters in a sig-
nificant way; rather, regulation has been a more significant influence, either enabling or
constraining smart meter adoption. There is also an association, however, between state
policy and regulatory support for smart meters and liberalized electricity markets, such
as in California, Texas, Illinois, and Massachusetts. This would suggest that an over-
riding policy goal of increasing competition, customer choice, and the flexibility of the
demand side in electricity markets positively influences smart meter adoption through
policy and regulation, but not necessarily through the structure of markets. Whether or
not this policy support for smart meters has been warranted, or has been implemented
in the best way or at the right time, is another issue.
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CHAPTER VII
SMART METER DIFFUSION POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES
The empirical findings from the previous chapter have public policy implica-
tions for enhancing the diffusion of smart meters in the United States. In this chapter
I describe and assess existing smart meter diffusion policies in the United States and
present additional empirical investigation of their impacts. Although the econometric
analysis of the previous chapter investigates the effects of smart meter diffusion policies,
it does not explore theories of diffusion policy and rationales for the specific diffusion
policies enacted. The empirical analysis suggests a prominent role for policy in extend-
ing the diffusion of smart meters, which is consistent with previous research (Zhang
2010; Spodniak, Jantunen, and Viljainen 2014; Zhou and Matisoff 2016). Three aspects
of diffusion policy, and public policy in general, frame the discussion in this chapter:
rationale, instruments, and impact. These aspects concern the reasoning and motives for
policy intervention, the methods of intervention, and the consequences of intervention
(Stoneman 2002, 175–177).
7.1 Theories of Diffusion Policy
Theories of technological diffusion lead to theories of diffusion policy, aimed at
identifying if and when public policy may be needed to alter a diffusion process and
the appropriate methods for intervening in a diffusion process. Diffusion policy is typi-
cally oriented toward enhancing the diffusion of a particular technology, but it may also
be oriented toward blocking diffusion. Diffusion policy is a type of technology policy
and should be analyzed in the context of innovation policy more broadly. Two distinct
approaches to diffusion policy exist: neoclassical theories concerned with correcting
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market failures and evolutionary theories concerned with avoiding lock-in to inferior
technology choices. More broadly, the two approaches align with market failure and
system failure approaches to innovation policy. Although these two approaches are
opposed in some ways, they may be viewed as complementary (Bach and Matt 2005;
Lundvall and Borrás 2005; Metcalfe 2005b, 2007; Steinmueller 2010; Bleda and Río 2013;
Pyka 2014; Fagerberg 2016).
The general rationale for innovation policy is the tendency toward underproduc-
tion of scientific and technological knowledge in markets as a result of the uncertainty
of practical outcomes from innovation activities, the inability to fully appropriate the
benefits from innovation activities, and the need to invest in prior knowledge to pro-
duce new knowledge from innovation activities (Nelson 1959; Arrow 1962a). In the
market failure approach, public policy should then promote a socially optimal level of
knowledge production determined by the positive externalities of knowledge. This ap-
proach is concerned more with the generation than the diffusion of knowledge and also
treats knowledge as having public good characteristics. A policy of subsidizing basic
scientific research, as opposed to applied technological research and development, is
more strongly supported by the market failure approach. Because the market failure
argument focuses on static, allocative efficiency, it may neglect dynamic, adaptive effi-
ciency. Additionally, the market failure approach may prove to be an inadequate guide
to practical policy making given the uncertainty and path dependence in innovation
processes that prevents the identification of a socially optimal level of knowledge pro-
duction (Smith 2000; Bach and Matt 2005; Chaminade and Edquist 2006, 2010; Bleda and
Río 2013; Fagerberg 2016).
Perceived inadequacies with the market failure approach to innovation policy,
which focuses on individual firm incentives, led to an innovation systems approach that
recognizes the importance of the connections and interactions among different elements
in an innovation system that function together to generate and diffuse innovations (Free-
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man 1987; Lundvall 1992; Nelson 1993). These elements include firms, research univer-
sities, public laboratories, and other nonmarket institutions that collectively advance
technology. The networks connecting the various elements of an innovation system
facilitate the combining of disparate ideas, diffusion of knowledge, and learning and
adaptation in an open, dynamic environment (Cohendet and Meyer-Krahmer 2005; Pow-
ell and Grodal 2005; Powell and Giannella 2010; Özman 2015). The systems perspective
can be applied at a national, regional, or sectoral level and is also careful to emphasize
historical and institutional specificities that affect economic performance (Edquist 2005;
Metcalfe 2005b, 2007; Soete, Verspagen, and Weel 2010). For economic policy in general,
a systems view orients policy toward creating a supportive institutional environment
for an evolving economic system and thereby transcends the dualistic policy frames of
intervention versus nonintervention (Colander and Kupers 2014).
The ultimate goal of investing in innovation activities is to turn technological
knowledge into economic value. The innovation systems approach can also be distin-
guished from the market failure approach based on the analysis of knowledge. Knowl-
edge is equated to information in the market failure approach whereas knowledge is
distinguished from information in the systems approach. At a general level, knowledge
can be decomposed into codified and tacit dimensions that differentiate between knowl-
edge that is easly communicated and that which is not (Leppälä 2015).
The market failure rationale for innovation policy treats knowledge as a public
good, but this may not necessarily be the case. This results from the treatment of knowl-
edge as information in neoclassical models, such that all knowledge is generic, codified,
easily transferred at low cost, and context independent. Subsequently, knowledge is
viewed as nonrival and nonexclusive and thus creates positive externalities leading to a
market failure in the allocation of resources to knowledge production. While basic scien-
tific knowledge may fit this description of a public good, technological knowledge often
does not as a result of its specificity, tacitness, difficulty to acquire, and context depen-
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dence. If knowledge is differentiated in these and other ways and dispersed throughout
the economy within heterogeneous people, firms, and other organizations, then knowl-
edge has both public and private characteristics and learning and search processes be-
come more important for understanding innovation processes and formulating policy
(Smith 2000; Metcalfe 2005b, 2007; Chaminade and Edquist 2006, 2010; Lundvall and
Lorenz 2012).
Imperfect knowledge is linked to true uncertainty and bounded rationality in de-
cision making that in turn motivates learning and active search for knowledge. Knowl-
edge is generated and diffused on social and economic networks that help shape knowl-
edge management practices and learning processes, serving as both a cause and a con-
sequence of economic performance (Cohendet and Meyer-Krahmer 2005; Powell and
Grodal 2005; Powell and Giannella 2010; Özman 2015). Viewing knowledge as multidi-
mensional may impact diffusion and policy making through learning processes. Insti-
tutions play an important role in reducing uncertainty and facilitating network connec-
tions. The main policy recommendation in the systems approach is to enrich innovation
networks through which knowledge is generated and diffused. For the diffusion of tech-
nologies, enriching innovation networks can facilitate the diffusion of knowledge about
technologies in both its codified and tacit dimensions. The diffusion of this technolog-
ical knowledge through both centralized and peer-to-peer channels can then influence
adoption decisions.
The systems perspective affects the theory and practice of innovation policy
by expanding the relevant set of policy rationales and instruments, including those re-
lated to education and labor (Edquist 2005; Lundvall and Borrás 2005; Soete, Verspagen,
and Weel 2010; Steinmueller 2010; Fagerberg 2016). In contrast to the market failure
approach, the systems approach to innovation policy is concerned more with institu-
tional and system failures and also recognizes the potential for government failure. The
systems approach is concerned with missing actors, institutions, and associated con-
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nections. Network connectivity also evolves to create new business opportunities and
institutions based on the search processes for solutions to social and economic prob-
lems, so supporting network infrastructure and mobility should be a goal of innovation
policy (Ricard 2015). Although endorsed by many countries, the innovation systems
approach has also been difficult to translate from theory into practice because of its
sometimes unclear concepts and complex depictions of innovation processes that do not
readily generate policy instruments (Smith 2000; Mytelka and Smith 2002; Woolthuis,
Lankhuizen, and Gilsing 2005; Chaminade and Edquist 2006, 2010; Bleda and Río 2013).
Diffusion policy has arguably been understudied in the literature on innovation
policy, even though the impact of technological innovations can only be felt through
their widespread use (Stoneman 2002, 305–306). In practice, diffusion policy is typi-
cally oriented toward increasing the rate of diffusion with the presumption that faster
is better, although theory demonstrates that this is not always the case. Conventional
diffusion policy theory is framed in terms of market failure as a rationale with either
information provision or adoption subsidies as instruments (Stoneman and David 1986;
Stoneman 1987a; Stoneman and Diederen 1994; Caiazza 2015). The market failure ar-
gument for diffusion policy rests on the comparison between the private and social
costs and benefits of technology adoption. Diffusion policy may be warranted if the so-
cially optimal level of technology adoption is not reached in an economy or not reached
fast enough in the absence of policy intervention. This theory can be used to derive
a welfare-optimal diffusion path, but the appropriate policy instrument and timing
depends on the context, such as the state of technological expectations or market struc-
ture (Ireland and Stoneman 1986; Stoneman and David 1986; Stoneman 1987b, 67–79;
Stoneman and Diederen 1994). In contrast to the market failure approach, the systems
approach to diffusion policy as informed by evolutionary thinking focuses on avoiding
inefficiencies as opposed to incentivizing efficiencies. The goal for policy from this per-
spective is to avoid lock-in to an inferior technology and to ensure variety in technology
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choice (Metcalfe 1994a, 1994b, 1995a, 1995b; David 2005, 2007; Pyka 2014). Either ap-
proach is concerned with overcoming barriers to diffusion and achieving certain social
goals (Edler 2010; Caiazza 2015).
Different theoretical perspectives on diffusion can lead to different rationales and
instruments for diffusion policy. Epidemic models of diffusion view information and
learning as the key determinants in diffusion processes and thus produce a relatively
limited set of policy rationales and instruments concerning the provision of informa-
tion. Probit models of diffusion focus on the effects of firm heterogeneity and thus pro-
duce a wider array of policy rationales and instruments related to firm characteristics.
Game theory models also point to the relevance of strategic interaction, and evolution-
ary models emphasize both firm heterogeneity and learning in a continually changing
environment.
Nonlinear models of the innovation process suggest that technology policy
should not focus on diffusion in isolation. Interdependencies between diffusion and
the other stylized stages of the innovation process suggest that technology policies for
invention, commercialization, and diffusion cannot always be separated and should be
considered in tandem and designed to work together synergistically. While integrating
the supply of and demand for innovations in theoretical models enables welfare compar-
isons of diffusion paths, it also complicates policy design. Good policy for R&D may be
bad policy for diffusion, and vice versa. Additionally, policy makers do not necessarily
have the requisite knowledge to determine the welfare-optimal diffusion path (Stone-
man 1987a, 1987b; David 1986; Stoneman and Diederen 1994; Metcalfe 1994a, 1994b,
1995a, 1995b; Hahn and Yu 1999; Geroski 2000; Williams, Stewart, and Slack 2005, 211–
247; Caiazza 2015).
The most common diffusion policy instruments include information provision
and adoption subsidies, but other instruments include demonstration projects, support
of technology standards development, and public procurement. A policy mix with mul-
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tiple instruments may also be needed to ensure widespread diffusion. Furthermore, the
boundaries of diffusion policy may not always be clear. Environmental regulation, for
example, may incentivize the diffusion of certain technologies over others. Additionally,
education policy affects human capital development that can in turn determine what
technologies are used or not used based on the available skillsets and capabilities in an
economy. (David 1986; Stoneman and Diederen 1994; Caiazza 2015).
The use of information provision to stimulate the adoption of new technologies
is premised on the belief that firms may not be aware of new technologies or may not
understand the full costs and benefits of adopting new technologies. The provision of
information aims to reduce this uncertainty through learning and thereby encourage
adoption. Differentiating between information and knowledge, however, implies that
simply providing information to firms may not be enough to encourage adoption. If
there is a considerable tacit dimension to knowledge about using a certain technology,
then the transfer of knowledge becomes more difficult and costly. Information provision
may then have to be combined with subsidies to generate knowledge through learning
by using. Building absorptive capacity for technology adoption is another policy instru-
ment to consider when both learning and firm heterogeneity are taken to be important
determinants in diffusion processes. Absorptive capacity also links generation and diffu-
sion in innovation systems (Wegloop 1995; Goodwin and Johnston 1999). Subsequently,
an information provision policy can be transformed into a more general learning policy,
either passively providing information or actively generating knowledge in uncertain
environments.
Adoption subsidies aim to reduce the costs of adopting new technologies through
financial incentives and enhance their diffusion as a result. Even if some firms may
adopt without such incentives, given firm heterogeneity, subsidies may be needed to
induce further adoption along both the interfirm and intrafirm dimensions. Subsidies
may also be needed to encourage early adoption and generate learning which can then
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feedback to suppliers to improve technologies that can then lead to mass market adop-
tion. The heterogeneity of firms, however, may make it difficult to design an optimal
subsidy (Stoneman and Diederen 1994).
Apart from these more common and direct instruments, the support of technol-
ogy standards development can be considered an important indirect instrument for
diffusion policy. Different types of standards may impact the diffusion of technologies
in different ways. Quality standards, for example, reduce uncertainty as to the perfor-
mance and reliability of a technology. Product standardization can generate economies
of scale in production and thus reduce unit costs. Additionally, interface standards can
alleviate the fear of vendor lock-in. The development of standards can reduce uncer-
tainty and lower costs and thus positively influence technology adoption (David 1987;
David and Greenstein 1990; Tassey 2000, 2015; Blind 2004).
Uncertainty plays an important role in formulating and assessing diffusion poli-
cies. Expectations of the costs and benefits of technology adoption may play an im-
portant role in the formation and impact of diffusion policies (Ireland and Stoneman
1986). This is true for both neoclassical and evolutionary approaches to diffusion policy,
but they differ qualitatively in how expectations of firms are conceived and modeled.
Neoclassical models assume unbounded rationality whereas evolutionary models as-
sume bounded rationality. The distinction is one of decision making under risk versus
uncertainty. From the perspective of ecological rationality, decision making should be
connected to the decision-making environment that is defined in part by the presence
and degree of uncertainty (Lee 2011; Todd and Gigerenzer 2012). Neoclassical views
are more appropriate under conditions of little or no uncertainty whereas evolutionary
views are more appropriate under conditions of true uncertainty.
In neoclassical thought there is, strictly speaking, no uncertainty at all. Any un-
certainty is reduced to risk, where all the possible outcomes of a decision are known
along with their associated probabilities of occurring. When modeling behavior, risk is
136
accounted for by attaching probability weights to all possible outcomes in an optimiza-
tion framework. Risk can be distinguished from uncertainty where risk is equated to
known probabilities of known outcomes and uncertainty is equated to unknown prob-
abilities and unknown outcomes (Keynes 1921; Knight 1921). Uncertainty can also be
viewed in a nondualistic framework as composed of varying degrees of uncertainty
(Dow 2015, 2016). Uncertainty may also be termed true, fundamental, radical, or irre-
ducible uncertainty to distinguish it from risk, and it results from imperfect knowledge
of the world because of continual, endogenous change in an open system. Decision mak-
ing in truly uncertain environments is characterized not by optimizing but by satisficing
and heuristics (Lee 2011; Todd and Gigerenzer 2012).
The distinction between risk and uncertainty is important for thinking about
diffusion processes and for policy making aimed at altering diffusion processes. Uncer-
tainty, in contrast to risk, implies limits to knowledge and motivates simpler strategies
for decision making. Uncertainty also implies that policy makers are boundedly rational
and learn with firms together as a diffusion process proceeds. Policy making, therefore,
is necessarily adaptive and interacts and co-evolves with technology as well as the de-
velopment of innovation theory (Metcalfe 1995a, 1995b; Mytelka and Smith 2002; Witt
2003). Uncertainty undermines, to some extent, the market failure rationale for diffusion
policy because it presupposes that policy makers can identify a socially optimal diffu-
sion path. It can be difficult, if not impossible, to ascertain an optimal diffusion path in
an uncertain environment. Welfare comparisons of different diffusion paths can also be
difficult if relevant factors change over time like preferences and the technology itself,
especially if those changes are endogenous (Stoneman 1987a, 1987b).
Because evolutionary perspectives take more seriously the distinction between
risk and uncertainty, evolutionary diffusion policy is concerned less with selecting and
enhancing the diffusion of a particular technology and more with preventing inferior
technologies from becoming locked-in through a path dependent process. From an evo-
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lutionary perspective, uncertainty is inherent in innovation systems and not a market
failure itself. It prevents the identification of a socially optimal diffusion path, limiting
the purview of policy makers. Diffusion policy from an evolutionary perspective seeks
to reduce uncertainty and to ensure a variety of technology is available to be selected
through minimizing switching costs and encouraging experimentation. Strengthening
network ties so that diffusion of knowledge and learning can occur more widely is an-
other policy goal. Additionally, evolutionary policy aims to balance incentives for both
the generation and diffusion of technology (Metcalfe 1994a, 1994b, 1995a, 1995b; David
2005, 2007; Pyka 2014).
7.2 Rationales and Instruments for Smart Meter Diffusion Policies
The rationales and instruments for smart meter diffusion policies can be dis-
cussed within the theoretical frameworks of diffusion policy. The complex distribution
of the costs and benefits of smart meters among different stakeholders, in part resulting
from the complex regulatory and governance structure of the electric power industry
itself, gives rise to many reasons for supporting their diffusion through policy. In par-
ticular, the benefits of smart meters from demand response are primarily social benefits
because reducing peak demand improves reliability of electric power grids and can save
infrastructure costs in the long run. Smart meters can also reduce greenhouse gas emis-
sions through energy efficiency and the integration of renewable energy sources. Along
with barriers to adoption, these isues provide a rationale for public policy support for
smart meter adoption (Zhang 2010; Brown and Zhou 2013; McHenry 2013; Pupillo and
Serre 2013; Katz 2014).
From a market failure perspective, a policy rationale for aiding the diffusion of
smart meters can be made only under certain circumstances. The benefits of smart me-
ters, especially those from enabling time-varying rates, must be compared to the costs.
Only if the social benefits of a higher level of smart meter adoption than occurs in a mar-
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ket exceed the costs of installation can policy support be justified. There is no general
case for subsidizing smart meter diffusion (Doucet and Kleit 2002; Brennan 2004; Römer
et al. 2012). In most cases, the private benefits for utilities from operational efficiencies
are not sufficient to justify smart meter deployments. It is often the case that the bene-
fits obtained from demand response programs are needed to justify such deployment.
Theoretical and empirical studies demonstrate both short-term and long-term benefits
from changes in consumption patterns induced by time-varying pricing. These benefits
result from improved allocative efficiency and asset utilization as well as reductions in
environmental emissions. The level of benefits, however, depend on demand elasticities
and market contexts such as rules, load profiles, and mix of generation sources (Boren-
stein, Jaske, and Rosenfeld 2002; Borenstein 2005a, 2005b; Borenstein and Holland 2005;
Joskow and Tirole 2006; Holland and Mansur 2006, 2008; Ata, Duran, and İşlegen 2016).
The rationales for smart meter diffusion policies in the United States revolve
around a number of complementary objectives including reducing peak demand, em-
powering consumers with consumption data, encouraging energy efficiency, reducing
environmental emissions, and fostering innovation. These policies are typically part of
a broader push for smart grids and should be assessed with this in mind because of the
complementarity of smart grid technologies and policies. Government support of energy
technologies like smart meters can overcome barriers to adoption such as lack of infor-
mation or financial constraints. Given these rationales, policy makers and regulators
have used various instruments to incentivize adoption of smart meters. These include
both adoption subsidies and cost recovery mechanisms and to some extent information
provision. Additionally, smart meter technology standards were developed with the aid
of policy. Specific diffusion policies include the Recovery Act smart grid programs at the
federal level subsidizing smart meters and associated learning and standards develop-
ment as well as active support at the state level through regulatory mechanisms (GAO
2004; NSTC 2011; Weyant 2011; Aldy 2013; Rose 2014; CEA 2016).
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Federal policies supporting the diffusion of smart meters have been motivated
primarily to enhance demand response and energy efficiency but also a means to create
more dynamic retail markets linked with wholesale markets and to spur innovation. Pol-
icy instruments have included a mix of adoption subsidies and information provision as
well as public procurement and support for standards development. The Recovery Act
invested an unprecedented $90 billion in clean energy projects as part of a broader effort
to stabilize the US economy during the Great Recession and to invest in infrastructure
that supports sustainable long-term growth. Apart from the recession, the clean energy
investments in the Recovery Act were motivated by market failures in energy markets
related to environmental impacts, energy security, incentives for innovation, information
provision, and financial constraints (Aldy 2013; Rose 2014; CEA 2016; DOE 2017b).
The clean energy projects in the Recovery Act focused on technology deploy-
ment and embodied the largest form of federal support for the adoption of smart meters
through the Smart Grid Investment Grant program. The SGIG program subsidized
the cost of adopting smart meters by those utilities who applied for and were awarded
monetary grants. The SGIG program clearly emobides the diffusion policy of adoption
subsidies meant to lower the cost of adopting smart meters to incentivize utilities to
adopt. Additionally, a mix of ten investor-owned, municipal, and co-operative utilities
also received funding and assistance to carry out consumer behavior studies related to
time-varying electricity prices as part of their smart meter deployments. The SGIG pro-
gram, then, also embodies the diffusion policy of information provision by generating
knowledge about the actual costs and benefits of adopting. Furthermore, the broader
Recovery Act smart grid program also supported the development of smart meter tech-
nology standards and funded workforce training and development related to smart grid
technologies, activities that have also aided the diffusion of smart meters (Aldy 2013;
Rose 2014; CEA 2016; DOE 2017b).
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State policies, either from legislation or regulatory action, supporting smart me-
ter adoption do not necessarily fit into a market failure argument for diffusion policy.
Given the high levels of regulation in electricity markets, regulation does not simply cor-
rect market failures but actively shapes electricity markets in different ways depending
on the exact nature of regulation. The rationale for economic regulation, however, de-
rives from market failure arguments related to both the natural monopoly characteristics
of electricity distribution and services affected by the public interest, so the rationale for
supporting smart meters and smart grids ultimately results from a duty to protect the
public interest in one or more ways. Therefore, state policies supporting smart meters
are carried out through regulatory instruments.
State policies concerning smart meters have typically been prompted by the pre-
viously described federal efforts at grid modernization. The Energy Policy Act of 2005
requested states to consider implementing time-varying pricing and deploying enabling
technology like smart meters as a means to reduce costs. In addition, state policies have
typically been motivated by similar rationales to the federal policies, including increas-
ing energy efficiency and reducing peak demand to constrain system costs, reducing
operational costs and therefore electricity prices, reducing environmental externalities,
and empowering consumers through consumption data and rate choice. The policies
are typically part of wider smart grid policies that also encourage distributed generation
and net metering. Related policies that protect consumer data have also been imple-
mented (EIA 2011; Urban 2016).
The support for smart meters by states exists on a continuum from passive to
active support. For example, some states simply order utilities to provide smart meters
if requested by a customer, but do not order mass deployments. Only a small number of
states can be considered to have an active program of support for deploying smart me-
ters. In Arizona, California, Connecticut, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,
Texas, and Vermont, there have been concerted efforts to invest in smart meters as part
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of a wider push for smart grids with a more active state role in transforming electricity
markets. Additionally, these requirements typically specify metering functionality but
not specific hardware. The diffusion of smart meters in these states has been aided by
regulatory instruments such as guaranteed cost recovery of smart meter investments
(EIA 2011).
7.3 Impacts of Smart Meter Diffusion Policies
More than 16 million smart meters were installed for 81 utilities across the coun-
try as a result of the SGIG subsidies. Of the 16 million meters from the SGIG grant,
more than 14.5 million smart meters were deployed to residential consumers, more than
1.6 million meters were deployed to commercial consumers, and the remainder were
deployed to industrial consumers. Figure 14 shows that after the Recovery Act smart
grid programs were implemented the rate and level of smart meter diffusion increased
substantially. Of the 81 utilities awarded grants, only one had previously installed smart
meters, 200 in total. The SGIG grants extended both the interfirm and intrafirm dimen-
sions of smart meter diffusion, amounting to rougly one-third of the overall increase
in smart meter use during the time period of the program. Figure 14 also depicts illus-
trative counterfactuals. The first alternative diffusion path depicted can be considered
as one possible counterfactual, constructed by simply subtracting the 16 million smart
meters contributed by the SGIG. This alternative path, however, does not take into ac-
count the learning generated from SGIG smart meter deployments and the knowledge
spillovers that could have encouraged other utilities to adopt smart meters. The second
alternative path depicts a diffusion path that accounts for the possible lack of learning
(DOE 2015, 2016a, 2016c, 2017b).
142
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
●
AMI
AMI
(alt1)
AMI
(alt2)
Recovery Act
signed into law
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014
Year
C
ou
nt
 o
f m
et
er
s 
(m
ill
io
ns
)
Figure 14. Temporal Pattern of Smart Meter/Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI)
Diffusion in the United States with Illustrative Counterfactual Trends in the Absence of Re-
covery Act SGIG Funding, 2007–2014. Observed data from EIA (2017a). First counterfactual
based on data from DOE (2015) subtracted from observed data from EIA (2017a). Second
counterfactual not based on data.
The use of smart meters from the SGIG grants produced many benefits based on
their capabilities. All the meters were capable of interval reads, more than 10.8 million
of the meters were capable of remote connect and disconnect, more than 12.6 million
were capable of outage reporting, and more than 14.5 million were capable of tamper de-
tection. As a result of these and other capabilities, smart meters led to improved restora-
tion times and reduced numbers of customers affected in outage events, improved oper-
ational efficiencies resulting in cost savings, improved customer service and satisfaction,
improved energy efficiency, reductions in peak demand, and reductions in environ-
mental emissions. The SGIG grants also deployed various customer devices, including
10,468 in-home displays, 2,174 energy management systems, 408,188 direct load con-
trol devices, 259,836 programmable controllable thermostats, and 292 smart appliances.
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These devices are coupled with smart meters to manage energy use. The deployment
of smart meters also led more than 417,000 customers to enroll in some form of time-
varying rate program, although this number is small compared to the total number of
smart meters deployed (DOE 2015, 2016a, 2016c).
At the state level, the active support of smart meter adoption has led to high pro-
portions of smart meter use in those states. Figure 15 depicts the level of smart meter
use by state in 2014. Those states that have actively supported smart meter adoption
have seen, unsurprisingly, high proportions of smart meter deployment, such as Ari-
zona, California, Maine, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Vermont. At the same time, other
states without active support have also seen high proportions, such as Alabama, Florida,
Georgia, Idaho, and Nevada. Some of these high proportions have resulted from SGIG
funding. The majority of states without active support, however, do not have high pro-
portions.
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Figure 15. Spatial Pattern of Smart Meter/Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) Diffu-
sion in the United States in 2014. Data from EIA (2017a).
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Other trends related to smart meter diffusion should be examined to give some
context in assessing the impact of diffusion policies. These trends relate to how smart
meters are actually being used and leveraged to create additional value. Figure 16
shows the aggregate pattern of smart meter diffusion decomposed by customer class.
The growth in smart meter use is primarily a result of its extension to residential con-
sumers. Table 11 presents data from Form EIA-861 on certain aspects of how smart
meters are being used. Data on the total number of smart meters with home area net-
work (HAN) gateways, total number of customers with daily digital access (DDA) to
consumption data, and total number of customers with direct load control (DLC) capa-
bilities were first collected in 2013. These data indicate that the meters are capable of
these functions, but it does not imply that they are actually being used as such.
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Figure 16. Temporal Pattern of Smart Meter/Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI)
Diffusion in the United States by Customer Class, 2007–2014. Data from EIA (2017a).
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Table 11. Characteristics of Smart Meter Use.
Year Number of
Meters
Number
of Meters
with HAN
Number of
Customers
with DDA
Number of
Customers
with DLC
2013 53,341,422 1,305,013 30,620,539 3,424,994
2014 58,545,938 2,006,859 35,686,536 3,757,183
Notes: Data from EIA (2017a). HAN = home area network. DDA = daily digital access. DLC = direct load
control.
Figure 17 shows the aggregate pattern of customers enrolled in demand re-
sponse and dynamic pricing programs. More than 9 million customers were enrolled in
demand response programs and more than 6.3 million customers were enrolled in dy-
namic pricing programs in 2014, far below the number of smart meters deployed. Table
12 also shows the number of utilities offering dynamic pricing programs decomposed by
type of pricing. Other impacts of smart meter use related to their social benefits would
be interesting to know, such as improvements in energy efficiency or reductions in peak
demand, but such data in the aggregate are not readily available. Smart meters are also
being used, of course, for operational purposes such as meter reading and outage man-
agement and new uses for them are being discovered (DOE 2016a; IEI 2016a).
Table 12. Number of Utilities Offering Dynamic Pricing Programs.
Year TOU RTP VPP CPP CPR
2013 414 86 16 58 22
2014 490 77 18 67 26
Notes: Data from EIA (2017a). TOU = time of use. RTP = real time pricing. VPP = variable peak pricing.
CPP = critical peak pricing. CPR = critical peak rebates.
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Figure 17. Temporal Pattern of Utility Customers in Demand Response (DR) and Dynamic
Pricing (DP) Programs in the United States, 2007–2014. Data from EIA (2017a).
7.4 Assessing Smart Meter Diffusion Policies
Smart meter diffusion policies should be assessed in the context of the energy in-
novation system and energy and environmental policy in the United States. Systems of
innovation differ substantially at the sectoral level, and even sectors exhibiting high lev-
els of innovation have systems that are organized differently (Malerba 2005). The energy
innovation system is international in scope and consists of a diverse set of actors, net-
works, and institutions engaged in interdependent and uncertain innovation activities.
Relative to other sectors, rates of innovation are slower in energy systems as a result
of the intensiveness and longevity of the capital stock, the need for experimenting and
learning, and the low level of technology clustering and spillovers (Gallagher, Holdren,
and Sagar 2006; Gallagher et al. 2012). Energy policy is intertwined with environmental
policy because of the environmental externalities resulting from the production and con-
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sumption of energy. Energy innovation policy is relevant for the policy mix because of
the role of technological change in both creating and resolving environmental externali-
ties (Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins 2005; Praetorius et al. 2009, 9–43; Popp, Newell, and Jaffe
2010).
Although a systematic comparison of neoclassical and evolutionary approaches
to diffusion policy specifically, as opposed to innovation policy more broadly, has not
yet been attempted, I assess smart meter diffusion policies while keeping both theoret-
ical perspectives in mind. The assessment criteria concerns the strength of the policy
rationale, the appropriate use of policy instruments, and the impact of the policy with
respect to its stated objectives. Clearly, the SGIG subsidies and active state support for
smart meters have increased both the rate and level of smart meter diffusion, but it is
less clear if such policies have been warranted or implemented in the best way. It is
debatable whether the push for smart meters has been an appropriate policy goal or,
alternatively, if the push has been premature.
The most effective smart meter diffusion policies to pursue depend on specific
policy objectives, market contexts, and timing (Zhang 2010; Zhang and Nuttall 2011;
Rixen and Weigand 2014). The main goal of all the smart meter diffusion policies in
the United States has been to enhance the flexibility of the demand side in electricity
markets at times of peak demand through demand response and dynamic pricing pro-
grams. These policies have emphasized large-scale smart meter deployments so that
smart meters are used for residential customers in addition to commercial and indus-
trial customers. Pilot projects, however, have typically preceded mass deployments.
Such a strategy emphasizes a mix of policy instruments where learning is subsidized
first to ascertain the costs and benefits of adoption and then, if found beneficial, finan-
cial incentives of some kind are enacted to facilitate mass deployment. Smart meter
adoption may be beneficial for some utilities but not for others, depending on local con-
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ditions, consumer preferences, and ability of consumers to shift load from on-peak to
off-peak times.
The SGIG program subsidized both adoption costs and learning through match-
ing funds. To be considered for funds a utility was required to submit an application
involving the rationale for adoption, connections to smart grid functions, expected uses,
expected costs and benefits of deployment, a detailed deployment plan, a plan for as-
sessing technology performance, and a plan for further expansion. Grant recipients
were competitively selected based on the merit of the applications. Recipients were also
required to report on activities, progress, and lessons learned throughout deployment
timelines. This knowledge was then aggregated across utilities through case studies and
reporting as a mean to diffuse knowledge to the industry as a whole (DOE 2016a, 2016c,
2017b).
The nature of the SGIG program, through the application process and the match-
ing funds, was arguably well designed in that it led to a self-selection process for utili-
ties that expected smart meters to be profitable investments and integrated into larger
smart grid projects. Because the application required detailed plans, the grant process
ensured that only utilities with thoughtful plans would receive subsidies. Additionally,
because the grants were matching funds, it ensured a certain level of commitment to
using smart meters by leveraging utility funds. The SGIG to some extent also recog-
nized that utilities are different in their characteristics by specifying a generic subsidy
of 50% of program costs as opposed to a set level of funds. The design of the program
accounts for the heterogeneity of utility characteristics by considering the diverse needs,
abilities, costs and capital vintages, and regulatory environments of utilities, empha-
sized in probit and evolutionary theories of diffusion. Those utilities that desired to use
smart meters could apply and potentially receive funding if selected, but those that did
not want to use smart meters were not forced to use them. The requirements, however,
could operate on unobserved heterogeneity in that only utilities that had the capacity to
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apply for funds and comply with the reporting requirements applied for and received
funds. This could have perhaps biased the grants away from smaller utilities who did
not have such capacity, but the program was likely targeted toward larger utilities any-
way.
The SGIG program also invested in learning as a means to reduce uncertainty
about technology performance and encourage continued investment in smart grid tech-
nologies after the program ended. The SGIG program also subsidized learning through
the reporting of lessons learned in smart meter deployments and the consumer behavior
studies that examined the effects of time-varying rates on consumption patterns. The
results from the Sacramento Municipal Utility District study were positive enough to
encourage implementation of default time-of-use rates for residential customers in the
near future, which also influenced the same policy for the state of California as a whole.
Additionally, although the SGIG deployed a relatively small number of customer de-
vices, the behavioral studies showed more demand reduction with such devices. The
SGDP also subsidized learning through smart grid demonstration projects involving
smart meters. Through public-private partnerships with smart grid technology vendors,
these smart grid programs also helped to mature the industry (DOE 2016b, 2016c).
Other aspects of the Recovery Act smart grid programs may be critiqued. It may
be considered odd, for example, to simultaneously subsidize large deployments of smart
meters while funding research into their effects on consumer behavior, because these
effects can be important factors in cost-benefit evaluations. In addition, although the
Recovery Act also provided support for the development of technological standards
and cybersecurity guidelines related to smart meters, it may also be considered odd to
simultaneously subsidize large deployments of smart meters before these important
standards and guidelines are in place. At the same time, SGIG grant recipients were
required to address interoperability, security, and privacy concerns in their smart meter
deployment plans, and the two-way communication function of smart meters allows
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software updates as new standards and security protocols are developed. These cri-
tiques point to a possible tension between the Recovery Act’s goals of macroeconomic
stability in the short-run through “shovel-ready” projects and investment in infrastruc-
ture for long-run growth and technology that is not yet mature (MITEI 2011, 197–234;
Aldy 2013; CEA 2016; DOE 2016b, 2016c).
In critiquing smart meter diffusion policies, the main issues with the market fail-
ure approach is the identification of the socially optimal diffusion path for smart meters.
There has been uncertainty associated with the actual costs and benefits of adoption,
including both the private costs and benefits for utilities and the social costs and bene-
fits for electricity consumers and society as a whole. The costs are mostly up front and
many of the benefits are long-term but not guaranteed, such as those from demand re-
sponse. Although some uncertainty has been reduced over time as smart meters have
been deployed in large numbers across the country, uncertainty persists and has led to
diverging opinions about how beneficial smart meters actually are. The benefits ulti-
mately depend on how smart meters are used, such as for demand response programs
and integration with other smart grid technologies. The social benefits and the privacy
and security costs are difficult to quantify, in part because of these uncertainties. These
complexities prompt a need for regulatory oversight and governance throughout smart
meter deployments (EPRI 2008a; Neenan and Hemphill 2008; NETL 2008; Haney, Ja-
masb, and Pollitt 2009; McHenry 2013; Leiva, Palacios, and Aguado 2016).
There has been pushback from consumer advocates and even some utilities ques-
tioning the cost-benefit evaluations. Some of this pushback from residential consumers
has related to the perceived negative health effects of wireless transmission of consump-
tion data from smart meters, and this has led to fee-based opt-out programs in some
states for consumers who do not want smart meters installed on their homes. Addition-
ally, the lifespan of smart meters is expected to be 10–15 years with potential for obso-
lescence as the technology changes and improves, which could impose additional costs.
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The more forceful arguments against smart meters, however, relate to a general lack of
consumer interest in smart meters and time-varying rate programs. Because subscrip-
tions to time-varying rate programs have not diffused nearly as widely as have smart
meters, many of the benefits associated with demand response that have been used to
justify deployments have not yet been realized in most cases. These benefits are often
necessary to return positive net benefits (EEI 2006b, 2006a; Neenan and Hemphill 2008;
Haney, Jamasb, and Pollitt 2009; Faruqui, Harris, and Hledik 2010; IEE 2011; MITEI
2011, 132–137; Cook et al. 2012).
After the large deployments of smart meters in Texas, in 2013 only 0.8% of cus-
tomers with smart meters had accessed the Smart Meters Texas web portal to view their
consumption data and only 0.2% of customers had connected their smart meters to
some kind of automation device like a smart thermostat. This apparent lack of interest
may result from lack of funds and emphasis on customer education and engagement
concerning smart meters. Ease of access to smart meter data and market design may
also be important factors (SPEER 2014). Other states found that large-scale deployments
of smart meters were not cost-effective. Such analysis and critiques have even found
their way into the popular press regionally (Galbraith 2012; Starkman 2013; Turkel 2015;
Finnerty 2016) and nationally (Smith 2009; Wald 2009, 2014; Vergano 2011; Chediak 2012;
Guerrini 2014; Mooney 2015). To some extent, this uncertainty also likely reflects that
the benefits from demand response vary in different contexts, as a result of climate and
load profiles or the generation mix, for example. Dynamic pricing may not necessarily
have environmental improvements, and flatenning peak demand may increase depen-
dence on fossil-fueled baseload generation (Holland and Mansur 2008; Ata, Duran, and
İşlegen 2016). Policy support, then, may be suitable in some areas but not others.
The benefits of smart meters from demand response seem to be more uncertain
than initially thought, resting on the uncertain behavior of consumers. A major part of
the uncertainty in demand response benefits surrounds the debate as to whether or not
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residential consumers have sizable enough loads to reduce during peak demand, re-
spond to dynamic pricing, or are interested enough in such programs. Because the ben-
efits from demand response are typically necessary to make smart meters cost-effective,
the behavioral research on consumer response to smart meter consumption feedback
and time-varying pricing is important to consider. While much of the behavioral re-
search finds that consumers do respond to dynamic pricing by shifting consumption,
this research has often suffered experimental design problems such as small samples
and self-selection bias (Davis et al. 2013). The level of peak demand and overall energy
reductions has declined in studies over time as a result of better design (Torriti 2016,
61–82).
The consumer behavior studies that were part of certain SGIG smart meter de-
ployments were an attempt to provide a more rigorous design through randomized and
controlled trials to assess demand reductions. All studies relied on opt-in programs and
two also compared results to opt-out programs. The key findings from these studies
were that opt-out programs maintained higher enrollments but lower peak demand
reductions than opt-in programs, automated control technologies led to more peak de-
mand reductions than in their absence and were cost-effective, consumers were largely
not interested in in-home displays, and demand reductions depended on the on-peak to
off-peak price ratios. Additionally, continual engagement was found to be necessary to
maintain customer interest in the long-term (DOE 2016b). These findings are consistent
with other research, which also highlight the limitations and unintended consequences
of consumption feedback (Hargreaves, Nye, and Burgess 2013; Buchanan, Russo, and
Anderson 2014, 2015).
These findings collectively suggest that the benefits attributed to smart meters
from demand response may be lower and the costs higher than anticipated, potentially
calling into question the cost-effectiveness of deploying smart meters to most or all
residential consumers if the operational benefits to utilities are not sufficient. This is es-
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pecially true if the majority of the benefits from demand response come from a minority
of customers. Emphasizing residential customers is important because, as depicted in
Figure 16, the growth of smart meter use results from expanding their use to residential
customers. This imposes substantial costs compared to only industrial and commer-
cial customers. There are also concerns about the ability of some consumers to respond
to dynamic pricing, raising the issue of fairness. It is likely true, however, that even
customers who do not particpate in dynamic pricing programs can benefit from the
positive externalities generated by those customers who do participate, reducing peak
demand and therefore the associated avoided costs. These concerns can be overcome
with proper design of dynamic pricing programs and customer engagement, taking into
account the complex distribution of costs and benefits (Borenstein, Jaske, and Rosenfeld
2002; GAO 2004; Alexander 2010; Brand 2010; Faruqui 2010; Felder 2010; Hanser 2010;
Hogan 2010; Levinson 2010; Faruqui and Palmer 2011; Léautier 2014).
The lack of residential consumer interest in demand response and dynamic pric-
ing programs could also be a failure to effectively engage customers or coordinate poli-
cies. This has arguably been the experience in Texas (SPEER 2014) and elsewhere (Mur-
ray and Hawley 2016). Customer engagement can ensure that smart meter deployments
and demand response programs are both fair and effective and targeted to those who
are willing and able to participate (Honebein, Cammarano, and Donnelly 2009; Alexan-
der 2010; Brand 2010; Honebein 2010). The deployment of smart meters has largely not
been matched with the adoption of time-varying rates, despite a long history of inter-
est and countless pilot projects in the industry. This is starting to improve, however, as
California and Massachussets are set to adopt time-of-use rates for residential customers
as the default rate in the near future. Additionally, complementary policies related to
customer choice and the adoption of data privacy and sharing programs like the Green
Button Initiative are also relevant (SPEER 2014; Lazar and Gonzalez 2015).
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Another interesting issue is the potential for leveraging existing AMR meters
for dynamic pricing. One SGDP pilot project investigated the possibilities and found
that it was technically possible to use AMR meters for such purposes at a substantially
lower cost compared to AMI meters. They were found to not always be reliable, but im-
provements in technology have overcome the issues encountered. The communication
system and meter data management system components of AMI were found likely to
be needed to effectively enable dynamic pricing on a wide scale. The communication
system may also be used for other smart grid purposes, which AMR could not provide.
Additionally, the project found loss of interest in dynamic pricing programs over time.
Therefore, AMR-enabled demand response programs would only be useful for inter-
ested customers who could be expected to reduce their on-peak consumption (Navigant
Consulting 2014).
On the cost side, there are also uncertainties related to smart meter standards,
data privacy, and cybersecurity. Some utilities adopted smart meters prior to the devel-
opment of key standards, like interoperability, and therefore incurred either reduced
benefits from limited capabilities or increased costs to replace meters. Smart meter data
can reveal detailed information on household activities, raising concerns of surveillance
and targeted home invasion. Because the data is typically transmitted wirelessly to a
utility, the data can potentially be intercepted by an unauthorized third party. Data
can also be intercepted through unauthorized physical access to the meter. There has
also been ambiguity as to who owns smart meter data, posing legal issues. In addition,
unauthorized access to smart meter software can allow a third party to manipulate data
records and send false information to grid operators. Although there has been policy
action around these issues, privacy and security measures have not kept up with the
pace of smart meter deployments and the smart grid as a whole (CRS 2011, 2012; GAO
2011; Makovich 2011; Urban 2016).
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Policy that supports a technology too soon is one of the concerns of evolutionary
perspectives on technology diffusion. Such support may lock-in technology choices to
an inferior technology. For smart meters, the idea of avoiding evolutionary inefficiencies
is not immediately applicable because smart meters are capable of performing the same
functions as the prior AMR meters. These competing metering technologies are not dis-
tinct in that sense. There is not necessarily a possibility of industry-wide lock-in, but
individual utilities can be locked-in for a time because smart meters are long-lasting cap-
ital investments. The issue here, then, is unnecessary costs, including the opportunity
cost of investment funds, if smart meters are not as beneficial as hoped.
The issues raised here suggest that the push for smart meters has been too fast.
In the push for smart grids, too much attention appears to have been given to the ben-
efits and not enough to the costs, and many of the proclaimed benefits have not yet
materialized. Consumers appear not to be interested enough in demand response pro-
grams and will not necessarily benefit from smart grid technologies in the short-run,
and there may be cheaper technical alternatives to smart meters for those who are. Ad-
ditionally, cybersecurity and privacy concerns have not been adequately addressed. The
deployment of smart meters and smart grid technologies has arguably been too fast at
the level seen because of still evolving technology. Some states like Pennsylvania and
Connecticut, however, in pushing for smart meters have been flexible in deployment
timelines by requiring a certain level of deployment within 10–15 years that takes ac-
count of learning as well as vintage effects. The smart grid should be a more gradual
evolution of the electric power industry where concern is taken to understand the im-
plications of smart grid technology, and consequently public policy should be more
cautious (Brennan 2004; Levinson 2010; Makovich 2011; Blumsack and Fernandez 2012;
McHenry 2013). Additionally, these issues highlight that the market failure approach to
diffusion policy is difficult to implement in practice when technology diffusion is a re-
sult of supply and demand interactions and when the technology is changing over time.
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They also highlight the need for diffusion theory and the theory of diffusion policy to
consider complementary technology use.
If the push for smart meters has been too fast because of uncertain costs and
benefits, then this suggests that smart meter diffusion policies should have put more
emphasis on learning before committing to large deployments with the aid of adoption
subsidies. Diffusion policies oriented toward learning about the costs and benefits of
smart grid technologies should lead to more rigorous and better designed pilot projects,
helping to reduce uncertainty. From a systems perspective, policy could also support the
absorptive capacity of utilities related to technology adoption and encourage learning
networks for knowledge diffusion. The absence of absorptive capacity and learning net-
works can be barriers to knowledge, thus impeding the effective adoption of technology
(Kelley and Brooks 1991; Attewell 1992; Williams, Stewart, and Slack 2005). Policy aimed
at absorptive capacity could provide support to the legacy Electric Power Research In-
stitute or to alternative institutions, accounting for the diversity of utility characteristics,
needs, and market environments.
Because R&D is also linked to learning on both the supply and demand sides
of new technology, an integrated policy design that connects and balances generation
and diffusion is also needed in the electric power industry as grid modernization pro-
ceeds (Sagar and Zwaan 2006; Weiss and Bonvillian 2009; Sivaram 2017). R&D and
learning-by-doing on the supply side improve the supply of new technology, and R&D
and learning-by-using on the demand side improve the demand for new technology.
Discussions of research, development, demonstration, and deployment (RDD&D), how-
ever, are not uncommon in the energy industry, reflecting at least some understanding
of the connections between traditional R&D and diffusion. In the electric power industry
specifically, utilities perform relatively little R&D compared to equipment suppliers and
other industries. The liberalization of electricity markets has also reduced R&D activities
by utilities. Policy is needed to reverse this trend in order to solve the challenges of grid
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modernization, climate change, and other policy goals while taking into account the na-
ture and variety of market structures and regulation (Jamasb and Pollitt 2008, 2011, 2015;
Sanyal and Cohen 2009; Sanyal and Ghosh 2013). The nature of regulation may also
need to change to accomodate new technologies (Kiesling 2009; Praetorius et al. 2009;
Costello 2012; Costello 2016a, 2016b; Römer et al. 2012; Schiavo et al. 2013; Katz 2014;
MITEI 2016; Shomali and Pinkse 2016). Further research and data collection is needed
to analyze the actors, institutions, and networks in the innovation system of the electric
power industry, and the energy sector more broadly, in order to inform policy making in
this area (Sagar and Holdren 2002; Gallagher, Holdren, and Sagar 2006; Gallagher et al.
2012).
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION
The analysis in this dissertation concerns the early diffusion of smart electricity
meters in the United States. Public policy and regulation have supported the adoption
of smart meters by utilities in the United States, principally as a means to foster demand
response in electricity markets. Using a panel dataset and econometric models, I ana-
lyzed the determinants of the early diffusion of smart meters in the US electric power
industry. These models were informed by theories of technological diffusion as well
as the history and institutional context of the electric power industry. In addition, I as-
sessed smart meter diffusion policies in the United States as informed by theories of
diffusion policy.
8.1 Key Findings
The key findings of the empirical analysis in this dissertation include the impor-
tance of policy and regulation, utility characteristics like size, ownership, and capital
vintages, as well as some combination of learning, cost reductions, and technology stan-
dards as determinants in the diffusion of smart meters. These findings were consistent
across the interfirm and intrafirm dimensions of adoption, implying that decisions to
adopt and at what level to adopt have been considered jointly by utilities and deter-
mined by the same set of factors. In the absence of public policy support for smart me-
ter adoption, it is likely that the rate and level of smart meter diffusion would be lower
than has occurred. This finding is consistent with previous research (Zhou and Matisoff
2016), but I also find that utility characteristics and some combination of learning, cost
reductions, and technology standards are important determinants.
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Public policy support for smart meter diffusion, at both the state and federal
levels, is primarily based on the desire to enhance demand response activities in electric-
ity markets and to deploy an initial technological foundation for smart grids. Whether
or not policy support for smart meters has been warranted, or has been implemented
in the best way or at the right time, is another issue to consider. Although there is a
rationale for smart meter diffusion policies, based on the social benefits from demand
response, they are not generalizable. Some utilities or regions may benefit more from
smart meters than others. The timing of diffusion policies is especially important to
consider. A reasonable argument can be made that some smart meter diffusion poli-
cies, in the form of state policy or regulatory support as well as the Recovery Act SGIG
subsidies, were premature. The costs and benefits of smart meter adoption have been
more uncertain than initially thought, and a substantial level of smart meter adoption
occurred before the development of important technology standards related to cyberse-
curity and interoperability.
The analysis covered in this dissertation concerned the time period 2007–2014. In
2015 and 2016 there were reported slowdowns in smart meter deployments, based on
utility deployment announcements, that have been attributed to the end of the Recovery
Act funds. The diffusion of smart meters appears to be growing again, however, as ma-
jor utility deployments begin in states like New York and Massachusetts that have not
yet adopted at extensive levels. It is predicted that smart meters will grow to 90 million
meters in 2020, roughly 70% of the electricity metering stock in the United States (IEI
2016a).
8.2 International Comparisons
The diffusion of smart meters varies across countries. The United States has not
adopted smart meters as quickly as other developed countries. Some of the major users
of smart meters globally include Italy, Sweden, Finland, the United Kingdom, Germany,
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Ontario (Canada), and Victoria (Australia). Italy was an early adopter of smart meters
and ran into technical problems as a result, increasing the cost of adoption. In contrast,
Germany chose to focus on renewable generation of electricity instead and is now be-
ginning to deploy smart meters, in part because of lessons learned about the constraints
on the power grid from intermittent generation sources for which smart meters can
help. The United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia have also seen pushback against
government-led smart meter deployments similar to that experienced in the United
States. Public policy has aided the diffusion of smart meters in many of these countries,
although different instruments have been used to varying success (Haney, Jamasb, and
Pollitt 2009; Zhang 2010; Brown and Zhou 2013). In Europe, after a push from the Eu-
ropean Commission in 2009 to deploy smart meters, mass deployments were found to
be cost-effective in the majority of European Union member countries and large scale
deployments then commenced. It is predicted that more than 200 million meters will be
deployed in Europe by 2020, roughly 72% of the electricity metering stock in Europe (EC
2014).
8.3 Future Research
Future research related to the topic of this dissertation could cover a number of
areas. The econometric evidence presented here could be complemented with evidence
from case studies, in-depth interviews, and mixed-method studies in order to gain a
better understanding of the decision-making processes within utilities with respect to
metering technology adoption and technology choice more generally (Metcalfe and
Boden 2003; Preece 1995; Tidd 2010b; Dedrick et al. 2015). Qualitative research would
be especially informative for how the interaction between investor-owned utilities and
the regulatory process influences technology adoption decisions. Understanding the
specific reasons why smart meters are being adopted or not adopted, beyond a vague
profitability explanation, would give new insight into the subjective aspects of utility
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management, changing utility business models, and utility strategy, particularly with
respect to grid modernization. Detailed knowledge of how and why technology choices
are made within utilities can also aid the construction and implementation of diffusion
policies. Moreover, the specific ways in which smart meters are actually being used, as
well as the variation in this use among utilities, would also be useful in assessing the
actual benefits of smart meters and their impact on productivity (EPRI 2013). Additional
evidence from such research would help triangulate the relative impacts of learning,
cost reductions, and technology standards on the diffusion of smart meters that could
not be separated in the econometric methods of this dissertation. Other research could
examine the complementary adoption of smart grid technologies. Because the adoption
of technologies is in part creative, requires adaptation, and is influenced by firm strategy
(Attewell 1992; Antonelli 2006), adoption decisions can often be complementary and
path dependent as a result of the cumulative nature of the knowledge base within firms
(Colombo and Mosconi 1995; Arvanitis and Hollenstein 2001).
In general, regulation can impact innovation activities and therefore regulation
can also be an instrument of innovation policy (Blind 2010). State policy and regulation
was found to be an important determinant in smart meter diffusion, so the interaction
between the regulatory process and technological change in the electric power industry
should receive more attention in research. Technological change is important because it
enables new value creation opportunities and associated markets. Because smart meters
and other smart grid technologies reduce the transaction costs associated with buying
and selling electricity in real time, dynamic retail markets can emerge that are more
closely integrated with wholesale markets. Smart grid technologies and dynamic retail
markets combined with advancement in distributed generation and storage technologies
could even lead to decentralized coordination of electricity markets. Radical technolog-
ical change in the industry, however, is hampered by customer, utility, and regulatory
inertia, resulting in a status quo bias. Investments in smart grid technologies that re-
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duce capital and operational costs require a different set of regulatory instruments to
incentivize adoption, especially when the costs are upfront and the benefits are realized
in the long term. The industry itself has also recongized that the regulatory model is
in need of change. The conventional cost-of-service regulatory model as informed by a
static view of markets from neoclassical economics could be complemented by an alter-
native regulatory model informed by a more dynamic view of markets from evolution-
ary economics. An evolutionary perspective would aim to reorient regulation toward
a more adaptive mindset in a constantly changing technology space. Additionally, the
coordination of policies at different levels of government and across related issues is
important to consider (Munson and Kaarsberg 1998; Hirsh and Sovacool 2006; Kiesling
2009; Praetorius et al. 2009; MITEI 2011, 2016; NSTC 2011; Römer et al. 2012; Brown and
Zhou 2013; Schiavo et al. 2013; McHenry 2013; Katz 2014; Marques, Bento, and Costa
2014; Guo, Bond, and Narayanan 2015; Zhou and Matisoff 2016).
Future research could also include analysis of the nature of innovation in the
electric power industry, both from a technological and institutional perspective. Smart
grids can be considered a technological paradigm in which the industry focuses its in-
novative efforts to solve problems, but there are competing visions, or technological
trajectories, of where and how smart grid technology should be developed (Dosi 1982).
The concepts of the supergrid and transactive energy can be considered two such trajec-
tories on opposing extremes. States differ in their specific goals and visions for shaping
electricity markets and comparative institutional analyses would be helpful in under-
standing directions of technological change. The shaping of electricity markets can be
interpreted within the conceptual framework of public sector entrepreneurship (Ley-
den and Link 2015), and future research should investigate the implications of this for
technological change in the electric power industry. More research could address the
relationships among market structure and regulation and innovative capacity. Addition-
ally, studies of the quantity and quality of R&D in the industry as well as the energy
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innovation system as a whole would also be informative. Such analyses could help un-
derstand barriers to innovation, predict the direction of technical change, and reveal the
institutions and policies that influence paths of innovation toward certain desired ends
(Gallagher, Holdren, and Sagar 2006; Kiesling 2009; Praetorius et al. 2009; Gallagher et al.
2012).
The future of the electric grid in the United States is in flux and will likely change
in different regions and at different times. Information and communication technolo-
gies, like smart meters, are at the heart of this change by enabling new capabilities and
thereby new markets. They will continue to play a pivotal role in shaping the rate and
direction of technical change in the electric power industry.
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